WMD,
UN, and Weapons
Inspectors
Updated 12/19/2005
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| Also see "Allies/UN" FAQ Section, "Allies Who Veto" and "Was the War Inevitable?" FAQ section | |
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1. Why
have WMD not been found? What were the Weapons Inspectors
finding and reporting? (Also
see P.S. FAQ section for updates.) Before the war, undersecretary Defense Douglas Feith foreshadowed problems in his Senate testimony in mid-February. According to The New York Times, "getting at the stockpiles of WMD would be a 'complex, dangerous, and expensive task.'" In his interview with Dan Rather in late-February 2003, President Hussein said he would not destroy the missiles which have been determined by the UN to fly further than allowed. This was seen as a key issue in the likely UN vote for the second resolution. In a typical pattern, Hussein's tough talk was soon followed some of the missiles being destroyed. The Progressive editor Matthew Rothschild provided this perspective: "The inspectors asked for unimpeded access to sites, anywhere and anytime. They got that." They asked to "talk with scientists alone and they got that, too." They also got aerial surveillance. "Big deal, said Powell." Powell was not satisfied with the delay in scientist interviews or the actually number of interviews given. In fact, Powell said, "These are all process issues. They are all tricks...more inspections--sorry, it's not the answer. What we need is immediate cooperation...Resolution 1441 was not about inspections. [It] was about the disarmament of Iraq... We got 12,000 pages. Nobody in this council can say that that was a full, complete or accurate document... And now...I have heard nothing to suggest that they have filled in the gaps in the declaration, or they have added new evidence that should give us any comfort..." He thinks many more scientist should already have been interviewed. and "we haven't accounted for the anthrax...botulism, VX" and others. Powell concluded, force should always be a last resort. "I have preached this for most of my professional life as a soldier and as a diplomat; but it must be a resort . We cannot allow this process to be endlessly strung out, as Iraq is trying to do right now. My friends, they cannot be allowed to get away with it again."
President Bush, trying to shift the burden since the UN resolution, demands that Iraq must provide evidence that is does not have leftover WMD from the '90s and actually lead inspectors to those sites, as well as make available for interview all people who worked on the weapons. (See Question below). Senator Shelby (R-AL) of the Senate Intelligence Committee, calls the declaration "a bogus report" because it fails to account for missing mustard gas shells from the early '90s and Hussein's alleged attempt to purchase uranium. U.S. officials and to some extent Blix further claim the Iraq document also leaves out proof of destruction of 26,000 tons of anthrax, long-range missiles, mustard gas shells, "150 aerial bombs, 200 tons of complex growth media, and 200 tons of VX chemical." In the past, weapons inspectors found more than was declared. Also, the administration says that at least 2000 pages of the report are an exact copy of an earlier document. The Washington Post provides a detailed analysis of "nuggets and lies" in "Gold Mine or Minefield." Inspectors have trouble finding biological weapons. Biological weapons can be hidden in a petri dish in a refrigerator. As Donald Rumsfeld said in July 2002, "A biological laboratory can be on wheels in a trailer..." (NYTimes, 7/31/02). An anthrax facility could be "presented as an animal feed plant" (Chicago Tribune, 11/10/02). 2.
In the two months between President Bush's (9/5/02) UN speech and the passage of
the UN resolution (11/8/02), what were the key events, comments, and accusations?
The Washington Post realized that Hussein would never have agreed without Bush's forceful UN speech but warned the administration not to return to its "unilateral course" ("The Inspections Trap", 9/18/02). Post writer Glenn Kessler pointed out the "the diplomatic dance over inspections obscures the larger context of the debate in the UN: the administration appears to view the inspections process as a path to war, while Iraq and other nation [especially Russia and France] hope to use inspections to thwart war" (10/2/02). The Guardian's Julian Borger, felt that the first U.S. inspections proposal "is clearly an unworkable plan, but that too may be deliberate" (10/3/02. In "A Dangerous Game", The Nation's Richard Falk realized that "The Iraqi acceptance...offers the administration a graceful way to defuse the crisis and move on, but is it flexible enough to seize the opportunity?" (10/7/02). "The administration views UN approval...like the option of air conditioning in a car: nice to have, but the vehicle will move just fine without it." These priorities were seen as consistent with the fall 2002 unveiled national security strategy on pre-emption (Chicago Tribune, 10/12/02). Iraq foreign minister Naji Sabri, days before the resolution passed, was asked if Iraq would accept it. He replied, "This is not a UN resolution. this is a declaration of war on the UN and on Iraq' (Chicago Tribune, 11/4/02). Later reaction to the October 7, 2002 prime time speech (full text). include: the amazingly detailed and provocative point-by-point analysis from the Institute for Public Accuracy, an examination of the veracity of Bush's claims against Iraq, a view that inspections will only lead to invasion, the Post editorial "Fear, Justice, and War", suggesting the war could be called, "A war to end all fear", and BBC special on the public's reaction to the speech. (Also see "Inevitable" FAQ section). Thomas Friedman wrote that President Bush "has to be ready to take yes for an answer from Saddam, and give him a chance to comply...if we want to retain allied and U.S. public support" ("Chicken a l'Iraq", 10/29/02). "Give inspectors a chance," pleaded chief nuclear inspector Mohammed El Baradei in his Washington Post Op-ed (10/21/02). "The best way to establish the facts is through the return of inspectors." He also predicted in the first week of inspections that it would take his nuclear team "probably around a year before we can come to a reasonable conclusion" (The Guardian, 12/2/02). Looking back at the 1441 debate, Powell recalled in his last pre-war press conference that, "it is absolutely clear that [France] understood that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime had [WMD]. It is not something just known to American intelligence, it's known to all the major intelligence agencies in the world" (NYTimes, 3/17). Some administration officials told the New York Times privately that "they suspect that Mr. Bush was toning down his talk of removing the Iraqi leader, by force if necessary, to mollify nervous allies on the day that the U.S. and British began circulation a revised resolution in the Security Council." The revision "aimed at ending the month -long deadlock" and was realized on October 22 with the message, "You are either with us or against us," said an administration official (NYTimes, 10/24/02). A few days later the President urged the UN not to look "foolish" and wonder whether the Security Council had "'the will or the courage' to enforce its own resolutions'" (NYTimes, 10/29/02). On October 23, the Post editorial "Let the UN vote" criticized "Franco-Russian obstructionism" In late October, Russia did seem to be the most serious veto threat for the early November vote. The unanimous passage of Resolution 1441 on November 8 was "a high point in the [diplomatic] campaign" (AP,. 3/17). (Also see "Should We Have Gone to War?" FAQ section, #2) 3. What were the key events and comments at UN and U.S. between the November 8 UN resolution and December 7 Iraqi declaration? Some UN members were more hesitant of war after the UN resolution. Reaction around the world has varied.
In early December the Chicago Tribune headline called out, "Bush doubts Iraqi compliance," thought Iraq had not yet released its declaration. "Any act of delay, deception or defiance will prove that Saddam Hussein has not accepted the path of compliance and has rejected the path of peace", threatened the President on December 2. In anticipation of this document, Bush further warned, "That declaration must be credible and complete or the Iraqi dictator will have demonstrated to the world once again that he has chosen not to change his behavior. Americans seek peace in this world...War is the last option" (Washington Post, 12/2/02). Looking back at November 2002 from the perspective of the eve of war, a French official recalls that the passage of the resolution, a high-water mark for Powell, seemed to upset U.S. officials, for whom the passage "should have been a happy moment. But the Americans saw it as a setback. They showed they never wanted the inspections to work" (NYTimes, 3/17). In Romania in late November Bush drew this historical analogy, as described by the Post: the duel of Hussein and global terrorism as compared to" the oppression of Nazism and communism, telling citizens in two eastern European countries that the newest dangers facing the world will meet the same fate..." (11/24/02).
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said on September 24, "We are damned if we do [let inspectors back] and damned if we don't...It doesn't matter; we'll get hit." The New York Times analyzes how Iraq is being tested On November 13 Iraq shocked much of the world by agreeing to the return of inspectors. They did so with a letter which included the assurance that "Iraq has not developed [WMD] as claimed by evil people. The lies and manipulation of the American administration and British government will be exposed..." (NYTimes, 11/14/02). Vice President Ramadan felt that weapons inspections were only "to provide better... more precise information for a coming aggression" (Chicago Tribune, 12/5/02). In the week after the UN November resolution, the Iraqi foreign minister Sabri's letter to Secretary Annan was poetic yet harsh: "You may recall the huge clamor fabricated by the president of the U.S. administration in the most wicked slander against Iraq, supported in malicious intent and spearheaded in word and malevolence by his lackey Tony Blair. The American government may stab the truth with the dagger of evil... He who remains silent in the defense of truth is a dumb devil." The Guardian's Brian Whitaker looked at three Iraqi complaints of inspectors, all of which could be legitimate: inspectors used as cover for spies, as occurred in the '90s, abuse of inspections to trigger a new confrontation, inspections going on indefinitely without the lifting of sanctions (9/10/02). Later, The Guardian updates and summarizes the UN/Iraq situation with 10 FAQs in mid November. Bill Keller's cleverly titled "What to Expect
When You're Inspecting" (NYTimes, 10/16/02) realized that in
waiting for the Iraq weapons declaration, "We are not going to war
just yet. We are going to inspect. That is why the cheerleaders
of the new imperialism--The Weekly Standard, The Washington Times, The
Wall Street Journal editorial page--are uneasy. They worry that
Mr. Bush has been Blixed." but the Hawks have a stake in giving
inspections time to work, explains Keller, with five reasons: Under the UN agreement of November 8, Iraq must
accept the resolutions terms by November 15, send the UN its weapons report
by December 8, and let inspectors begin by December 23. In early
November, most Americans surely doubted that all three of deadlines would
be met. Would
that be a cause for war? The language "serious
consequences" is not UN code for enforcement action. Rather,
that term is "all necessary means". Would a future war be
sanctioned by the UN without a second resolution? The December 8 2002 declaration was to be of any and all of its WMD programs, research, missiles, and possible dual use civilian products. The administration carefully read the document, especially the new section in Arabic, to judge the veracity of these claims: The Iraqi weapons report, released a day early on December 7, despite worries that they did not have enough time to finish it. The controversial report runs about 12,000 pages, and was to take at least 17 experts in New York (chemical and biological) and Vienna (nuclear) about two weeks to read and analyze it. "Judging Iraq's Response" is the Washington Post's immediate response to the declaration. "If Iraq sticks to their story that they have no WMD, [this means] that they feel that war is inevitable and so why give away anything" (David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security). One assumes that if Hussein did have WMD he probably wouldn't admit so (because the U.S. wouldn't believe he had declared all of them and because he would want to use them in the coming war) and if he did not have WMD he certainly wouldn't admit that he did. So, was it realistic to expect Hussein to declare any WMD? For more on Blix, see #13. and
the article "World
divides under the strain." 4. What should we make of Iraq's 12,000 page December 7, 2002 weapons declaration? What evidence does the US have?
In his December 20 press conference, Powell labeled the report a "material breach", mostly due to its recycled information, omissions of evidence and lack of documentation that weapons were destroyed in the early '90s. Using phrases which suggested the U.S. has no direct evidence, the Secretary of State often described Iraqi weapons using the phrase "could have produced" or "can be used to". Concluded Powell, "We have seen this game again and again...This time the game is not working...The burden remains on Iraq to prove..." (See complete Powell text). U.S. allies refused to use the label "material breach", which is a term widely interpreted as a prelude to war, following the UN resolution language. Comments The Guardian on Powell's hard line: "The man credited with preventing the U.S. from unilateral action...yesterday appeared to [transform] from a leading White House dove to born-again warrior." The New York Times editorial "Iraqi Stonewalling" seeks hard evidence before going to war. (12/20/02). Most European countries sought more proof of WMD rather than just omissions in the declaration.
Other critics of the declaration claim, "In his 12,000 page report to the UN, Saddam has written the longest suicide note in history." Bush claims that he wouldn't go to war just over a report with gaps. Iraqi advisers responded that the U.S. "is worried because there is nothing that they can pin on us. All their statements were mere allegations, not supported by evidence...The U.S. is looking for a pretext to attack....The U.S. has made it clear that the issue is not disarmament but to change the legitimate government of Iraq." The Chicago Tribune (Dec. 20) comments that some U.S. allies "have questioned the White House motives for not sharing the intelligence" with the inspectors. Added Spokesman Ari Fleisher, "Iraq is lying," but provided no evidence. In response to Blix's Jan. 9 report, Fleisher quipped, "The problem with guns that are hidden is you can't see their smoke." Challenges Iraqi General Amir Saadi, "If they have anything to the contrary, let them forthwith came up with it." Does the U.S. have secret evidence of these weapons? Is there a "smoking gun"? In December and January before the Powell UN speech, the administration was giving mixed signals, claiming it is worried about "compromising sources and methods." Must Iraq prove it no longer has weapons or must the U.S. prove that it does have them? The New York Times editorial advises the President, "Many people still doubt whether Saddam Hussein is hiding banned weapons or poses a threat. In the coming weeks, the administration needs to make more of the evidence it has available, both to inspectors and to the public." As if in response, the administration started privately making some evidence available to inspectors soon after this editorial.
One official in December said that the U.S. was already preparing a list of material breaches "Which, though none may necessarily constitute a casus belli alone, will together amount to one." (Observor/UK, 12/22/02). 5. What
was the U2 spy plane issue? Were Iraqi missiles a "material
breach"? Some Al Samoud 2 Iraqi missiles were discovered by inspectors that could have once had chemical warheads attached to them. Blix's determined that the missiles violated UN mandates by traveling about 10 miles too far; see map for their range (and scroll) (WashPost, 2/13/03). For a few weeks, Hussein adamantly refused to destroy them, saying they did not fly as far as the UN believed. The Washington Post reported in late February that the decision to destroy the missiles could have a large impact on France's views. Meanwhile, the New York Times reported that "At first, the U.S. cited the missiles as proof that Iraq would not disarm. Then, after Iraq had signaled that it might comply with orders to destroy them, Mr. Powell said, 'It doesn't change our view of the situation in the slightest'" (3/2). Iraq agreed to destroy them beginning on March 1 and did so over a period of weeks. The first day they bulldozed under four and the next day six. Their stock was about 100 (NYTimes, 3/2). The UN thought the demolition should be able to be completed in two weeks. Blix called the demolitions "a very significant piece of real disarmament. " Blair labeled it another one of Saddam's "games" (NYTimes, 3/1). The White House labeled these actions "the mother of all distractions" (NYTimes, 3/4) and then added a new accusation in early March that Iraq was hiding machinery to build more of the same rockets (Colin Powell in NYTimes, 3/6). As Iraq destroyed about 4-6 missiles per day, a senior U.S. official said Bush was unimpressed. "The stand for cooperation...is full and immediate, not grudging and late" (WashPost, 3/3). 6.
Will or should Iraqi scientists be interviewed? Where and how? Under the UN Resolution, scientists must leave willingly, not by force. Iraq was to provide a list of scientist since '98 when inspections ended. The resolution did not say that Iraq must force scientist to be interviewed. In the December Post article, Khidhir Hamza, who himself defected and wrote a book on Hussein's nuclear program, said that the US and UN are "potentially endangering the lives of Iraqi scientists" because lone defector would place his Iraqi family in peril. Will the Bush administration pressure Blix again, this time to take scientists out of the country against their will? What if extended families, very important in Iraqi culture, number in the dozens? The UN resolution only call for taking our "their immediate family." Among the excellent BBC specials includes "What Will The Inspectors Do?" and a look at dual use equipment in "Inspectors can go anywhere...But will they find anything?".
The world was again surprised at Iraq's continued cooperation with seemingly all aspects of inspections. On December 20, the U.S. had said it may give its own list to Blix before the year end. Blix, in an ever growing public disagreement with the Bush administration, responds, "The UN is not an abduction agency." On December 23, two initial interviews by IAEA began inside Iraq. Some were without Iraqi "minders" present. Iraq's head of weapons monitoring directorate, Gen Hussam Mohammed Amin, signaled then that scientists should talk inside the country, making it unlikely that, under a dictatorship, any scientist will go against his "suggestion." "Seeking not to run afoul of the [UN] resolution," writes the Post, "Amin said individual scientists were free to decide whether they wanted to leave." (1/10/03). The possibility of interviews outside of Iraq was accepted by Iraq on December 27. The Guardian describes the possible interview process and names the top 5 Iraqi figures. A possible "showdown" on scientists is described by the Post. Earlier in the process, some felt that any concessions by Iraq will not be enough for the Bush administration, as he wants to take scientists and their families out of the country, perhaps without their permission. After the interviews, probably in Cyprus or maybe Turkey, they would then be offered political asylum, possibly in the U.S. One ex-Iraqi worker tells of fooling inspectors in the 1990s. Comments Ari Fleisher, "History has shown that one of the most effective ways to judge what Iraq is up to is by talking to people who are involved in the weapons development program." Fleisher is no doubt referring to the high-profile defection of Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed. After telling his secrets from Jordan in the 1990s, he was lured back to Iraq and gunned down. Will defector information be up to date? Richard Perle wants scientists and their families to be taken away to be interviewed. One wonders if their entire extended family would need to leave too, because in Iraq nieces, nephews, and cousins are considered close family members who could be threatened by Saddam Hussein. Hawks hope that Hussein will not allow Iraqi scientists to permanently leave the country (they would be too afraid to return) and may therefore create a further "material breach." In late December The Post reported that back in May, the U.S. had offered money to Iraqi officials visiting New York City, repeatedly calling their hotel room, trying to lure them into defecting. The Bush administration and a CIA spokesperson refused to comment on the story. However, in December and January Iraq has again accused the US of trying to bribe scientists into giving false evidence. On January 10, 2003 we thought that Iraqi scientists are not likely to in fact be taken out of the country for questioning but then 5 days later the U.S. expected Iraqi scientists to be questioned abroad. A "tug-of-war...over the scientists is shaping up as the crunch issue. The dilemma for the Iraqi president...is that if he allows a scientist out to blow the whistle on a banned weapons program it could lead to war, but if Iraq were to block their departure, that too could" cause war (The Guardian, 1/10/03. Deputy Sec. of Defense Wolfowitz claimed on Jan. 24 (Chicago Tribune), "We know...that Saddam has ordered that any scientists who cooperate during interviews will be killed, as well as their families." Late in January while Wolfowitz accused Iraq of threatening to kill any scientist who cooperated, as well as the scientist's family. Then three days before Blix crucial Jan. 27 report, Iraq said they were not yet successful in convincing scientist s to be interviewed privately (WashPost/AP, 1/24/03). However, an Iraqi biologist was interviewed privately on march 1, the first since three interviews of February 7. Two more were interviewed on March 2 and 7 a few days later. While Blix labeled interviews "on our terms precisely" Powell alleged that they were secretly taped by bugs (NYTimes, 3/6). On a second front, nuclear inspectors had carried out a dozen interviews by early March. One week before the major weapons inspector report of Jan. 27, Iraq surprisingly changed course and said they "will encourage" private interviews without Iraqi "minders" present and even allow others to go abroad but "we can't force them." Also in that week Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz first alleged that Iraq was threatening any scientist who dared by interviewed. For a few weeks following, about 20 scientists insisted on Iraqi minders and refused interviews in private or without being tape recorded. Following his February. 5 UN speech, Powell appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Feb. 6) again urging that Hussein show his cooperation be allowing the inspectors to meet with scientists. Within hours, the first Iraqi scientist was interviewed without minders. Two more followed starting on February 7. Will this satisfy the administration? Blix will further discuss the issue when he visits Baghdad on February 8. In his March 6 pre-war press conference, President Bush alleged, "We know from multiple sources that Iraqi scientists continue to be threatened with harm should they cooperate" and "they wear recording devises during interview" (NYTimes, 3/7). 7.
What were the key diplomatic developments and comments in the first two
months of inspections (Nov. 27-Jan. 27)? The UN resolution outlines all the new deadlines. The BBC asks their readers, "Can the Inspectors Achieve Their Goal?" Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri has doubts: "The U.S. [did] not want the inspectors to return because they will expose its lies and allegations against Iraq." U.S. columnists argue that "Bush has raised the bar so high that Saddam is bound to fail. Bush's intention is not to negotiate a peace but to precipitate a war." Bush's puzzling early criticism of weapons inspectors progress, despite Iraqi cooperation for the first few weeks, led the increasingly hawkish New York Times editorial page to conclude, "President Bush's criticism...this week seemed hasty and unfair." Also see "Allies/UN" FAQ sections With much world-wide coverage, inspections began on November 27. Bush vaguely claimed that the first few days of inspections were "not encouraging." In contrast to Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney, Powell felt that the inspectors were "off to a good start." The Nation is not surprised by the Hawks reaction: "Like a playground bully, we have made it clear that there is no answer to our verbal demands that would forestall a punishing physical assault . Yet, to anyone not rabid for war, the UN inspectors would seem to be going well." Given Iraq's cooperation with inspectors and lists of scientist, can the U.S. accept "yes" as an answer? But the inspectors are apparently finding "zilch", U.S. plans for war have been complicated, writes the Post on January 6. In December, weapons inspections leaders suggested they will need "at least several months" (Blix) or perhaps even a year (ElBaradei) to carry out "credible inspections." Can Bush wait that long? Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, Britain's Jack Straw said on Jan. 6 that the chances of going to war were only 40%. This upset the U.S.. Perhaps Straw's motivation was to "avoid the impression of unquestioning, gung-ho support" for the U.S. position, and to ensure that "Saddam believes war can still be avoided if he cooperates fully with UN weapons inspectors" (Wash. Post, 1/8/03). Jump to Jan. 9 UN report or to response to Jan. 9 UN report.
The New York Times' "The Iraq Dossier" analyzes Blix's report. In response to Blix, UK, France, and Germany want more time before a war is launched. BBC News examines the disputed evidence. Many world leaders were "seeking to play down the significance" of the January 27 report. Intelligence reports in January first began to suggest that Iraq might have shipped some chemical weapons to Syria (Chicago Tribune, 1/9/03) On January 16, 12 empty warheads were found at a storage area that had already been inspected more than once. The White House called the discovery "troubling and serious" as the weapons were not previously declared by Iraq. "Time is running out," warned President Bush. El Baradei wanted a country "eager to comply" (Chicago Tribune, 1/20/03). Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage wonders, "Where are the other 29,984...empty chemical warheads?" Added a State Department official, "Some people may say there is no smoking gun, but there's nothing but smoke" Washington Post, 1/22/03). A week later Blix reported that the bunker built to store them was new and Iraq should not have had any such missiles, whether used with chemical weapons or not. Soon Iraq volunteered that they had found four more such warheads, which they claim were imported in the '80s. Return
to Top Gary Milhollin (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) wonders, "If they were going to hide them, why would they leave them at a site they knew the inspectors were probably going to visit?" In "How Much Proof in Iraq Is Enough For a Strike?" (1/18/03), writer Michael Gordon summarized the regime change view of guilty until proven innocent. In mid-January the two pieces of evidence were Iraq's faulty weapons declaration and the above mention missile shells. The Washington Post editorial criticizes "Mr. Blix's Irresolution." Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told NATO ambassadors that he compared the definition of pornography to WMD lying: "I can't define it; but I will know it when I see it." One government official commented that it's like "knowing someone has committed a murder but not being able to find the body." Iraq has consistently said they have no WMD and feel it in unfair to have to prove a negative. A top scientist to Hussein tried to see logic as to why the U.S. has not presented evidence. "They don't have evidence...If they had, they would have come up with it right away" (NYTimes, 1/20/03).
In the January 23 report, "What Does Disarmament Look Like?", the Bush administration said documents and weapons are "hidden in lakes, rivers, mosques, and hospitals and are moved constantly" (Wash Post, 1/22). Return
to Top In response to Blix January 9 report, the State Department put the burden on Hussein to prove his weapons were destroyed, rather than on the weapons inspectors to find them. Also in January, 3000 pages of documents were taken from the home of an Iraqi scientist. Topics included enrichment of uranium. An upset Blix complained to Iraq, "We shouldn't have to find these on our own" but then he back stepped with "Documents are not WMD" (NYTimes, 1/20/03). Indeed, the documents were from the early 1990s. "Where
the world stands" highlights the mid-January views of seven
nations. Blix and El Baradei visited
Baghdad on January 19 and "seemed to win most of what they were
demanding" on scientist interviews, and "pro-active"
cooperation (NYTimes, 1/21/03). Blix warned that to disarm
peacefully, Iraq must: More specifically, Blix was concerned with four missing or unaccounted for items, anthrax, VX, biological growth , and ballistic missiles. Other concerns were four suspicious finds, al-Samoud missiles, 16 chemical warfare warheads, nuclear papers in a scientists house, and lack of interviews with Iraqi scientists. On potential allies, The Washington Post reports that "international pressure [Germany, France, Russia] was clearly mounting on Washington to slow down. For example, Pakistan's Foreign Minister commented, "If the inspectors say they want some time, I think that time should be given" (NYTimes, 1/22/03). If Washington agrees to allow the inspectors to run their course," it could be past the Feb-March "weather window." Would the U.S. keep over 100,000 troops in the Gulf until the hot Iraqi summer ended in October or would the U.S. attempt to start the war in the summer? Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post points out that due to "the administration's rising frustration...The US may soon find itself faced with deciding whether to go to war with minimal international support in order to take advantage of what is sees as an optimal military and political timetable" (1/19/03). Then, on January 22, Germany and France held a joint news conference to come out strongly against war. A March analysis of "failed diplomacy" cites mid-January as when the French break with the administration, when U.S. officials signaled they were prepared to end the inspection only weeks after they had started. "'There was shock and surprise'", a French official said. "U.S. officials, wrote the Times, "argue that it is clear that French...'always intended to block a war, and that no amount of diplomacy would have bridged that gab...'The goals is not to reach consensus at any price." Also see "Allies" FAQ section. The New York Times in-depth analysis "A Long, Winding
Road to a Diplomatic Dead End" (3/17) told of how once the Bush Administration
"realized it had lost France [in mid-January] its diplomatic stage
centered on...Russia...But Russia was a hard sell," because of economic
connection with Iraq and because Putin "was still smarting from
having to accept Bush administration policies from NATO expansion to
scrapping" the ABM Treaty. "But the most the U.S. tried to
dangle incentives For more details, see "Allies" FAQ section. Jump to Jan. 9 UN report or to response to Jan. 9 UN report. 8. Why didn't the U.S. share its best intelligence with the inspectors?
After weeks of delay, Powell claimed on January 8 that inspectors were receiving "significant" intelligence. The next day Iraq invited the CIA to help inspectors on the ground and said they were prepared to answer all questions regarding its weapons declaration. How can Iraq prove that no weapons or weapons development are hidden? Also see the helpful timeline from The Guardian.
Yet State Department spokesman Boucher seemed to contradict his boss Powell, in saying, "I can certainly say that they're getting the best we've got." The explanation for "withholding the best information" was that sensitive information might leak to Iraqis and/or sources would be compromised. Blix disputed the allegation that "his agency might have been penetrated by Iraqi agents" (NYTimes, 1/31/03). Replied a UN official, "We know the Americans have concerns, but if they want to make their case...They should be more forthcoming with us" (WashPost, 1/27/03). Blix also criticized UK's dossier on the Iraq attempt to acquire aluminum tubes used in uranium enrichment. He doubted a second British claim that Iraq had resumed biological weapons production. Washington Post writers Pincus and DeYoung talked to Pentagon officials who also admit to withholding intelligence which may be among the first targets in an attack. "disclosing the locations of these weapons would inevitably lead to the being removed" (1/11/03). Senator Carl Levin, (D-MI) throughout January, continued to desire more intelligence for his Senate Committee. He said the U.S. has shared only "a small fraction" of highly suspicious sites so far (WashPost, 1/24/03). Another intelligence official in March admitted , "Not all the top sites have been passed to the inspectors" (Wash Post, 3/15). This contradicted testimony by CIA's Tenet when he said, "If we have not shared the suspect sites, we undermine our own case at the Security Council." A "nightmare scenario" would be if Iraq used weapons hidden at one of the sites not shared with the weapons inspectors (NYTimes/AP, 3/6). In mid-February Levin was still frustrated. "When they have taken the position that inspection are useless, they are bound to fail. We have undermined the inspection since the beginning" (WashPost, 2/12). In his UN speech Powell chose his words carefully regarding information given to inspectors. "We are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams." However, a few weeks later CIA director Tenet corrected himself in front of the Senate Defense panel. The Washington Post reported that the CIA "had not actually given the inspectors all the information on 'high' and 'medium' sites." Rather, testified Tenet, there are "one handful of sites which may not have been known" to inspectors. (2/12/03). In March the issue of sharing intelligence continued, as a top Iraqi official felt that, according to the Post, "The U.S. government, which claims to have geographic coordinates of facilities allegedly engaged in the production of banned weapons, should instead give that information to the inspectors. "it would be much easier and less costly and much faster," he said (3/2, "Baghdad destroys six more missiles"). One week later Blix complained again for more information from the U.S. about these suspected sites. Admitted some U.S. officials, according to Pincus and
Woodward (Wash Post) in "U.S. Lacks Specifics on Banned
Arms", "The Administration is not interesting in helping the inspectors
discover weapons because a discovery could bolster support" for
continued inspections. "We don't want to have a smoking gun...I
don't know whether the point is to embarrass Blix or embarrass Saddam
Hussein." Commented one regularly briefed by the CIA,
"They have only circumstantial evidence...nothing that proves this
amount or that." The Post predicted that although senior
intelligence officials said "they are convinced Iraq is hiding WMD,
they feel they will not be able to prove it until after an invasion, when
U.S. militarily foresaw and weapons analysts would have unrestricted
access. These officials said the administration is withholding some
of the best intelligence on suspected Iraqi weapon--uncertain as it
is--from UN weapons inspectors..." Said one official,
"They are clearly hiding weapons, but it is a Catch-22 situation that
we will only prove after an invasion." On the eve of war, one inspector
from MIT was angry that "U.S.
intelligence was wrong" and that "none of their hot tips
were ever confirmed. I don't know about a single decontamination
truck that didn't turn out to be a fire engine or a water truck.
Jorn Siljeholm added, "When you find nothing and repeat the
hypothesis that [the Iraqis] are hiding something, it just weakens the
hypothesis." |
9. What were the key developments surrounding the January 27, 2003UN report?
| Annan | Pre-Jan. 27 Report | The Jan. 27 Report | Reaction to Report |
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During a critical 16 day period, the inspectors gave a long-awaited report to the UN, President Bush gave his State of the Union address, (see "Was the War Inevitable" FAQs) Powell issued specific allegations to the UN, (also see "Inevitable" FAQs) and finally Blix and El Baradei issued a second report. As events and reports unfolded, war looked even more inevitable.
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In anticipation of the January 27 weapons inspector report, The Guardian saw January 27 as "decision day." , but Powell claims that "it is not necessarily a D-day for decision-making" (Post, 1/10/03). Powell's statement came a day after the British UN representative gave advice to "calm down about the 27th". The German ambassador echoed, "There are no ground for military action."
Yet on Jan. 19, NSA's Rice, on "Meet the Press", sounded a harsher tone than Powell, calling Jan. 27 the start of the final phase. Rumsfeld suggested this "final phase" would be only a matter of weeks (Times, 1/20). Yet earlier that week Rumsfeld admitted that in response to "no smoking gun", if inspectors had found something, "The argument might then have been that inspections were in fact working, and, therefore, they should be given more time to work" (WashPost, 1/18/03), thereby prolonging the inspections process (NYTimes, 1/19/03).
A Senior official told Reuters that only after the Jan. 27 report is submitted will the administration "make public more information it has about Iraq's possession of banned weapons." Why the delay? Also see "Will We Go To War" FAQ Section.
The administration made a concerted effort to get out the word, on various fronts. President Bush hinted that the report could quickly lead to a second UN resolution and war. At one point, war soon after January 27 seemed likely.
 |
Colin Powell warned, "We cannot fail to take the action that may be necessary because we are afraid of what others might do." He urged UN members not to "shrink from [their] duties." France, Germany, and China were still, at this point, openly against war. On the PBS Newshour Interview, Powell elaborated: Hussein "continues to cheat [and] deceive." Powell provided Jim Lehrer with some arguments we would hear two weeks later at the UN, such as "what happened to...?" why have more time for inspectors if he is lying? and "time is running out." |
Powell said that the President still hopes for a peaceful resolution but Iraq must disarm, one way or the other. The Washington Post article on Jan. 24 speaks for itself, "Moderate Powell Turns Hawkish On War With Iraq". That week Powell also spoke at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. Here Powell was in essence rehearsing for his UN speech the next week. He emphasized such issues as "What happened" to the 1990s WMD?" and reminded the Forum that "Multilateralism cannot become an excuse for inaction."
Reasons given for the French decision to oppose was Bush's "growing belief that neither inspectors not Saddam Hussein appeared capable of disarming Iraq." Jessica Matthews (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) called Powell's seemingly giving up on inspectors "a dramatic change." "Inspections will not work," Powell had said. France appealed for patience had backfired. The administration was trying to make the question , "Do you want to save Saddam or save the Security Council?" (WashPost, 1/27/03).
Meanwhile, the LA Times reported that the British
wanted to see one of three circumstances to justify war:
1. "a 'smoking gun' in the form of concealed weapons;
2. evidence that Saddam Hussein is lying; or
3. tangible proof that Baghdad is blocking the inspections process
(1/24/03).
"Where they stand on the war against Saddam" summarizes the position of the large European countries prior to Blix's report (The Guardian, 1/24/03).
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 |
In the week leading up to the January 27 report, Donald Rumsfeld joined Powell's tough talk. "The decision between war and peace will not be made in Washington and not at the UN...but in Baghdad" (NYTimes, 1/20/03). Rumsfeld also laid out the case, as Bush would a few days later in his State of the Union. Rumsfeld stressed these six points. "No other living dictator has shown the same deadly combination of capability and intent, of: |
1. aggression against its neighbors;
2. pursuit of WMD;
3. the use of chemical weapons against his own people as well as against
his neighbors;
4. oppression of his own people;
5. support of terrorism: and
6. threatening...the U.S." (NYTimes and Chicago Tribune,
1/21/03).
Rumsfeld angered many when he told foreign journalists, "You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think of that as old Europe...The vast number of European countries...are [with us]" (NYTimes, 1/23/03).
Condoleeza Rice's op-ed of that week included, "By both its action and its inactions, Iraq is proving not that it is a nation bent on disarmament, but that it is a nation with something to hide" (NYTimes, 1/23/03).
Just four days before the anticipated UN report, the administration released a report, "What Does Disarmament Look Like?" The paper spoke of Iraq's failed declaration, "weapons hidden in lakes, rivers, mosques, and hospitals", moved constantly, attempts, to procure uranium from aboard, ballistic missiles over limits, unmanned vehicles.
&h=291&w=210&sz=61&tbnid=_Fj-zYKttD03BM:&tbnh=110&tbnw=79&hl=en&start=8&prev=/images%3Fq%3DPaul%2BWolfowitz%2B%26svnum%3D10%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D%26safe%3Dactive%26sa%3DG) |
The next day saw Paul Wolfowitz speaking at the Council of Foreign Relations and alleging that so far, Iraq "has treated disarmament like a game of hid e and seek...but it is not a game. It is deadly serious. We are dealing with a threat to the security of our nation and the world...Iraqi security organization and a number of government agencies provide thousands of personnel to hide documents and materials from inspectors, to sanitize inspection sites, and to monitor the inspectors' activities...The decision rests entirely with Saddam Hussein" (NYTimes, 1/24/03).; Wolfowitz also for the first time alleged that "multiple sources" have told that Iraq has intimidated scientist by threatening them "as well as their families" with death if they are cooperative. (NYTimes, 1/23/03) |
On January 27, the two lead inspectors finally gave their much anticipated first comprehensive report to the UN, it was a mixed report and the analysis depended on one's perspective. Hawks and doves saw what they wanted. El Baradei (see full text of report) admitted there were no signs of nuclear weapons or nuclear programs and doubted the use of aluminum tubes for nuclear program. All sites which were identified by the U.S. as "having been modified or constructed over the past four years" had been inspected. The Iraqi nuclear program was eliminated in the 1990s and there is no evidence of its revival.
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| However, Blix (see full text of report) "sharply criticized" (NYTimes) Iraq for not being more forthcoming and for not actively disarming, according to the UN resolution. He did not have proof that weapons from the '90s were destroyed. Blix also found no evidence of rebuilding of old sites, alleged by the U.S. and UK. These head inspectors called Jan. 27 "a routine update", criticizing others who "have made it into the end of history. And maybe some members states will make it the end of history" (NYTimes, 1/21/03). |
Reaction to the report varied. Powell seemed ready for war no matter what was in the report and he focused his remakes on "unanswered questions". "Iraq continues to conceal vast quantities" of chemical and biological weapons that "could kill thousand upon thousands of men, women, and children" (NYTimes, 1/27/03). A helpful FAQ-style guide to the key issues in late January is from the Washington Post.
France suggested tripling the number of inspectors. In Britain, Foreign Minister Jack Straw said Hussein had "made a charade" of inspections. Straw also for the first time publicly labeled Iraq to be in "material breach" of UN resolution 1441. At a news confine that day one source close to British military advisers asked, "What if there aren't any [such weapons] or you can never find them?" (The Guardian, 2/5/03).
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The Wall Street Journal reflected on the end of January events: "It's been on heck of a good week for us Iraqi hawks, hasn't it? First on Monday came Hans Blix's unexpected tough report, in which he confirmed that Iraq has failed to fulfill its obligation under [1441]. Then on Tuesday President Bush delivered his State of the Union address, in which he made clear (in case there was any doubt) that he remains fully determined to liberate Iraq. Wednesday night the Wall Street Journal publishes a letter from eight European leaders expressing full support for American, putting to rest the 'unilateralism' canard" (1/31/03). Also see "Should We?/Editorials" FAQ sections
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10.
What were the UN/inspectors/diplomatic highlights of February, 2003?
The liberal Madison Capital Times were
editorializing (2/6/03) that the U.S. "has lost a great deal of
credibility with the international community in recent weeks by pressuring
for an end to inspections so that a war can begin. As...Mandela
noted, the world is inclined to believe that...[Blix and El Baradei] are
best positioned to determine whether Iraqi is complying with UN resolutions--not
Powell."
Leading up to the inspector talks in Baghdad on February 9, Blix warned that "it's five minutes to midnight" and wanted more evidence from Iraq.
On February 9, after two days of talks in Baghdad, Blix and AlBaradei reported some progress but not the drastic changes they were calling for before the visit. Then, Iraq allowed U2 spy planes (see #4 below) to fly. Al Baradei reported that "We made progress on all the areas we asked for" (Post, 1/10/03). In fact, El Baradei "said that his agency does not need the active cooperation Powell insists upon to determine whether Iraq is nuclear free" (The Progressive, 2/14).
The administration pressured the UN to ignore an earlier resolution (#1284 of 12/99) which Blix interprets as the need for another report on March 27, to discuss possible end of sanctions against Iraq. Only the Security Council can make a decision regarding what is needed to implement its own resolutions, says Phyllis Bennis.
 |
In the Feb. 14 inspector (8 page full text) report to the UN by Blix and by elBaradei, The Tribune headline blared, "Inspectors say Iraq is cooperating." Four scientist interviews have been helpful and no WMD have been found but many were still unaccounted for. El Baradei felt that inspections were in "midcourse" having inspected 125 locations. |
Blix rejected Powell's assertion that inspectors were tipping off Iraqi officials and according to the Times, "took issue with satellite images Mr. Powell showed of trucks [which] had been taken two weeks apart", so the movement of munitions they showed "could just as easily have been a routine activity" (2/15). But Powell was pleased that Blix placed the burden on Iraq to prove it didn't have WMD (WashPost, 2/14/03).
Blix's presentation approach was described as using "inimitably dry, roundabout language" (Observer, 2/16). Detailed descriptions of the Blix report and reaction to it can be found in "Worlds apart on war." "The World Press Review" showed the variety of press reaction. Europe, Russia, and China mostly called for more time for inspections. Various UN Ambassador's reacted to Blix. Into March Blix said Iraq had provided additional documents on anthrax and VX nerve agents (NYTimes/AP, 3/7).
Reaction from Iraq came on the same day, as Iraq announced, in all seriousness, that by Presidential decree, Saddam Hussein had banned the importation or production of any WMD. The New York Times called it "laughable" (2/14). Tariq Aziz calling the aggression "baseless, illegal, and immoral" warned that the war could be seen as a "crusade against the Arabs and against Islam" if other Christian countries in Europe join (NYTimes, 2/15). The Iraqi ambassador responded to requests for pro-active cooperation: "If it means that Iraq is to show [WMD], we would respond saying, Mr. Powell, by an Arab proverb...an empty hand has nothing to give" (NYTimes, 2/15)
Germany spoke of the inspections diminishing the danger emanating from Iraq and Russia urged inspection to continue.
In Britain, Straw spoke of the need for "active cooperation...We must hold our nerve...It takes no time at all for Saddam to cooperate. It just takes a fundamental change of heart" (WashPost, 2/25). Blair felt increasingly under siege in February as polls showed his popularity dropping. Concurred President Bush, the UN needed to confront Saddam with "backbone and courage...or fade into hastily as an ineffective, irrelevant, debating society" (WashPost, 2/14).
A few days later the U.S. strategy seemed to shift,
putting less emphasis on finding the smoking gun and stressing that:
1. Hussein is withholding weapons information; and
2. Iraq refuses to make scientists feely available (NYTimes,
1/19/03).
After the President's State of the Union Address of Jan. 28, and Powell's Feb. 5 UN speech, there were numerous predictions of war within a few weeks of the Feb. 14 report. With the next UN reports due on March 1 and probably March 14, will we be at war by then? Also see "Was the War Inevitable?" FAQ section.
In the March 1 UN report, Blix was pleased with some U2 spy plane lights and with Hussein's destruction of missiles, but overall, "the results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far." U.S. accusation that inspectors were incompetent or infiltrated by Iraqi spies was resented by Blix. One Blix colleague spoke of U.S. pressure. "The Americans have been heavy-handed, obvious and clumsy in their dealings with him." replied one Senior administration official on Blix appearing to trying to please all sides rather than stating the facts: "Blix is a very nice man who does not want to go back to Sweden and be the cause of war. That fact is distorting what he should be doing...the inspectors have turned out to be a trap...a false measure (NYTimes, 3/2, "To White House, Inspections Is Now More a Dead End Than a Guidepost").
On March 7, both Blix and El Baradei reported "active" and "forthcoming" cooperation from Iraq and El Baradei sought 2-3 more months to come to "a credible conclusion that Iraq has or does not have a nuclear weapons system" (NYTimes, 3/8). Powell criticized Blix for not emphasizing evidence of pilot less drones (NYTimes, 3/11).
11. Why was there never a second UN Resolution (UNR) in February or March, 2003? What were the spying allegations? (Also see "Allies" FAQ section)
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
Concerning a second UN resolution, (UNR) Bush was likely to push hard in his January 28 State of the Union Speech for one urging war. (For details, see "Was the War Inevitable") On Jan. 29 the UN started meetings to debate and Blair met in D.C. with Bush on January 31. The U.S. ended up pressing for a second resolution "out of loyalty to Tony Blair....who is getting scourged at home by public opinion" (NYTimes, 3/9). The UK's Straw defended pressuring Iraq saying they only began cooperating because of 200,000 troops on their border.
Bush did not plan to reveal any alleged new evidence until after the Jan. 29 UN report. Inspectors returned to Baghdad on Feb. 8, where they discussed scientist interviews, U.S. U2 spy planes, and other issues.
The
BBC analyzes the "Battle for a second resolution" and The
Guardian examines where
Security Council members stand and why. The "Yes"
votes appeared to be US, UK, Spain, and Bulgaria. They were the only three
allies in the Security Council meeting in mid-February to speak against
continuing inspections, though more spoke in the coming days. The
U.S. at one point. considered "a series of benchmark tests" for
Iraq to meet with a strict deadlines (NYTimes, 2/20). France
lined up allies at a previously planned summit of 52 African countries.
The legal language and the need for a second resolution is explored in "The
legal case for war with Iraq."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4624520-103701,00.html
Nine votes were needed for passage in addition to no veto from US, UK, France, Russia, or China. At one point in late-February, Russia did not seem like a certain veto. They were pressured with economic repercussions. Also see Allies FAQ section.
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
In the Washington Post, writer Karen DeYoung saw "no easy road to a [second] resolution" (2/13). Britain had urged a second resolution in January but the U.S. only joined that call after Powell's February UN presentation. Predicted a former U.S. UN Ambassador, "If Saddam is stupid enough to refuse to disarm, then the U.S. will get the resolution" (Richard Holbrooke, NYTimes, 2/25).
By March 10, Russia also promised to veto. UN Secretary Kofi Annan warned that a war without a second UNR would violate the UN charter. The Bush administration "sharply criticized" the remarks (NYTimes, 3/11), claiming self-defense makes it legal.
One senior diplomat at the UN suggested, "We're not going to let two or three nations on the Security Council stop what seems to be the will of the world." Blair echoed, "Ridding the world of Saddam would be an act of humanity. It is leaving him there that is inhumane" (Chicago Tribune, 2/16/03). Expert Pollack predicted a second UNR might pass because SC members may think, "If Saddam Hussein is a goner anyway, why in the world do we want to cross the Bush administration" (Chicago Tribune, 2/16/03). On February 18, though saying that a new resolution "is not necessary, Bush pledged to work for a second UNR, saying, "War is my last choice."
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
The Times reported that Bush was willing to go
along with a second UNR at the urging of and protection of Blair. On Feb.
22 the British government said that there would surely be a vote as "political
cover" for Blair (Tribune, 2/20) within three weeks and the
Bush administration submitted a new proposed resolution on Feb. 24,
giving Iraq until March 17 to eliminate weapons. Also on February
24, France
and Germany saw no need for a second resolution.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4612369-103681,00.html
| On Feb. 17 France pledged to veto the new resolution, because they wanted more time, more inspectors, though admitting that Iraq could cooperate more. The stunning Feb. 20 news conference of France's Dominique de Villepin (Foreign minister; "Nothing today justifies military action") was analyzed by the Post: The French statements "ran counter to an assumption that had underpinned their entire diplomatic strategy on Iraq: if the U.S. made plain it was ready to act alone if necessary to disarm Hussein, the allies would jump o the bandwagon" (2/26), "Bush and Chirac, Poles Apart on Iraq"). Villepin campaigned against the resolution to the ire of Washington, calling for four more months of inspections, and saw Russia as the chief veto wielding ally. Also see Allies FAQ section. |
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
France and the U.S. competed to offer Angola aid to rebuilding from Civil War. Villepin added in early March, "Some countries many think that with force in Iraq you are going to get the end of terrorism, the end of proliferation in the world...and like by magic you are going to make peace in the Middle East. We don't agree...You don't make war on a timetable...You cannot say 'I want Saddam to disarm' and at the same time when he's disarming say 'They are not doing what they should.'" (NYTimes, 3/2).
France and Germany proposed their own second resolution with the support of Russia, China, and what they said was a majority of the UN Security Council.
Then on March 5, France, Russia, and Germany formally pledged to oppose the new resolution. France stated strongly, "We will not allow a resolution to pass that authorizes resorting to force (NYTimes, 3/5). The French/Russia/German joint statement expressed that the inspections "are producing increasingly encouraging results" in terms of destruction of Al Samoud missiles, formation on biological and chemical weapons, and interviews with Iraqi scientists. In addition, the statement called on the Iraqi authorities to "cooperate more actively with inspectors to fully disarm their country. These inspections cannot continue indefinitely" (NYTimes, 3/6). Later the French added that a war "would not inhibit international terrorism but only increase it" (Wash Post, 3/7). Chirac felt "it's not up to you or me to say if the inspections are working" (NYTimes, 3/11)...Whatever the circumstances, France will vote no."
The day after the joint statement Blix produced a 167 page draft report on the 29 categories of remaining disarmament tasks for Iraq. Some bombs and chemical agents such anthrax were still unaccounted for "and may still exist", wrote Blix, from as far back as the 1980s (NYTimes, 3/7).
Russia added that the U.S. had agreed that resolution 1441 was about disarmament not regime change . Dramatically, a Colin Powell speech of the same day asked the question, "Has Saddam disarmed?" The answer he gave was no. More time was not needed. France reiterated on March 10 that they would veto "no matter what the circumstances" (Wash Post, 3/10).
"But one way or the other, Saddam Hussein, for the sake of peace, and for the security of the American people, will be disarmed...We will disarm him now," reiterated the President in late February. The resolution noted that Iraq had "failed to take the final opportunity afforded it. Echoed Ari Fleisher, "It is important for the UN...to have its chance to protect the peace" (Chicago Tribune, 2/20, 2/25 and NYTimes, 2/28).
Also in late February, Pakistan appeared to be on board for a second resolution (Tribune, 2/27). Yet my mid-March wanted "more time to be given to peace in Iraq" and couldn't support a war, as a vote with the U.S. could weaken General Musharaff at home." Pakistan receives over $300 million in U.S. aid per year, 8 times any of the "middle six" potential allies (Tribune, 3/12).
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
In early March, Bulgaria was set to receive a number of trading benefits with the U.S. (NYTimes, 3/1). "The President is not offering quid pro quos," assured Ari Fleischer, but trade benefits, invitation to the White House, and help on commercial projects were likely at least being hinted at.
As diplomacy quickened in mid-March, London floated six demands or benchmarks including that Hussein admit to WMD on Iraqi TV, and he account for and destroy stocks of anthrax and other biological and chemical weapons, and he permit 30 scientist and their families to fly to Cyprus for interviews (NYTimes, 3/12 and Chicago Tribune, 3/11and http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4624080-103685,00.html).
Britain was frustrated that the U.S. did not publicly committee to these floated/proposed changes. On the eve of war Blair claimed that the U.S. had the votes to pass until France threatened to veto (NYTimes, 3/17).
 |
Losing patience, Bush in his March 6 press conference said, "It's time for people to show their cards...When it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission." The President's opening statement also re-enforced the administration ideas that Iraq had not fully disarmed. "Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors.' He added a more specific accusation: "In some cases these materials have been moved to different locations every 12 to 24 hours, or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods" On interviews of scientists, he expressed dissatisfaction. |
Blix indeed showed some of his cards hours after the Presidential press conference and was "cautiously optimistic" (NYTimes, 3/8). "After a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation there has been an acceleration of initiates...since the end of January" (NYTimes, 3/8). To complete inspections would take "months" not years or weeks, Blix calculated. Responded a State Department official, "We don't want to take another 50 years to accomplish this task" (NYTimes, 3/14).
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
The March 9 Guardian gives us a helpful Q
and A on Inspectors issues and what could happen next.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4621304-102274,00.html
Would a second resolution be brought to a
vote? Three
scenarios at the time seemed most likely:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4626162-102274,00.html
1. The veto of a second resolution;
2. Dumping the second resolution: or
3. A passage of the second resolution.
The London Observer gave odds to all three predictions, with a 70% chance
of the second scenario, as of March 16.
In the flurry of diplomacy, Canada suggested a compromise deadline of March 31. Suggestion of a April 17 deadline was also floated. The U.S. wanted 72 hours. As late as March 9, Powell was encouraged that the U.S. might get the 9 or 10 votes needed to pass and "we'll see if somebody [France] wants to veto." This appeared a strategy to isolate France. A last week French proposal gave Iraq 30 days to disarm. President Bush didn't speak with Chirac for five weeks. For more on France see "Allies: 4 Who Veto" FAQ section.
Where
did the Security Council members stand one week before the war? The
Guardian summarizes their positions.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4624614-103550,00.html
The Tribune blared
in its March 8 headline, "Saddam down to his last 9 days?"
On March 12, the U.S. finally admitted that the new resolution was
doomed, as they were promised only 4 of 15 votes. The U.S. UN Ambassador
John Negroponte said the decision not to vote was because of one country
[France] and he was confident the vote "would have been close" (Wash
Post, 3/19).
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43034-2003Mar17?language=printer
Why did the "middle six" not force a veto by France or Russia? By Feb. 20, with France, Russia, and China opposed and holding veto power, the new U.S. strategy was to try to convince and pressure 9 of the 15 members to pass and then force a standoff on veto power, hoping that Russia and China might abstain, leaving France as the lone "obstructionist", so that France might comply or be shunned under pressure. The "middle six" the U.S. was working for a "Yes" vote were Angola, Guinea, Cameroon, Mexico, Chile, and Pakistan (NYTimes, 2/21/03). Guinea is a largely Muslim country which could use American intervention in speeding its debt recovery. The Guardian labels the negotiations "open and shameless bartering" in "Morality for sale." http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4611119-103682,00.html Ari Fleisher denied any deals. "You're saying that the leaders of other nations are buyable and that is not an acceptable proposition" (NYTimes, "How to Win France and Influence Small Countries", 3/16).
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
In the first Gulf War, Yemen voted with Cuba against the U.S. Yemen had a $70 million U.S. aid package cancelled. "That is the most expensive 'no' vote you'll ever cast," threatened an American diplomat to Yemen minutes after their vote (NYTimes, 3/16 and other sources).
Some 12 years later, "It is abundantly clear that this time the threats are heavier" (The Guardian, 3/2). None of the middle six want to be on the losing side by declaring their intention and then finding that a vote is not taken.
Phyllis Bennis (Institute for Policy Studies) co-authored the report "Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced?" The report tells how almost every country faced "coercion, bullying, bribery, or the implied threat of U.S. action that would directly damage the interest of the county." Many nations may remember what the U.S. did to Yemen prior to the Gulf War in 1991. "When Yemen, the sole Arab country on the council, voted against the resolution authorizing war, a U.S. diplomat told the Yemeni ambassador, 'That will be the most expensive no vote you ever cast.'' Three days later, the U.S. cut its entire aid budget to Yemen.
Mexico was on the surface a likely U.S. ally, as the first foreign visit by Bush was to his friend in Mexico, President Fox. Mexico probably felt pressure to get a deal for illegal immigrants in the U.S. The Guardian details other potential votes in "Morality for Sale."
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
President Bush said "I don't expect for there to be significant retribution" from the [US] if Mexico voted no. When Hispanic Democrats in Congress called this a threat, the White House denounced their charge as partisan. (NYTimes, 3/16).
The administration promised to reform to legal status of undeclared Mexican immigrants and "the Mexican president feels betrayed", writes Paul Krugman in "Threats, Promises, and Lies" (NYTimes, 2/25). At least 70% of Mexicans against the war put Fox in a "quandary" (NYTimes, 2/28) partly because the U.S. accounts for 80% of Mexican exports. In turned out that Chile was the first of the middle six to declare it would vote against the resolution.
Why did the U.S. become so isolated? The Washington Post, article suggested that "forceful tactics" have caught up with the U.S. at the Security Council. Due to rejection of the Kyoto Treaty, refusal to join the International Criminal Court, "withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and announcing a doctrine of fighting preventive wars that surprised and concerned allies."
The administration isolation stemmed from three
factors: "hard-edged rhetoric...growing distrust of administration's
motives and its failure to make a case that Iraq poses an imminent
danger" (Wash Post, "U.S. in a Tough Position As Isolation
Increases", 3/6). Some countries felt that Bush's UN effort
was "disingenuous" and that regime change goals kept changing
. For example, three weeks before war, a new reason was presented to
the public: bringing Middle East peace and democracy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48303-2003Mar5?language=printer
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
"Bush's Doctrine of War", is a New York Times analysis by writer David Sanger. He expresses the view that Bush's March 17 speech "almost certainly confirmed some of the word's worst fears about George Bush's America: that when the UN will not bend to its will, when allies will not go along, Mr. Bush will simply break away and pull the trigger. 'To them, it will show that this while UN detour was an exercise in futility--that this is what the president planned to do all along', Stanly Hoffman, the Harvard professor...said today: 'There is no room in the UN charter for the president's doctrine of pre-emption, for anticipatory self-defense."
A European diplomat complained that the administration "seems to believe that if you push hard enough, everyone will give in" (2/16). Said one council diplomat, "To be a superpower is to be a leader, not a dictator." Also see "Allies" FAQ section.
In an effort to pressure other countries
and win votes it was revealed
in early March that the U.S. was spying on UN delegates by
intercepting their home and office telephones and emails of these
"middle six," with "extra focus" on Pakistan.
Others would include Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, and Guinea. The
Washington Post described the spying as typical, the NSA
refused to comment. The story gained wide attention worldwide, and
was labeled as an "embarrassing disclosure" by the London Times,
but took several days to warrant a story in the U.S. press, evidently because
the spying was deemed "typical" in the in the U.S. Only the Baltimore
Sun had thorough coverage in the mainstream U.S. press. The charges
were never denied by the U.S. or UK.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4621249-102273,00.html
The memo of the plan to bug, a January 31 email, describes gaining information to "give U.S. policy makers an edge in obtaining results favorable to U.S. goals or to head off surprises" in upcoming votes.
 |
After the war the spy issue resurfaced, as the leaker,
Katherine Gun, of Britain's top-secret Government Communication Headquarters,
(GCHQ) was arrested in March 2003, charged in November, and could face two years in
jail for violating the Official Secrets Act. Gun felt the UN was being undermined and she was concerned with the people of Iraq. "I felt that the British intelligence services were being asked to do something that would undermine the whole UN democratic processes." Her advise to others was, "listen to your conscience. I know it's very difficult and people don't want to jeopardize their careers or lives." (The Guardian, 2/26/04) |
In late February 2004 we learned that the
charges against Gun would be dropped, possibly because the evidence she
would present in her defense would be embarrassing to the British government
and/or intelligence. The leading prosecutor said it would not be
"appropriate" to go into the reason for dropping the case.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A6889-2004Feb25?language=printer
The Institute for Public Accuracy has further details on the Gun case. Bob Herbert comments in "A Single Conscience V. the State" (NYTimes, 1/19/04 and http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0119-10.htm).
 |
The next day, a front page Chicago Tribune
headline of February 27 read, "Britain accused of spying on
UN." Former cabinet member Claire Short, who resigned
after the war began, said in a BBC interview that conversations
with Kofi Annan had been secretly taped. Short said she had seen
transcripts of Annan's conversations. She specified, "In
fact "I've had conversations with Kofi in the run-up tow war, thinking:
"Oh dear, there will be a transcript of this and people will see what
he and I are saying." Blair called the allegations "deeply irresponsible"
but would not confirm or deny them. Annan's spokesman called the taping
"illegal...We would be disappointed if this were true. Such
activities would undermine the integrity and confidential nature of
diplomatic exchanges." |
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A8045-2004Feb26?language=printer
Just after Short's allegations came Hans
Blix on
February 28, 2004 who said he suspected his UN office and New York home had been
bugged by the U.S. before the war. In the interview with The
Guardian, Blix realized that though one might suspect bugging among enemies
"here it is between people who co-operate and it is an unpleasant
feeling...and disgusting." He based his allegations on repeated
troubles with his home phone and on photographs he had been show that could only
have come from the UN weapons office. Adding to the accusations was former UN
chief weapons inspector Richard Butler who was "well aware" he was
being bugged.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4869058-103550,00.html
The Guardian summarized events in "Your
essential weekly Iraq crisis briefing", from early March.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4616549-102275,00.html
The legality of war was debated between Bush, Annan, and legal scholars. Bush wanted to apply resolution 678 from 13 years ago and a legal scholar in agreement views suspension of ceasefire with "failure to perform." The middle road of the argument is that war could be legitimate if WMD are found. A third camp argues that war is "clearly illegal."
The
flurry of diplomacy over the four days before war is examined in
"Final countdown,"
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4626926-103550,00.html
Annan finally ordered the withdrawal of all UN staff on
March 17. On the eve of war, Kofi Annan stated, "Whatever our
differing views on this complex issue may be, we must all feel that this
is a sad day for the UN and the international community...I know the
millions of people around the world share this sense of disappointment"
(NYTimes, 3/19). Hans Blix said, "I don't think it's
reasonable" and "it's a pity" that
inspection work has been cut short "after three and a half
months" (Wash Post, 3/19). "I
would have welcomed more time", explained Blix upon
leaving. The chief weapons inspector predicted Iraq would not use chemical
or biological weapons during the war, but has technology capable of
developing them.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4629128-103681,00.html
As serious a topic as the UN debate became, over war and
peace, The Guardian's Simon Tisdall
was able to add some humor with his "UN playgroup" clever
piece. It opens, "If the UN were a kindergarten, it would definitely
be time to call a time out." He teases the views of Blair,
Bush, Annan, Chirac, Hussein, and even bin Laden.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4624365-105806,00.html
| France | Pakistan | Middle Six | Mexico | U.S. Isolated | UN Spying & Post War |
12.
Why were the "U.S.-edited" parts of the Iraq weapons declaration not
released? Who supplied Iraq with WMD? (Also
see "History" FAQs and "Saddam
Hussein" FAQs)
Only the five permanent members of the Security Council
got to look at the entire report, and 8500 pages were removed before the
rest of the UN saw it.
The New York Times reported that the "material breach"
declaration was premature, among others reasons, because "most of the
10 nonpermanent Council nations had barely had time to read the cover
sheets" of the declaration. Even with the omitted pages, names of
German and U.S. companies who have supplied Iraq's WMD program have been
leaked. Some companies probably stopped supplying after Iraq invaded
Kuwait in 1990. However, according to a German newspaper, some
German companies continued to do business with Iraq right up until last
year. "These are familiar corporate faces--the ghosts from the first
Gulf war, who may still be active", said the director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control. On December 21 the Times
described the companies
which supplied Iraq and The Guardian reported that according
to part of the Iraqi declaration, Germany
is the #1 country helping Iraq acquire WMD with 80 companies and the
U.S. ranks #2 with 24 companies, including Hewlett Packard, Honeywell,
Rockwell, and others. In 1988 Dow Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticide
to Iraq despite suspicions they would be used for chemical warfare (Guardian,
12/31/02).
In "U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup", (Post, 12/30/02), we learn that "dozens of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-'80s under license from the Commerce Department, included various strains of anthrax." Some UN diplomats think the leak might have been American inspired to embarrass Germany. "This is not news", the diplomat said. One Baltimore company, Alcolac, "pleaded guilty in 1989 to federal export violations involving shipments of chemical that could be used to make mustard gas." The list of foreign suppliers, reports the Times, was obtained by "lawyers for ailing gulf war veterans", and "could be important as the vets pursue lawsuits accusing some of the companies of responsibility for their health problems." LA Times "Iraq List Censored to Protect the Innocent and the Helpful" is a good read. (Also see "Allies/UN" FAQ Section).
13.
Who is Hans Blix? Who is Mohammed El Baradei?
 |
As described above, Swedish diplomat Hans Blix is the UN weapons chief inspector of the new UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). A separate organization working out of Vienna, is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headed by Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei. He attended Law School in New York, deals with nuclear inspection issues, and has been inspecting since at least 1999. ElBaradei is ready to move in quickly. to inspect for nuclear capabilities and argued that advanced nuclear systems are virtually impossible to conceal because they leave a "footprint." He reminded an impatient Bush in early December, "The people who sent us here are...the UN. We are not serving the U.S." Blix says he has "learned his lesson" about being "fooled" by the Iraqis before the Gulf War, when he ran the nuclear IAEA. |
Blix earned a law degree in Stockholm and a doctorate from Cambridge
and was Sweden's foreign minister during the 1970s. He was on a
cruise ship with his wife when he was notified in January 2000 by Kofi
Annan. Blix's
background is detailed at "World divides under the strain."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4626150-110863,00.html
Other views of Blix vary. The Washington Post reports that Paul Wolfowitz, deputy Secretary of Defense, had asked the CIA to investigate the previous performance of Blix. UN Sec. General Annan feels, if the report is true, it would be "...an attempt at intimidating an international civil servant...[which]...would be unacceptable."
Time magazine editors concluded in February that Blix was "a lot more skeptical of Iraq behavior than had been assumed." http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,425801,00.html
14. How did weapons inspectors operate on the ground in Iraq?
| The continued presence of weapons inspectors would make it very difficult for Iraq to resume its alleged WMD program. Iraq also finds it difficult to "disprove a negative". After the new UN resolution passed on November 8, Iraq and its Parliament voted against the resolution but on November 13 Iraq accepted, with a hostile letter. |
This Iraq acceptance of the new UN resolution in a long letter referring to Bush's "gang of evil." Inspectors returned on November 18 with 30 initial inspectors when inspections began on November 27. By mid-December the number had grown to 100 with at least a dozen sites inspected daily. In the first month, nearly 200 sites were searched, some up to six times. There were about 100 "priority" sites. 700 sites were predicted in September, but the list grew to nearly 1000. At this rate, all of the sites will be visited by sometime in May. Would President Bush wait this long? While "the numbers seen quite large", comments David Kay (former head of IAEA for ten years), "It's how thorough you do your job, not how many sites you visit...In some ways they've been playing the Vietnam bodycount game." Also see "P.S." FAQ section for many more details on Kay.
The number of inspectors grew to 300 UN officials (over 100 at at time rotating in), from 44 countries with the U.S. making up 10% (27) of the inspectors. Said Blix, "There is a new opportunity and we hope...we can get out of sanctions and...have a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East [a reference to Israeli nuclear weapons]. The question of war and peace remains...in the hands of Iraq and the Security Council." Further commented Blix, preparing for his mission: "This is an opportunity for peace. I hope Iraq will make full use of it....It's an opportunity to eventually eliminate sanctions." Using a similar tone in mid-January, Blix observed, "We cost about $80 million a year. If you take an armed path, you are talking about $100 billion, you're talking about 250,000 men, you're talking about a lot of people killed or injured, a lot of damage. So I think the whole world prefers a peaceful solution, if you have one that is credible" (Chicago Tribune, 1/14/03).
Said Blix earlier, "We will report objectively what we see and if there are any violations...but it's not we who decide whether there is war...or what is a material breach." What would be considered a serious violation? Bush and Blix would clearly disagree. Could one door locked for a few minutes trigger a war? Blix feels that one 30 minute delay could be a serious violation. The Guardian analyzes the issue in "Can Blix nix Iraq's tricks?". Iraq is concerned that the U.S. military would use U.S. flight information in the so-called No Fly Zones to help them in an attack. Fox News has suggested actually filming the inspectors at work. Also see The Guardian's "Photo Gallery of Inspections."
The inspectors were using high-tech gear and code-named Hanaa and Alex, able to detect "even if a site has been comprehensively cleaned before they arrive." Ready to "step up the pace," Helicopter use began in early January, and a branch office in Mosul (240 miles north of Baghdad) was added to the team. A second of the nine Presidential palace was visited on Jan. 15. After at first refusing to change any old UN inspections guidelines, Iraq agreed to tougher inspections than the '90s, when presidential palaces were visited by appointment only. Iraq also dropped insistence that there be no inspections on Friday, the Muslim holy day. The "Old Palace" overlooks the Tigris River.
Then, on Jan. 16, inspectors first went into private homes. Inspectors have even pulled lecturers out of classes at universities, demanding access to laboratories.
The first month showed total Iraqi cooperation. Even Powell admitted on December 29 that "they have been cooperating with the inspectors and we'll see if that cooperation continues." Polls in mid-December show that 43% of Americans are confident that weapons would be uncovered while 52% were not confident. For detailed poll analysis, see "Should We Have Gone To War?" FAQs.
As it turned out, after less than four months, inspectors left on March 18, without finding any WMD.
15. Did weapons inspectors succeed
during the '90s? Did they work in 2003?
It depends who one talks to. BBC's "Q
& A: What will the inspectors do?", Time magazine's "Inspections:
Can They Work This Time?" and Post's "US/UN
Differ on Arms Hunt" are helpful for background. The White House has released a thorough timeline
of the inspectors. The Guardian has completed their own FAQ
on Inspectors.
Without weapons inspectors there for nearly four years, we do not know if the government was developing more weapons or where they might be hiding them. The U.S. counted on defectors and "doing guesswork" (Time, 9/16/02).
When inspectors left in '98, they drew up a list of chemical and biological weapons that had not been accounted for (not proven to be destroyed), including 4 tons of lethal VX nerve gas and large amounts of Sarin. Were they destroyed or hidden? We do know that the Iraqi government lied and delayed the work on weapons inspectors during the '90s. For example, only after four years of inspections, in 1995, did Iraq tell inspectors after the defection of Hussein's son-in-law Kamal, that it had made "enough deadly [biological and anthrax] microbes to kill all the people on earth several times over." UN inspectors in 1995 reported the vast majority already destroyed. Former inspector spokesman writes, "The lack of new 'weapons finds' after 1995 emboldened the Iraqis to argue that there was nothing left to find, whereas it really meant they were hiding things better" (Tim Trevan, "How Iraq cheated in the past: an inspector's tale", The Guardian, 9/18/02).
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see special "Crisis in Iraq") reported in 2002 that UN inspections destroyed "far more of...Hussein's weapons of mass destruction" than did the actual Gulf War. Reports are that the "inspectors discovered and disposed by 38,500 chemical munitions and 690 tons of chemical weapons agents" (Time Magazine, May 2002), 48 long-range missiles, 30 chemical warheads, and 690 tonnes of chemical weapons agents (The Guardian, 9/18/02).
Former UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission on Iraq) Chief Richard Butler said in 1998, "If Iraqi disarmament were a five-lap race, we would be three quarters of the way around the fifth and final lap." Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright agrees with Blix that inspections were much more successful than the Gulf War in destroying Hussein's weapons. We later found out that Hussein's most important weapons plants had not even been targeted during the Gulf War. Ironically, even then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney confidently asserted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1991, "Saddam Hussein is out of the nuclear business."
David Albright, former nuclear inspector is now head of the Institute for Scientific and International Security. He thought there was no rush to war. "I think Iraq has become far less of a risk just because the inspectors are there" (1/6/03).
 |
Former lead inspector Scott Ritter agrees that inspectors were effective and Ritter criticizes Cheney. In mid-September, a Ritter interview appeared in The Guardian. A long Q & A with Ritter is in the September 2002 Guardian in which he explains why the threat posed by Hussein has been overstate, 90-95% of WMD were destroyed, they can't build a bomb in just two years, shelf-life of nerve agents can't last over 305 years, and Iraq has not long-range missiles. A critique of Ritter is in the October 21 Post called, "Fighting Words." Similarly, Clinton Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated in 2001, "Iraq no longer poses a military threat to its neighbors" (1/10/01). Also see "Should We Go To War?" for more on Ritter. |
Comments Thomas Friedman in regards to sniper shooting around D.C. in October, "A lot of us would like to see more weapons inspectors on the streets here, and in the gun shops here, not just in Baghdad....The administration is so obsessed with Saddam it has lost touch with the real anxieties of many Americans." Also see "Should We?/Columnists" FAQs on Friedman.
How the Inspectors work is described clearly by the Washington Post, including 24- hour TV cameras and inspectors attending any Iraq missile tests. Says the BBC, it will be "very difficult for Iraq to prove definitely there are no WMD. Far more likely is a report that says the inspectors destroyed all that they found or found nothing." To prove they have no WMD would be logically impossible. When would inspectors leave for good? The New York Times points out in "Iraq Makes a Philosophically Flawed Effort to Disprove a Negative" that "other scholars concede that the burden of proof placed on Iraq by the UN is so great that no amount of evidence is likely to suffice." Sandra Mackey, author of The Reckoning, feels that biological and chemical weapons cannot be controlled or eliminated, even with the return of inspectors. "It is impossible for Iraq to satisfactorily demonstrate that it has met a negative criterion" (Voices in the Wilderness). Also see The Guardian's "Once more unto the breach".
The defection of Hussein Kamel in 1995 is interpreted differently by various sources. Kamel, former head of Iraq' weapons program and Saddam's son-in-law, was said to have "spilled the beans' to interrogators on the weapons Hussein was hiding from inspectors. Yet head inspector Ekeus, interrogated Kamel before he inexplicably returned from Jordan to Iraq only to be killed in an ambush. Ekeus called him "a consummate liar" Kamel also said that Iraq had dset5oyed all of its chemical and biological weapons after the Gulf War.
16. Why were critics of weapons inspectors so skeptical?
| Perle | Pollack | Krauthammer |
| Kay | Milhollin | Other Administration Hawks |
| Return to Top | ||
After four years to hide alleged weapons, Hussein may try to use the UN to delay inspectors in to the hot summer months of 2003. Conservatives are wary: "There is no point in kidding ourselves: The inspections process on which we are to embark is a trap," say William Kristol and Robert Kagan in the Weekly Standard. Echoes a Brookings Institute expert, "Hussein is sucking us into the inspections trap." On December 9, The Guardian reported that Hawks in the administration will soon propose "refocused inspections", greater in number and aggressiveness. The Times of London reported in early December that those Iraqis who work in weapons programs "have been ordered to keep components in their own homes." On December 25 Israel accused Hussein of hiding WMD in neighboring Syria, but Sharon admitted that the evidence was unverified. Before March, the author of this web site has read only one concurring report on either claim.
Biological weapons are "the deepest blackhole", according to Time's 9/16/02 Special Report, partly because they are easily hidden and due to "dual use" capability. For example, fermenters that can brew beer or biological agents, sprayers that can spry crops or chemical toxins...Anthrax could serve as a poor man's suitcase bomb."
| Adds Hawk Richard Perle, of the influential Pentagon Defense Policy Review Board, "I'm very skeptical about our ability to find things if Saddam is not cooperating. Inspections are not very effective in a hide-and-seek situation; there are too few inspectors and too many hiding places." On delays, Perle says, "We will know it clearly when the inspectors bump against locked doors or when an individual Iraqi with specific knowledge refuses to meet them or has passed away or has been killed in an automobile crash." Perle's new book was released in January 2004. |
| Perle | Pollack | Krauthammer |
| Kay | Milhollin | Other Administration Hawks |
| Return to Top | ||
One administrative official cleverly commented, "It's like trying to find cockroaches in your kitchen at midnight. Once you turn on the light, you have less than 3 minutes to get them." Condoleezza Rice (NSA) concurred in November, "The inspectors are not going to go hunting and pecking all through a country the size of France, trying to prove that [Hussein] does or does not have [WMD]." Tim Trevan, '90s inspector, describes success of the current search as even more improbable than finding a needle in a haystack "unless you have a defector who hid the stuff" (Chicago Tribune, 1/19/03). Adds Ken Adelman, of the Reagan foreign policy team, "If we can prove their list of weapons facilities is palpably untrue, that's a good outcome."
 |
Later, in January Kenneth Pollack (also see "Saddam Hussein" FAQ section and "Should We?/Experts" FAQ section) of the Brookings Institute co-authored a New York Times op-ed advising "How Bush Can Avoid the Inspection Trap." The "cheat and retreat' tactic of Hussein had been used in the 90s with President Clinton, Pollack recalls. Hussein now believes that "feigning cooperation...can convince the Europeans to delay American military action long enough to prevent it altogether. Now the President should take four steps": make clear that cooperation does not equal compliance, de-emphasize finding a smoking gun, share more intelligence with allies, and press the UN for an ultimatum. Events would show that Pollack's advise was taken very seriously. |
| Perle | Pollack | Krauthammer |
| Kay | Milhollin | Other Administration Hawks |
| Return to Top | ||
Charles Krauthammer also expresses doubt in "The Window of Legitimacy": "The question on which everything hinges, is whether, when the window of legitimacy begins to close, Bush can find his way out of the trap set for him by the Security Council." For more Krauthammer views, see "Should We/Columnists For War" FAQ section.
 |
Former UNSCOM head David Kay feels that less will be verified this time around: "And even though the previous frustrating effort lasted seven years, this one--with a tougher mandate--is somehow supposed to be largely wrapped up in just 60 days with half as many inspectors....You can 'rollback' on weapons by destroying them, but how do you roll back knowledge? Only by changing the nature of a regime." Kay's skepticism is further reflected in this analogy: "You're sending a farm team up against a World Series contender in deception, denial, and concealment efforts" (Chicago Tribune, 9/13/02). Kay feels that Weapons Inspectors will need to look at 1400 facilities. Chemical weapons are unlikely to be used by terrorists, predicts Kay. (See "P.S." FAQs for more Kay details) |
| Perle | Pollack | Krauthammer |
| Kay | Milhollin | Other Administration Hawks |
| Return to Top | ||
The President has repeatedly warned, "The dictator of Iraq will fully disarm, or the United States of America will lead a coalition and disarm him." President Bush remains "skeptical", saying the issue is not inspectors but disarmament. Yet in early September Powell told the BBC that "the President has been clear that he believes weapons inspectors should return" (NYTimes, 9/2/02). New York Times foreign policy writer David Sanger, in late September, pointed out that in reality, "Simply put, the military plans now on Mr. Bush's desk all call for disarming Iraq by toppling Mr. Hussein" (9/30/02). Time Magazine wrote at the same time, "Even though the Bush administration considers inspectors a waste of time, it is stuck going through the motions...inspectors are just a politically necessary warm-up to the main event [regime change". Said Cheney in the fall, "A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort" (NYTimes/Reuters, 9/17/02). The Guardian reports collaborate these inconsistencies in an article which stated, "Colin Powell's declaration, in a BBC radio interview, that Washington might pursue 'regime change' in Iraq even if the Iraqi leader complies fully with weapons inspectors" (9/26/02).
The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control , Gary Milhollin, an arms expert and head, commented in mid-September that "UN inspectors, as they are currently constituted, will never' work, due to mobile labs, and the lack expertise of inspectors (NYTimes, 9/16/02). Other concerns include factories with dual use production, which could, for example, produce chemical weapons and pesticides.
| Perle | Pollack | Krauthammer |
| Kay | Milhollin | Other Administration Hawks |
| Return to Top | ||
Did the President still desire "regime change" from the start, regardless of the results of inspectors discovery of weapons? Critics of the administration claim that Weapons Inspectors are needed "to go through the necessary motions of peace." Former head of biological weapons inspectors Spertzel, feels inspectors hesitance to push for scientist interviews shows that "maybe they don't want to find anything" (Tribune, 1/11). William Safire (Jan. 9) criticizes inspectors for "not being serious" in three ways: not examining ammunition depots, computer tapes, and not taking scientists to Cyprus.
 |
Comments John Burns reporting from Iraq for The New York Times, top UN officials have "the suspicion that Washington hard-liners might prefer them to fail, so as to clear a path to a military showdown." |
The Washington Post wonders if the President really ever wanted inspectors to return: "Other provisions in the U.S. draft [to the UN] appeared designed to ensure that the inspection process never begins. Later the Post argues that "there is...almost no chance that ...Hussein will comply with the [UNSC] resolution." Comments a Post editorial after the UN resolution passed, "Giving inspections one last try was exactly the outcome ...Cheney and...Rumsfeld feared most." The Washington Post reports that a former U.S. official said, "The hawks' nightmare is that inspectors will be admitted...and economic sanctions would be eased." As Cheney himself said in August, "A return of inspectors would provide no assurances whatsoever" of Iraqi compliance. Since regime change was the original goal, one wonders if weapons inspections would ever prove satisfactory to the administration.
| Perle | Pollack | Krauthammer |
| Kay | Milhollin | Other Administration Hawks |
| Return to Top | ||
Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's deputy, used a business
metaphor in referring to inspections. "When an auditor discovers
discrepancies in the books, it is not the auditor's obligation to prove where
the embezzler has stashed the money. It is up to the person or institution
being audited to explain the discrepancy [in missing WMD] (NYTimes,
1/24/03).
Blix's predecessor
Rolf Ekeus, reputed for being tougher than Blix, asks, "Suppose the U.S. member [on the UN team] wants to go behind
one door in a building and the French member doesn't, what happens?...That plan
is unworkable." Clinton
Middle East coordinator Dennis Ross worries that Hussein "will not turn
over the crown jewels of his WMD program--especially in the nuclear and
biological area...The prospect of finding what he does not want us to find is
very limited without help from those in Iraq who know where the most sensitive
work is being done." Ross concludes that the December 8 disclosure is key
to judging Hussein's real cooperation.
17. What are "coercive
inspectors"?
Quietly suggested by the U.S. starting in September 2002, they would allow up
to 50,000 troops to
accompany inspectors--any place any time. The Carnegie Institute's
Jessica Matthews provides 6 pages of detailed analysis of "coercive inspections in "How
to make inspections work." It would quickly become an initial
invasion force, if necessary. France, Russia, and China threatened a
veto of such a
measure in the UN, and it was not presented for serious consideration. Had Iraq
not accepted the UN resolution, the U.S.
had plans to "raise the stakes" to make inspectors more
aggressive. Others suggest that this trial balloon may have been a strategy to
intentionally get the first U.S.
draft rejected by the UN so the U.S. could then be seen as compromising.
Head of GlobalSecurtiy.org, a military think tank,
felt the resolution was worded to be rejected, partly because it included
officials and their family members taken out of the country for
interviews. "I could never imagine Iraq agreeing to this. If
you're going to be invaded you might as well make the invading force shoot their
way in" (The Guardian, 10/3/02).
A small-scale invasion of Iraq began in September of 2002. According to a U.S. intelligence official, the spying and undercover war could well be going on in January 2003, according to the Chicago Tribune (1/5/03) and Sydney Morning Herald (1/6/03): Some special forces members [at least 100 inside Iraq since September] were following movements around suspected weapons sites, and this information could be handed to the UN teams"
18. It is true that UN weapons
inspectors were infiltrated by U.S. spies during the '90s?
Yes. Saddam Hussein had long
accused inspectors of being spies. For three years some UN "inspectors" (ironically paid by Iraq through the oil for food revenues), placed
by the U.S., actually admitted to being spies for the U.S.("U.S.
Spied on Iraq Military via UN", Washington
Post, March 2, 1999 and "USCOM
infiltrated by spies," BBC, March 23, 1999), passing on their U2 photographic intelligence to
Israel's Mossad, and being "co-opted by the CIA" (Out of the Ashes,
286). The
inconsistency of the Washington Post can be seen in articles in the
paper which continue to claim only that "Iraq claims inspectors were
spies."
 |
In early October, the New York Times reported the previous "disclosure that a U.S. spy on the UN team had planted an electronic eavesdropping devise in Baghdad that helped guide allied bombing" in December 1998's Operation Desert Fox under President Clinton (10/2/02). |
Blix further admitted in November that American spies had been placed on inspection teams, and this has been confirmed by the U.S. administration. The new inspection team is from a larger variety of countries and not dominated by the U.S. In December, The New York Times correspondent in Iraq, John Burns, reported that "new teams are determined to avoid what happened [in the 1990s], with American and British agents planted in the teams [were] passing information about weapons sites back to their superiors in Washington and London before it was passed up the UN chain."
UNSCOM chief inspector Scott Ritter said that in 1996 he was approved by the CIA to join the agency as an agent (Baltimore Sun, 7/20/03).
19. Why weren’t UN weapons inspectors in Iraq for four years?
 |
A complex question. After years of cat-and-mouse obstructionism and concealment by Hussein's regime, UNSCOM left in protest on December 16, 1998, just hours before four days of heavy U.S. bombings under President Clinton, code-named Operation Desert Fox. After these bombings, the Iraqi government refused to allow the inspectors to return and surely some weapons and factories were destroyed by the U.S. However, most don't know that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported Iraqi compliance for much of the '90s. |
Critics of sanctions point out that the standards the U.S. set keep changing. "We keep moving back the goalposts," says Dennis Halliday, former UN assistant Secretary-General, in charge of UN Humanitarian program in Iraq. Bush and Clinton have both stated that sanctions will remain as long as Hussein is in power, which is a policy contrary to UN resolutions. Also see "Sanctions" FAQ section.
20. What came of the
spring and summer 2002 meetings between the Iraqi
Foreign Minister Naji Sabri and UN Secretary General Annan?
They continued to discuss the possibility of weapons inspectors returning to Iraq. Sabri (a
Christian and former teacher of English Literature) wanted broader discussions to
include: 1.) the future lifting of sanctions; 2.) ending American threats
of war against Hussein; 3.) a timetable so that inspectors are not in Iraq indefinitely, and 4.) the enforcement of the no-fly
zones. Iraq sought assurances that sanctions will indeed be
lifted (as the UN resolutions mandate) if it is verified that they do not possess WMD
(Weapons of Mass Destruction). "The louder the US beats its drum, the easier
it is for Iraq to play the role of innocent victim," as explained in "War
Games." In other words, "How can the UN persuade Iraq to
allow inspections if Mr. Bush is still vowing to remove him?" (New
York Times, 9/4/02). Also see "The
Answer From Iraq", "Inspector
May Visit", "Invited
To Iraq" and "Mixed
UN Reaction."
21. Will weapons inspectors
certify that sanctions against Iraq should be ended?
The new UN resolution finally provides hope that sanctions could be
lifted. Since the Gulf War, Presidents Bush, Clinton, and Bush have given Hussein little if any motivation to
cooperate with weapons inspectors, because for years they have consistently demanded that sanctions not
be lifted until Hussein is "gone". On May 5, 2002, Sec. of State Powell
officially upped the ante, saying on ABC's "This Week" that the Administration wants to overthrow
Hussein even if weapons inspectors return, giving Hussein no insensitive to
relent on the inspectors and "giving the lie to the demands...for the
return of weapons inspectors" (UK's liberal MP Galloway). Powell changed his
view on September 1, urging inspector return as a top priority, and
contradicting
Cheney's speech the previous week. Is it possible to normalize
relations when the U.S. is calling for an invasion of Iraq and overthrow of
Hussein? Why wouldn't Hussein build weapons to defend
himself against an imminent U.S. attack? Sandra
Mackey, author of The Reckoning, feels that biological and chemical
weapons cannot be controlled or eliminated, even with the return of inspectors.
"It is impossible for Iraq to satisfactorily demonstrate that it has met a
negative criterion" (Voices in the
Wilderness). Some experts surmised that weapons inspectors could
be in Iraq for years. Also see
"Sanctions FAQ" Section.
22. Does the U.S. allow international weapons inspectors on U.S. soil?
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In September the administration expressed its opposition to an international inspections regime to destroy biological weapons. Resolution 687, often quoted by Powell and Straw, includes Article 14. While it does call for "the disarmament of Iraq's WMD programs to be taken as a step towards the establishment throughout the Middle East of 'a zone free of WMD and all missiles to deliver them and a global ban on chemical weapons'" (Bennis and UN Resolutions, 11/02). The free zone refers to Israel with its nuclear arsenal and the chemical weapons refers to the U.S. and others. Since the U.S. does not allow UN weapons inspectors in the U.S., some see this as a double standard. http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4612439-110481,00.html |
Also see "U.S. Drops Bid to Strengthen Germ Warfare Accord."
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