Was the War Inevitable?
Also see Nuclear/Al Qaeda and UN/Inspectors and P.S. FAQ section

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Last updated  12/15/2005

US begins the war on Iraq on March 19-20...

2.  What were the plans to attack Iraq before 9/11?  What was The Project for the New American Century?

"If Donald Rumsfeld is the face, mouth, and strong right arm of the war in Iraq, Wolfowitz--the intellectual godfather of the war--is its heart and soul," commented Time Magazine (1/29/04).

The "deep roots" of this policy of pre-emptive war from 1992 are detailed in "Deep roots of Bush's hatred for Saddam."  http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4625987-110863,00.html

In March 2005, John Bolton, undersecretary of State, was nominated to become US Ambassador to the UN.  He is more often labeled as a blunt hawk than a diplomat.

The PNAC statement of principles from June 3, 1997 had 25 signatures.  The group wanted to go to war with Iraq "even should Saddam pass from the scene" (SF Chronicle, Harley Sorenson, 7/21/03). The PNAC wrote an open letter to President Clinton in 1998, urging him to begin "implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's regime from power" (Washington Post, 1/12/03). 

Though Clinton actually urged "regime change", Secretary of State Madeline Albright tried to set the record straight on September 24, 2003.  Speaking at the Winnetka, Illinois Congregational Church, Clinton's Secretary of State said that regime change was desired from within as opposed to through invasion.

In 1998 Robert Kagan, Weekly Standard colleague of PNAC chairman Kristol, urged overthrow of Hussein.  "The only solution to the problem in Iraq today is to use air power and ground power, and not stop until we have finished what President Bush began in 1991" (Weekly Standard, 2/2/98). 

The Iraq Liberation Act of October, 1998 (Public Law 105-338) giving $97 million to the INC, conveyed the sense of Congress:  "It should be the policy of the U.S. to support efforts to remove the regime...from power..."  as a start at remaking the Middle East.

The PNAC's further aims, in their words,  were to "shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests" to achieve "a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad...to increase defense spending significantly" and to pursue "America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles...While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.' (The Guardian, 3/2/03).

A Minneapolis Star Tribune editorial, written after the war, sees  it as clear that with PNAC, "The American people were sold a bill of goods by a small, cadre of PNAC ideologues, bent on attacking Iraq" hoping that allies would come around and that democracy would spread through the Middle East. 

The PNAC group later wrote an Op-ed in the Washington Times on September 20, 2001 stating explicitly that Hussein must go "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack" or any connection to Al Qaeda.  The challenge, in their views, was to persuade the public that "such links either did indeed exist or were sufficiently likely to exist that a preventative strike against Iraq was warranted.  Their success in this respect was stunning, although, in order to pull it off, they also had to distort and exaggerate the evidence being collected by U.S. intelligence agencies" (7/16/03, "Key Officials Used 9/11 as Pretext for Iraq War", Inter Press Service). 

This Washington Times letter was signed by the original PNAC group and also Bill Bennet, Charles Krauthammer (see "Columnists For War" section) and Randy Scheunemann, who would soon lead the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.  This "Saddam Must Go:  A How-to Guide" included two of the articles written by Salmay Khalizad, special White House envoy to the Iraqi opposition under Bush, and Paul Wolfowitz, now deputy defense secretary. The Inter Press Service terms their success "beyond question" because by October 2001 a PEW survey found that 2/3 of Americans believed that "Saddam Hussein helped the terrorists in the Sept. 11 attacks" (7/16/03).  "Congress in running scared on Iraq, for fear of seeming unpatriotic," claims a Post commentary by David Ignatius.

But before Bush took office and before 9/11, The Washington Post reports that Dick Cheney, spoke on Meet the Press.  The Vice-President defended Bush's decision not to attack Iraq because the U.S. should not act as though "we are an imperial power, willy-nilly moving into capitals...taking down governments... We want to maintain our current posture vis-a-vis Iraq" (Post, 1/12/03). 

Cheney's PNAC pondered before 9/11 that what was needed to assure U.S. global power was "'some catastrophic and catalyzing event, like a new Pearl Harbor'" (The Guardian, 2/23/03).  The article further discusses the role of Wolfowitz and Karl Rove in pushing the war.  Later, administration hawk and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld set up the Defense Policy Board which sought evidence incriminating Iraq which the CIA could not find.  One of their main sources of information was Iraqi exile and INC leader, Chalabi, who was often mentioned as the next President after Hussein was deposed.

The Foreign Affairs review of Daalder and Lindsay's book America Unbound (2003) further examines Cheney's transformation after 9/11 and the power of the neocons who will gain credit or blame for the war.  The authors' write, "'Soon after the attacks...Cheney immersed himself in a study of Islam and the Middle East, meeting with scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami who argued that toppling Saddam would send a message of strength and enhance America's credibility throughout the Muslim world.'  Having spent time with such tutors, and under the influence of his chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president became the chief advocate of their positions."
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101fareviewessay82614/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives.html

After the war began, an Australian journalist discovered in September of 2003 that the State Department web site, was still linked to a February 2001 comment from Colin Powell.  He told reporters in Egypt that Saddam Hussein "has not developed any significant capability with respect to WMD.  He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors" (Wash Post, 9/25/03). 

Also after the war, came the new book (The Price of Loyalty, by Ron Suskind) about former Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill.  He alleged the plans to go to war with Iraq before 9/11.  He was surprised that these plans were a central focus of the first cabinet meetings in January and February 2001, with no specific evidence of WMD.

The White House reaction didn't directly deny these charges, but fired back at O'Neill, recalling that under the Iraqi Liberation Act it had been the policy of the government since 1998 for regime change.  They also reminded Americans that O'Neill has been fired (asked to resign) and that he was trying to justify his personal views against pre-emptive war.

At cabinet meetings O'Neill said that the president "was like a blind man in a roomful of deaf people"; Cheney was accused of blocking the president from debate. There was no free flow of ideas or open debate about whether the U.S. should go to war.  It was all about finding a "way,"  reported CBS News. "Go find me a way to do this," said the former Treasury Secretary.
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines04/0111-02.htm

O'Neill cited "Plan for post-Saddam Iraq" memos which included peacekeeping troops, war crimes tribunal, and even divvying up Iraq' oil wealth.  One Pentagon document, date March 5, 2001, was entitled, "Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts."  
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/10/oneill.bush/index.html

For press and Democrat response to O'Neill, see P.S. FAQs, #3. 

In March 2004, another former Bush administrator insider made further accusations.  Richard Clarke had worked in the Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and was a leading anti-terrorism expert for many of those years.  He accused the Bush administration of not heading his warnings of alQaeda prior to 9/11 and starting on 9/12 focusing on Iraq. For a myriad of responses to Clarke, see P.S. FAQ's, #15.

Bob Woodward became the third insider to focus on the inevitability of the war.  Based on interviews with 75 leaders and policy makers, including Bush and Rumsfeld, his Plan of Attack was released in April 2004.  Woodward alleged that just 72 days after 9/11, Bush asked Rumsfeld to draft an updated invasion plan against Iraq.  Bush wanted the planning to remain secret, which it did, so Bush would not appear obsessed with Saddam (Chicago Tribune front page, 4/17/04). 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29427-2004Apr20.html

CIA accounts of Iraq took a dramatic shift with the Bush administration.  (Also see nuclear evidence).

It seems to the author of this website that the shock, surprise, and subsequent misinformation that led from 9/11 to war with Iraq could be compared to similar wars:  (also see "History" FAQ section) 
1.  The Boston Massacre leading to the Revolutionary War;
2.  The explosion and sinking of The Maine at Havana, Cuba leading to the Spanish-American War;
3.  The Austro-Hungarian anger over the Sarajevo assassination of their Archduke leading to World War I;
4.  The shock and anger of Pearl Harbor leading to U.S. entry into World War II.  

Perhaps these four wars were all inevitable.  But did public and politicians grasped onto the shocking event to at least speed Americans involvement or declaration of war?  Would the U.S. have attacked Iraq without 9/11?  Why did 70% of Americans, even in September 2003, still believe that Hussein was personally behind the 9/11 attacks?

3.  What was the administration's case back in the spring and summer of 2002?

For the American public, first came President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech in January of 2002. Internal debates among administration leaders took place quietly in the spring of 2002, as Bush leaned more and more toward war.

Actually, though, the case for war goes back earlier, to September of 2001.  On September 11 (the day of the terrorist attacks) and on September 12 some in the Pentagon suggested that Iraq should be targeted first, not Afghanistan.  In his book Bush at War, Bob Woodward reports that on September 12, "Rumsfeld was raising the possibility that they could take advantage of the opportunity offered by the terrorist attacks to go after Saddam immediately."  Woodward quoted Rumsfeld, "'Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al-Qaeda?'"  The next days the Secretary of Defense insisted that Iraq should be "'a principal target of the first round in the war against terrorism."  Wolfowitz also pushed early to topple Hussein. See "The day the world changed forever", which concludes, "Finally, the theory of 1992 [PNAC] had become the reality of August 2002.  And all the hawks needed was proof of a link between Saddam and al Qaeda to find the justification for their long-awaited war to 'liberate' Iraq."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4626111-110863,00.html

Rumsfeld also set up the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Influence which was planning to provide "false news items to unwitting foreign journalists and to influence policy makers and public sentiment abroad."  Though Bush and Rumsfeld shut it down when the goals became public, the Pentagon contract was awarded for a similar project in the fall of 2003 (NYTimes, 12/5/03). 

See a complete listing of recommended books on Iraq.

The Washington Post reported that just six days after 9/11 a "top secret" document "directed the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq" ("U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past:  Opponents of War Wonder When, How Policy Was Set", 1/12/03).  Retired Army General Wayne Downey began working up plans, on his own initiative.  Only in his January 2002 State of the Union message did the President tip his hand.  "I will not wait on events while dangers gather."

Washington Post reporter Dana Milbank also reported on the President's mind being made up in 2001 ("For Bush, War Defines Presidency", 3/9/03). http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61350-2003Mar8?language=printer

Over the winter, the administration "was planning strategy for selling its Iraq policy," writes the AP in "9/11 Attack Leads to Showdown with Saddam" (3/17). 

In March, Time magazine reported that the President told a group of senators at the White House, "F--- Saddam, we're taking him out" (Globe and Mail, 6/25/03). 

By April, Bush hinted to a British reporter, "I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go" (Post, 1/12/03).  

During the summer of 2002, "Bush's deputies began laying out the case". Rumsfeld called Iraq a "terrorist state", Rice said Saddam's willingness to destroy his neighbors makes "a very powerful moral case for regime change", and Cheney warned that Iraq must not be allowed to build a nuclear bomb (AP, 3/17/03). 

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Then on June 1, 2002, the President, speaking at West Point and in other comments following, hoped for Hussein's downfall because "the world would be a better place without the regime" ("Bush ready to declare war"), he is "A Menace to World Peace", and "is stiffing the world." He also argued for the new doctrine of pre-emption:  "The Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment" must give way to "new thinking...We cannot defend American and our friends by hoping for the best.  We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants...If we wait for the threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long" (Wash Post, 3/17/03). The challenge for the administration, according to Time Magazine's special edition of September 16, was to answer "Why now?" Why not North Korea developing a lethal arsenal or Saudi Arabia, whose people deserve a "free and democratic state."

The Washington Post reports that "only later did it become clear that the President already had made up his mind".  Jordanian officials confirmed this early inevitability.  The New York Times reported that the president would not be dissuaded from military action.  "'The king [of Jordan] asked the president, 'Can I change your mind?' and the president told him bluntly, 'No." (3/9).  The Post's Dana Milbank reported in March 2003 that "Bush's aides believe the president made up his mind about Iraq in the early days after September 11." (3/9).

A thorough Post from  July 31, 2002 was entitled, "In Assessing Iraq' Arsenal, The 'Reality Is Uncertainty.'"

If his mind was made up, one wonders about Bush's "war is not inevitable" assurances in the fall of 2002. 

Simultaneously, we receive mixed messages when  Bush also "promises patience." and claims he has not made up his mind, saying "It's up to Saddam Hussein...to make that choice [of war]." See also "Administration Quotes About Saddam."  

On August 5, Powell asked for a dinner meeting with Bush.  There, Bob Woodward writes in his book Bush at War that Powell convinced him to go through the UN by arguing, "It's nice to say we can do it unilaterally, except you can't." Previously the President had not talked of any UN approval being needed.

During the summer of 2002 the administration did not speak with one voice, thus labeled as "a summer a disarray" by some.  Suggested Former Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, in early September, "They're singing at least...different lyrics to the same music, and they're undermining their case." (Washington Post, 9/2/02). 

Part of the reason there was no evidence of weapons labs is a "lack of reliable intelligence-gathering on the ground", reported the Washington Post, (7/31/02).  Was the goal over the summer regime change or disarmament? 

Time's special edition "Are We Ready For War" (9/16/02) set the scene broadly:  "With each new speech, each meeting with congressional leaders, each Op-Ed salvo, the Administration is speaking to a curious and conflicted public.  Is this war really necessary?  Do we have to fight it now?  Will we have to fight it alone?  And will starting a war have consequences like more terrorist attack at home and abroad?  Administration officials are still working out their plan for answering those questions in a way that will show American that war, as terrible as it is, is the least costly course possible.  Saddam, they will argue, is dangerous now and will grow only more dangerous as he builds his arsenal of gases and poisons and search for nuclear weapon.  There is a sense, at least inside the Beltway, that Bush will eventually win the support he needs.  But the issues haven't yet been fully aired, and to the extent that there has been debate, it has occurred largely within the President's party between the brain trust of the current President Bush and the veterans of his father's Administration.  Democrats have been nearly silent on the merits of an invasion, perhaps because there's no point wasting a bullet when, for now, there are plenty of Republicans to do it for them."  (Also see "Should We Go to War" FAQ section).

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Bush faced "task of uniting divided administration."  The administration did not want to present a new policy to the nation in August, during the summer. Phyllis Bennis, of the Institute for Policy Studies, has spoken out against the push for war.  In her prepared testimony (she was not called to testify), she prepared these ideas on July 31. Bennis worried about the death of Iraqi civilians (predicting 10,000), destruction of infrastructure, international law, the Bush  idea that "you are either with us or with the terrorists".  She also discussed "What happens after "regime change"? worrying that "The notion that everyone in Iraq will welcome as "liberators: those whom most Iraqis hold responsible for 12 years of crippling sanctions is simply naive."  

In addition to Dick Cheney's August speech, (see below for Cheney) early public support for an invasion came from Sec. of  Defense Rumsfeld,  appearing before Congress on September 18.  (see Rumsfeld's full text)  Some criticized Rumsfeld's responses to Congress as "content-free" (Newsweek, 9/16/02). 

NSA Condoleezza Rice has used the "moral" argument for war (and a response to Rice) A once wavering Sec. of State Powell appeared less hesitant to go to war by December or earlier. After weeks of silence, Powell contradicted Cheney in early September by making the return of weapons inspectors a top priority. Between State and Pentagon and CIA, there was clearly "Doubt in the Ranks,"  though spokesman Ari Fleisher played down publicly aired differences by saying that Cheney and Powell agree (Post, 9/3/02). 

Newsweek described the disagreement thusly: "...The Bush administrations mixed signals have begun to sound like Orwellian double think. Prodded by his hard-line conservative base, Bush said flatly months ago that he intended to remove Saddam, hinting that renewed UN arms inspections wouldn't work."  In early September regime change started to become secondary to disarmament in some administration voices.  But, continues Newsweek, "because of Bush's earlier hard-line comments, many foreign officials now believe the American's are trying only to set up a pretext for war."  Commentator Fareed Zakaria wrote that "this whole business smells less like flexibility and more like chaos." 

 Also see Allies/UN for updates on the UN resolution against Iraq.

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4.  Why was Dick Cheney's August 2002 speech seen as important?  What did Cheney argue in the countdown to war?  (Also see "Nuclear/al Qaeda FAQ section and Purdum's book)

VP Dick Cheney's August 26 speech (see full speech), cemented him as the most powerful player in the White House.  On August 26, for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Cheney urged the U.S. to "take the battle to Hussein" (Chicago Tribune headline).  "What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness...The risks of inaction are far greater that the risk of action...Saddam has perfected the game of cheat-and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception."  He believed that Iraq would have a nuclear bomb "very soon."

The Vice-President asserted directly, much to the chagrin of growing rival Powell, "We now know that Saddam had resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons." He added, "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has WMD, no doubt that he is massing them to use against our friends, against our allies and against us."

"When the CIA says [to Cheney in 2002] 'We don't have any evidence' his reaction is...We didn't have any evidence in 1991, either'" when Hussein was close to building a nuclear weapon.  "'Why should I believe you now?'"  Cheney would have asked.  The Washington Post's Walter Pincus writes after the war that "some strategist, in and out of the government, argued that the uncertainty itself--in the face of circumstantial evidence--was sufficient to justify 'regime change' But that was not what the Bush administration usually said to the American people...The administration describe a growing, even imminent, nuclear threat from Iraq"  Pincus and his sources wonder whether in August of 2002 "ahead" of the President, Cheney was trying to push Bush or play good cop, bad cop.  The Vice-President said "we now know" part of the nuclear evidence came from Hussein Kamel, Hussein's son-in-law, who defected in 1995.  However, Kamel told U.S. and other officials that uranium enrichment programs had stopped in 1991. Kamel died in 1996.

Cheney had said the previous week, as he had before, that the inspectors did no good and should never return.  They would only provide "false comfort."  Newsweek described Rumsfeld's views on inspectors: "utterly pointless." Yet on September 1 Powell said that the President wants inspectors to return. Against going to the UN, Cheney was understandably very quiet in October and November as the UN debated weapons inspectors. He stayed out of the spotlight through early 2003. The New York Times' Paul Krugman describes Bush's team in "The Bully's Pulpit."  

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The New York Times responds that Cheney's calls to bring democracy to Iraq "ring hollow as long as Washington is silent about General Musharraf's arbitrary rule in Pakistan." Cheney feels prominent Republicans critical of invading Iraq are displaying "deeply flawed" logic. See  "Cheney waves White House war banner," and "Cheney Says Iraqi Strike is Justified." Reaction to his August speech was broad, including the Washington Post's "Mr. Cheney on Iraq", and other publications writing "US rift widens over Iraq" and "Cheney's Oily Rhetoric."   General reaction to the administration in August came from "Daggers drawn in the house of Bush"  A thoughtful summary/analysis of the summer views of the administration comes from "UN Presses for Tough Stance."

Brookings Institute's Philip Gordon in mid-January, wrote, "The U.S. is in a box, and I think they hope that something gets them out of the box like an inspectors finding something, or provoking a crisis that provides a pretext for war...What is most likely is that the U.S.. is going to go to war on the best basis it can find." (The Guardian, "How Cheney's revelation led toward the point of no return"). Another writer suggests the inevitability without war on Hussein:  "It would be the foreign policy equivalent of his father saying 'read my lips no more (sic) taxes.'"

On three occasions, beginning in December of 2001, Cheney also continued to emphasize the alleged Mohammed Atta meeting in Prague.  The FBI, CIA, and Czech government had concluded that there was not such meeting. For more details see the last question in this section.

After the President's State of the Union address of 2003, Cheney surfaced again from his being "consumed by planning for the political reconstruction of a post-Hussein Iraq."  His late-January speech closed with "a sober warning:  'We will not permit a brutal dictator with ties to terror and a record of reckless aggression to dominate the Middle East and to threaten the U.S.'" (NYTimes, 1/31/03, "Cheney, Little Seen by Public, Plays a Visible Role for Bush"). It also turns out that Cheney made frequent and unprecedented visits to the CIA, which to some appeared intimidating.  

Cheney was CEO of Halliburton between his years as Bush 41 Secretary of Defense and Bush 43 VP.  In five years Halliburton "nearly doubled" its government contracts and its political contributions were "overwhelmingly" to Republican candidates.  Cheney's deferred payments from Halliburton as VP are up to $1 million a year for five years. (The Guardian, 3/12). See "P.S. FAQs" for more on Halliburton.

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5.  What did the administration argue in fall, 2002 about going to war?  (Also see "Congress" FAQ section)  

Bush's "Doctrine of Pre-emption" (full text), released earlier in the fall, explains the new, aggressive policy. Gore is among those criticizing the new pre-emptive policy:  "What this doctrine does is to destroy the goal of a world in which states consider themselves subject to law...That concept would be displaced by the notion that there is no law but the discretion of the President of the United States." (see Gore's full speech) Cheney feels that weapons inspectors return won't change the need for a U.S. invasion (Chicago Tribune, 8/8/02). Powell tellingly suggested on the BBC that if Iraq cooperated with weapons inspectors the U.S. might invade anyway. Comments a Post editorial after the UN resolution passed, "Giving inspections one last try was exactly the outcome ...Cheney and...Rumsfeld feared most."  

Released by the administration in October was the National Intelligence Estimate, "Iraq's Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction."  The Washington Post made available this 8-page excerpt of the report.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/documents/nie_iraq_wmd.pdf

Thomas Powers in The New York Times Review of Books wrote an 11-page analysis on "The Vanishing Case for War" in December of 2003. Powers focuses on the period from August 2002 until the outset of war.http://www.commondreams.org/views03/1121-11.htm

White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card set up the White House Iraq Group (WHIG) in August to play strategy.  The Post's Pincus reports that the group met weekly in the Situation Room.  Those attending were Karl Rove, Rice, her deputy Hadley, and the Vice President's Chief of Staff, Lewis (Scooter) Libby.  A task force under WHIG planned speeches and white (position) papers. 

Powell's State Department helped other departments form The Future of Iraq Project "which was supposed to involve Iraqis from the country's many ethnic and religion factions, including representatives from the exile community, but was dominated by Chalabi.  ("Listening to the wrong Iraqi", David Phillips, Council of Foreign Relations, NYTimes, 9/20/03.).  For more on Chalabi, see "If Not Hussein" FAQ section.

Newsweek's September 16 cover, on the eve of the President's UN speech, featured a photo of Rumsfeld (unilateral hawk) and Powell (UN, go slow).  It was entitled, "The War Over Iraq:  Rumsfeld vs. Powell--And American vs. the World".  The magazine labeled Rumsfeld "the hawk who's battling for Bush's soul."  The cover story suggested that the President hadn't decided which route to take "but there can be no doubt that Bush wanted to act, no dither, on Iraq, even if that means striking preemptively."  Rumsfeld describes the different roles played by him and Powell:  "His job is to talk them to death, and mine is to hit them over the head."

In October, Bush's Cincinnati speech on the Iraqi threat included these allegations, "If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today--and we do--does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?"  He also warned of "ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundred of miles" which could strike Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.  The al-Samoud 2 missiles can travel less that 200 miles, so could not hit all the targets the President named. (WashPost, "Bush Clings to Dubious Allegations About Iraq", 3/18/03). 

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After Congress approved in October but before the UN approval in November Bush seemed to change course and admit that real disarmament would be the same as regime change.  "That in itself will signal that the regime has changed" (NYTimes, 3/1/03).  But the so-called "dirty dozen" sons and officials surrounding Hussein would clearly not be acceptable and would likely face war crimes trials. 

After the November 8 UN Resolution 1441 passed, Bush talked of the possible need for starting a war against Iraq without any more UN approval. Warned White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, "The UN can meet and discuss, but we don't need their permission." Experts says the concern in the administration is "to make sure any defiance by Iraq is beyond dispute.  Only then could the administration convince the UN, its allies and Americans in general that war is necessary." The UN resolution says that false statements must be coupled with other violations "before a new material breach can be declared by the council" (NYTimes). Yet, after the resolution passed, the administration confirmed that it does not need further UN approval to begin a war; the resolution does mandate further "discussions" at the UN.

Despite the new military plan leaked to the press after the November 8 UN resolution, Bush says that no decision has been reached because he has not yet ordered the nation to war. Yet, starting on October 21, probably under pressure from dozens of countries in the UN, President Bush began to suggest that Hussein could stay in power if he is rid of his weapons.  Is the President being sincere?  On October 16 as he signed the Iraq War Resolution, Bush said, "for the sake of peace", we may need to begin a war with Iraq. In December he told Barbara Walters that he would only go to war if it would "save more lives than it would cost." 

How inevitable was the war?  It seemed only a matter of time before an invasion, judging from CIA plans, troops movements, Congressional hearings, military base buildup, and recent rhetoric. Military experts see unstoppable momentum to war.  Comments one, "There is a bit of 1914 [start of World War I] is this in that once mobilization begins, it's hard to turn off.  There are financial costs and practical costs...The world is psychologically prepared for it.  It would take an act of great fortitude to stop the train now...If you signal to the world that you're serious and you don't do anything, then you're saying you're not a serious country" (Ralph Peters, former army intelligence expert on the Middle East, quoted by Julian Borger in The Guardian, 12/31/02). As one critic of U.S. policy commented, "The 'material breach' [of the weapons inspectors], if it does not happen by itself, will be manufactured."  

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On December 19, Powell called the Iraqi declaration a "material breach", and said "Iraq is well on its way to losing this last chance...The world will not wait forever."  He also emphasized that this not mean that the U.S. would immediately going to war. Claims Powell, "We are doing everything possible" to avoid war, but "if Iraq continues its pattern, then we're not going to find a peaceful solution to this problem." 

However, the next day saw the Washington Post article "US Urges UN to Authorize War in Iraq". As 2002 came to a close, Bush repeated his short but consistent statement on Iraq at his December 29 radio address:  "The burden now is on Iraq's dictator to disclose and destroy his arsenal of weapons...If he refuses [to yield] then for the sake of peace, the U.S. will lead a coalition to disarm the Iraqi regime and free the Iraqi people."  The next week he added, "[We] will be fighting not to conquer anybody, but to liberate people."  Predicts a Brooking Institute Scholar (Michael O'Hanlon, NPR, 1/12/03), "We are going to war...The U.S. has made up its mind."  Jim Hoagland (Post Editorial, 1/12/03) echoes that the U.S. is quickly approaching "no turning back speed."  The troops buildup costs about $1 billion every week.  The same week, Rumsfeld comments that war is "clearly not inevitable."

USA Today reported that extra time before war was requested by UK, Germany, and Russia.  Tellingly, Blair's words spoke for most of the world:  "We are just in the middle of the process" (Post, 1/10/03).  Rumsfeld tried to express U.S. intelligence to NATO ministers in Brussels:  "There are things that we know, and then there are known unknowns.  That is to say, there are things that we now know that we don't know.  But there are also unknown unknowns.  There are things we do not know we don't know...That is, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence...Simply because you do not have evidence that something exists does not mean that you have evidence that is doesn't exist." 

According to the UN resolution and U.S. allies, more evidence is needed. Russia, France, and UK argued that it is the role of the UN to evaluate Iraq's conduct, not the U.S.; all three disagree with the U.S. and feel there has been no material breach. On January 6, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw put the chances of war at 40%, down from 60%. Would the U.S. try to get a second UN resolution passed in January? 

Comments The Guardian in late December, "War, they say, may still not happen, so it's pointless to discuss 'what ifs'.  Everyone knows this is nonsense...We are going to war, but Tony hasn't quite got round to telling us." A helpful Q & A from October includes "Will there be a war", "Why now?", and UN updates.  Also please see "Weapons Inspectors" FAQ Section and "The War" FAQ Section.

For The Guardian, Simon Tisdall felt that for hawks like Rumsfeld, "war remains not only inevitable but also desirable.  For that reason, they hope and expect the inspections process will fail" (11/14/02). Also see Tisdall's "Tricked and bamboozled into war"  

The New York Times warned in October that the country should hold Bush to his word that, "Congress approving this resolution  does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable" (10/8/02). 

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In the fall, insiders say it has become "politically inconceivable...for him to face an election in the future with Hussein left in power" (Observer/UK, 12/22/02).  Others in the "war is inevitable camp" by December argued, "Each time Saddam agrees to "run the course" set by the U.S.", "each time Washington intervenes to set the next hurdle even higher....Weapons inspectors and reports are irrelevant.  This is about America and its desire to change a regime in Baghdad.  Nothing else"    The op-ed concludes:  "Even if Saddam were to parade naked through Weapons sites, he couldn't influence events for the better." ("Lies, Damn Lies, and The War on Saddam Hussein", The Independent/UK, 12/21/02).

In a sense, the American public saw this inevitability in December polls, where 63% said they felt war was inevitable (LATimes). Ray McGovern, Vietnam Vet and CIA analyst, sees a "deja vu/flashback quality of the dissembling of top Bush administrators and leaders "as they make 6 contentions of the Iraqi threat.  "Sadly, this by no means exhausts the list of...allegations that have left most American frightened , but also anesthetized and resigned to an unnecessary war that could include nuclear weapons [threatened by U.S. in response to Iraq's likely use of chemical or biological] (Charlotte Observer Op-ed, 1/3/03).  

On December 31, President Bush put a new twist on the pro-war argument, saying that if Iraq attacked, it would "cripple our economy" (NPR).  But is Iraq likely to attack the U.S., if unprovoked? "We are ready," the President proclaimed to troops on January 3.  The Commander in Chief added, "And now he's got to understand, his day of reckoning is coming." The President's January 7 economic plan "may be dwarfed" by the cost of a war on Iraq. 

Arguing that the hawks in the administration had won by early January, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, portrays the inevitable:  "They have taken the positions that if Saddam admits he has [WMD] that means we should get him.  And if he denies it, that means he's lying and we should get him."  (The Guardian, 1/9/03). 

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The December 7 WMD Iraqi declaration is showing the administrative Hawks are losing patience. As E.J. Dionne criticizes the "Herky-Jerky Approach" in the Post, "If you're not happy with the Bush administration's policy toward Iraq at any given moment, just wait a week or two.  A new policy, more to your liking, is bound to appear." Rumsfeld admitted the confused rhetoric in early December ("A Rhetorical Weave on Iraq"):  Asked if the policy was getting rid of WMD or getting rid of Hussein, Rumsfeld replied, "It depends on who you talk to and when you talk to them." 

Powell spoke of the UN resolution before it passed on November 8: "This is not a resolution for war...everybody keeps looking for war.  We keep looking for peace."  Powell had commented in late-October: "If the U.S. was looking for a war and was not interested in may peaceful solution, the president...would not have gone to the UN on the 12th of September...And he would not have spent these last six weeks---and my hair would be less gray than it is now--if all we were looking for was an excuse for war."

Powell echoed these comments to the UN in his February 5 presentation:  "We wrote 1441 not in order to got to war, we wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace."  Retorts Phyllis Bennis, "Rather, the Bush administration intended that the resolution would serve as a first step toward war" Foreign Political in Focus, 2/6/03). The UN resolution mandates that a false Iraqi declaration must be coupled with failure to comply with inspections.

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6.  What was changed by President Bush's  September 12 UN speech or his Cincinnati October 7 prime time TV speech? (Also see "WMD/Inspectors" FAQ, #2 and Nuclear/al Qaeda section)

As an overview, after the President speech to the UN, more allies were more supportive of the U.S., including Saudi Arabia.  Then, when Iraq accepted the weapons inspectors on September 16 a vote became more challenging for Powell to gather.  A few days before his UN speech, Bush and Blair told reporters at Camp David that the world had all the evidence it needs that Iraq is continuing to develop WMD, including nuclear weapons (Washington Post, 9/8/02).  But the President was basing his new evidence, according to Walter Pincus of the Post, on an IAEA report which stated that Hussein was "six months away" from developing nuclear weapons.  There was no new IAEA report; the six month was from 1991.  Commented one intelligence analyst on the likelihood of six month in 2002, "That is just about the same thing as saying that if Iraq gets a bomb, it will have a bomb. We had no evidence of it" (8/10/03). 

A few weeks later the President said, "There are Al-Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq" (Chicago Tribune, 9/27/02). 

As a lead up to the President's UN speech, Newsweek and Time both ran cover stories on Iraq.  Time's special report "Are We Ready for War?" discussed President Bush "making his case" and described Rumsfeld's trip to Congress.  "So much for the smoking gun.  Rumsfeld's presentation left even stalwarts of the president's party unhappy."  On WMD evidence, Time's "What does Saddam Have?" concludes that "the Bush Administration's determination to topple [Hussein] is based less on the WMD he has now than on what he might get later--and what he might one day do with them.  Indeed,  in the debate over how to manage Saddam, Bush is not operating form new intelligence but from a new doctrine of pre-emption."

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In retrospect, the administration had planned a media blitz in the lead up to the President's speech.  On September 8 came the first reference to "aluminum tubes"  and "the mushroom cloud."  Rice warned "We don't want to smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."    Cheney told NBC on September 8, "We do know, with absolute certainty, that [Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon" (Atlantic Journal Constitution, 9/4/03). Then the day before the President's UN speech Rumsfeld said on Face The Nation:  "Imagine a September 11th with WMD" which would kill "tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children."

On September 12, President Bush spoke before the UN and the world (See Full Text of "Securing Freedom's Triumph"). It appeared that the road to Baghdad now went through New York.  He argued that confrontation is a better policy than containment and that the UN must act or the U.S. will.

Labeling Hussein as public enemy #1, the President argued that Iraq has "delayed, denied, and deceived" the UN for years. He issued 5 demands on Hussein, echoed by Powell's testimony before a House committee:  According to the NYTimes, (9/20/02) Powell said "Iraq must unconditionally remove all weapons of mass destruction, end all support for terrorism, cease persecution of civilians, account for gulf war prisoners and end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program."  The last complaint was aimed toward border nations Turkey, Jordan, and Syria.  These demands, the administration must have known, would not have been accepted by Iraq. 

Bush also  criticized Hussein for invading Iran and Kuwait, treating his own people horribly, and not returning Kuwaiti prisoners. He spoke of the link between aluminum tubes and Hussein's attempts to gain nuclear weapons. "Will the UN serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?" he asked. Bush warned that "for the sake of freedom and peace, if the UN will not deal with Saddam Hussein, the U.S. and our friends will."  

Some say his allegations were specific: "Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were once used for the production of biological weapons." 

Time magazine described the Washington strategy as "more likely to get a multilateral solution...if it appears ready to take action unilaterally"  (9/16/02).  Critics felt Bush also asked, "Will international law be irrelevant?"  and called the sudden U.S. "concern for the UN's authority and international law...hypocrisy" The Guardian, 9/17/02). 

A few days later, the Pentagon turned up the heat, warning that Hussein may try to develop missiles which could reach over the 150 km/93 mile limit , to reach Israel, Turkey, and others. Rumsfeld further supplemented the Hussein accusations, saying, "No other living dictator matches [Hussein's] record" on aggression, weapons, cruelty, support or terrorism, and other issues (NYTimes, 9/18/02). (Also see "Saddam Hussein" FAQ's, #1)

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Bush's top speechwriter, Michael J. Gerson, is being called the most influential presidential speech writer since JFK's Theodore Sorenson. Comparing and contrasting Bush speeches to Reagan, Churchill, FDR, and JFK, Presidential scholar and professor government at Georgetown, Stephen Wayne feels that Bush's oratory "lacks the eloquence of a Churchill, the idealism of a JFK, the Americanism of a Reagan or the emotional empathy of a Clinton." But Wayne feels Bush captured the "needs and moods" of the country in his first speech after 9/11 and his peach to Congress nine days later. . http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56783-2003Mar7?language=printer

Reaction to the Bush UN speech and the debate was favorable from the American public, as Newsweek polls showed that two-thirds of Americans "support using military force against Iraq..."  though by a 2-1 margin "it was important that the president have the approval on Congress...the UN...and most of the European allies." (NYTimes/AP, 9/16/02). 

Washington Post editorials, were "Spinning on Iraq", "Calling the UN Bluff".  In the later,  the Post urged a meaningful deadline which would necessitate a change in the France/Germany position.  Striving to both complement and criticize the President, they wrote, "Though powerful in outline Saddam Hussein's relentless drive to acquire deadly weapons, Mr. Bush's speech was less clear in explaining why it is urgent to confront Iraq immediately, when the battle to neutralize al Qaeda is far from over."

Phyllis Beniss of The Institute for Policy Studies, was among the President's critics.  The Progressive editor Matthew Rothschild, writing in "Arrogance at the Podium",  felt that Bush "unilaterally appointed the U.S. as the enforcer of UN resolution...How would the Bush Administration feel if Russia all of a sudden announced that the Security Council resolutions demanding that Israel withdraw from the Occupied Territories will be enforcer, and if they weren't, Moscow would attack Israel?"

A Post article from March '03 traced the "missteps" which "led to failed diplomacy", suggesting that the ground work for the diplomatic impasse "was laid from the moment Bush took office, according to diplomats, analysts and some administration officials.  They point to Bush's conviction in the primacy of U.S. power and his administration's early skepticism of international organization and commitment...the administration did not help itself, some Security Council members say, by signaling early on that it would not be deterred from what many governments viewed as a preset timetable for war...By the time Bush addressed the UN General Assembly on Sept. 12, the administration had angered its allies by its dismissal of the global arming treaty, the international criminal court and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia." 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30858-2003Mar15?language=printer

Initial praise in September for going to the UN dissipated as "many countries began to feel that [Bush's] efforts to solicit the backing of other countries were disingenuous" (Wash Post, "US in a Tough Position As Isolation Increases", 3/6). 

See also "UN/Weapons Inspectors" FAQ section of more diplomacy.

The New York Times'  "The Iraq Test", (Abstract) and The Chicago Tribune's "Bad News for Iraq", which calls for the unconditional return of inspectors an example of Hussein's "game of dodge, feint, and delay."  

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In Bush's prime time October 7 speech in Cincinnati, (also see "Nuclear/al Qaeda" FAQ section) days before the Congressional vote, he said, "The time of denying, deceiving , and delaying has come to an end...Saddam Hussein must disarm himself or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him"  (Chicago Tribune, 10/8/02).  He also stated the need to act now:  "We could wait and hope that Saddam Hussein does not give weapons to terrorists or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world.  But I am convinced that is a hope against all evidence"  (NYTimes, 10/8/02).  

The President further warned that "facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." He also spoke of threatening medium-range missiles and warned that Iraq might launch unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's) to threaten the U.S.  This accusation was dismissed by most as unrealistic before and after the war.  The President failed to say that the range of the drones is only 300 miles. For example, see "Air Force Analysts Feel Vindicated on Iraqi Drones", which appeared in September 2003. The analysts concluded before war that the UAV's were used for reconnaissance not attack. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A2013-2003Sep25?language=printer

The Institute for Public Accuracy breaks down his speech by paragraph and sentences, and, in 16-pages, critiques the President' speech, including his allegation that Iraq "is seeking nuclear weapons...providing safe haven to terrorists [and] we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people."

Other reaction to the speech included "Out of step on Iraq." 
Also see "UN/Allies" section. and "WMD/Inspectors"

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7.  What was the case for war made in President Bush's State of the Union message of January 28?  (Also see "WMD/Weapons Inspectors" FAQ section and Nuclear/al Qaeda FAQ section)
In December and January critics in the U.S. and Europe demanded to see strong evidence or proof before the situation could seem urgent to them. Starting on January 21, one week before the 2003 State of the Union speech, multiple members of the administration launched a new offensive and turned up the rhetoric.  One American diplomat said the President's challenge was to make Hussein "sound like an urgent threat without overreaching" so critics might say he is exaggerating.  "There's a risk to our credibility if we make claims that seem less than fully plausible" (NYTimes, 1/28/03). 

On January 23, The New York Times printed Condoleeza Rice's Op-Ed, (abstract) "Why We Know Iraq is Lying." The NSA chief asked, "Has Saddam Hussein finally decided to voluntarily disarm?  Unfortunately, the answer is a clear and resounding no...countries that decide to disarm [Ukraine, South Africa] lead inspector to weapons and production sites, answer questions before they are asked, state publicly...The declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq's effort to get uranium from abroad...Iraq's declaration even resorted to unabashed plagiarism."  She concluded that Iraq is failing "in spectacular fashion by both its actions and inactions."

On the same day of Rice's op-ed, the administration released a report  "What Does Disarmament Look Like?"  which accused Baghdad of hiding documents and "weapons are hidden in lakes, rivers, mosques, and hospitals and are moved constantly." 

Also, Powell argued, "We believe a persuasive case will be there at the end of the month that Iraq is not cooperating.  On January 22 Powell was interviewed on the PBS Newshour program. He added four days later, "multilateralism cannot become an excuse for inaction."

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Rumsfeld chimed in: "The burden of proof is on Iraq to prove that it is disarming" (guilty until proven innocent).  On January 21, Bush's own hawkish message was consistent with his cabinet: "This looks like a rerun of a bad movie and I'm not interested in watching it."  (Chicago Tribune, 1/22/03). "Time is running out ...At some point in time the United States' patience will run out" (Post, 1/16/03). At the Council of Foreign Relations in Jan. 23, Paul Wolfowitz said, "I'm sick and tired of games and deception." Also see "WMD/Inspectors" FAQ section.

It was assumed that Bush was not likely to give any deadline for the war to begin. However, sources in Washington and London said President Bush was "determined to got to war--in the next few weeks" (The Guardian, 1/24/03). Yet, Ari Fleisher maintained that, on the eve of the speech, "nobody but nobody is more reluctant to go to war than President Bush" (NYTimes, 1/27/03).  Meanwhile, the administration was consider allowing inspectors another month to complete their work before launching war (WashPost, 1/24/03).  Was this to get Turkey on board, to get U.S. troops fully deployed, or a sincere concession.  Was war less inevitable?  The Pentagon said in late January that enough troops would not be ready until late February or early March (WashPost, 1/25/03):  "The internal debate now is not war versus peace, or this year vs. next year, but February vs. March.  So what's the hurry?"  The Post assumed that the inconsistency of administrative statements was due to the two conflicting goals of "escalating pressure on Baghdad and also reassuring nervous allies.  A reaction leads to a counter-reaction. (WashPost, 1/26/03, Concern Grows Over U.s. Need for Allies"). 

The author of this website predicted in late January that President Bush would tell the world that the U.S. should go to war "in a matter of days or weeks" for at least six reasons:
1.  Iraq fires on UK and US warplanes in the no-fly zones (material breach);
2.  Iraq's weapons declaration had omissions, especially in not proving the destruction of weapons from the '90s;
3.  Iraq has imported missile engines and raw materials to produce solid missile fuel;
4.  Iraq is not sufficiently encouraging free interviews of scientists;
5.  The 12 artillery warheads found in early January show falsehood of their declaration;
6.  Even if some nations don't support us yet, we will "lead a coalition of the willing"; 

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The President's State of the Union address (see full text) focused on the "evil" of Hussein. The President said, "the dictator of Iraq is not disarming.  To the contrary, he is deceiving...Tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq:  your enemy is not surrounding your country, your enemy is ruling your country...He has given no evidence of destroying [anthrax and other weapons facilities]."

Mr. Bush also said that we cannot allow "an even greater threat to rise up in Iraq."  He complained about U2 flights and interviews of scientists.  "Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent.  Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?" 

On the alleged links to Al Qaeda, administration officials acknowledged that most of the evidence on the Al Qaeda links had come from detainees (likely in Cuba) who have bee imprisoned for nearly a year (NYTimes, 1/30/03). Bush suggested that we "imagine these 19 hijackers with other weapons...armed by Saddam Hussein...It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known."  See more details on Al Qaeda allegations.

On nuclear issues he spoke again of aluminum tubes and attempts to gain uranium from Africa. (See more details on nuclear allegations)  It was revealed during the summer of 2003 that the African uranium claim had been removed from the President's October speech by CIA director Tenet.  (Also see P.S. FAQ section).  As it turned out, the CIA tried to keep out the "uranium from Africa" claim from the speech.  See Joseph Wilson/CIA Leak Post-Saddam FAQ. for updated on Wilson and the CIA outing. 

Just after his State of the Union, he met with Blair and declared, "After September the 11th, the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water... time is running out...[He has] weeks not months" (NYTimes, 1/31/03 and 2/1/03) .

Reaction to the State of the Union included The Tribune's Clarence Page (2/12/03) described Bush as "a man of simple virtues and few words" that can be useful in a national leader "but unsettling in a complicated world.  In our post-Sept. 11 era, a leader should show some self-reflection, not just plenty of platitudes."

U.S. papers reacted with variety: some were convinced and some wanted more evidence.  For example, the LA Times: "The rhetoric worked.  But many facts need to be filled in.  Bush built a foundation on Tuesday, but he left a lot of hammering, sawing, and nailing to be done by Powell".  Kenneth Pollack, in favor of war, said, "There is still skepticism around the world that Saddam would give his WMD to terrorists.  So it is import that this is not the only argument" (NYTimes, 1/29/03).  Blix denied Bush's accusation that government agents were posing as scientists (also see "Inspectors" FAQ section). 

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8.  What was the case for war made by Powell to the UN on February 5? (Also see "Allies/UN" FAQs)
Two days before the speech, Powell's op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, was "We Will Not Shrink From War."  His case was assisted by the early February British release of documents showing Iraq was not cooperating on the ground, while inspectors and Iraqi scientists are being intimidated. The British report was entitled, "Iraq, Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception, and Intimidation."  Also see "How Saddam hides illegal weapons sites." (The Guardian, 2/2/03). In late January we first heard of the possibility that weapons might be hidden near Syria and Turkey.

Cheney's staff wrote the first draft of Powell's speech, with the Secretary examined for a few days.  At one point he proclaimed, "I'm not reading this.  This is bull..." Cheney assistant Scooter Libby worked to include the Prague story up until the last minute.  As it turned out, Powell's speech was six weeks before the US began the war. 

Powell admitted beforehand that he would present  "no smoking gun."  News reports later described how the Secretary of State spend days pouring over evidence and discussing sources with intelligence agencies. For example, the value of information from defectors was hotly debated in the government and in the Washington Post article, "Defectors Bolster US Case Against Iraq, Officials Say".   The article describes how the Pentagon was receptive but CIA is often dismissive, question their credibility.  One Iraqi contractor who fled in 2001, spoke of chemical and biological weapons labs beneath hospitals and inside presidential palaces.  He was relocated anonymously to a small town in Virginia.  Another defector "identified several locations where he said chemical weapons were stored," and said the weapons had been moved to Syria.  But the Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) called this defector a "marginal" source.  Explained one official, according to the Post, "many of his claims were exaggerated and ill-informed.  The agency is "no longer talking to him" (1/24/03). Others argue that detainees, "roughed up and threatened with torture" and defectors are not reliable sources.  

On Wednesday, February 5, Powell spoke to the UN.  Americans were ready to make up their minds. Televised live throughout Europe and watched by millions in the US, in 75 minutes he dramatically presented previously classified voice ("communication intercept") and photographic data about deceiving inspectors hidden, mobile, biological weapons, secret weapons development, no proof the chemical and biological weapons have been destroyed, unmanned drone planes, and ties or "harboring" of Al Qaeda, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, "an associate of bin Laden."

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See the entire 26-page Powell transcript  BBC's "Key Points" of the speech, and "Saddam Hussein" FAQ section, #8  Powell's thesis seemed to be that Iraq is "deliberately thwarting" the UN. He summarizes his new "denial and deception" evidence as, "Saddam Hussein and his regime are doing everything they can to make sure the inspectors find absolutely nothing."  

The Washington Post' article summarized well, ("Powell Lays Out case Against Iraq" (2/6/03).  Other highlights of the speech I deduce include:
1.  The burden is on Iraq not the inspectors;
2.  "What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing pattern of behavior...of concealment";
3.  "Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, sold sources...These are not assertions, these are facts;
4.  1441 passed unanimously and gave Hussein "one last chance";
5.  He has never accounted for...various weapons;
6.  Our conservative estimate on chemical weapons "would enable [him] to cause mass casualties across...an area nearly 5 times the size of Manhattan";
7.  Hussein has chemical weapons;
8.  There is controversy about what the aluminum tubes are for;
9.  Iraq harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Zarqawi;
10.  "Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him";
11.  "Leaving Saddam Hussein is possession of WMD for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world." 

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Reaction to Powell's speech, was suggested by a NYTimes article, "Even skeptics had to concede that Mr. Powell's presentation had been an important milestone in the debate."  Other positive response from papers around the U.S. included, "Only those ready to believe Iraq and assume that the U.S. would manufacture false evidence against Saddam would not be persuaded by Powell's case." George Will felt that the speech would "change all minds open to evidence."  In the New York Times, writer Steven Weisman asserted that "it will be difficult for skeptics to argue that Washington's case against Iraq is based on groundless suspicions and not intelligence information."  

Writing in the fall of 2003 in the "Editor and Publisher", Greg Mitchell described the significance of the press reaction.  "Why does any of this matter?  It's fashionable to suggest that the White House was bent on war and nothing could have stopped them.  But until the Powell speech, public opinion, editorial sentiment, and street protests were all building against the war.  The Powell speech, and the media swallowing of it, changed all that." 

Other articles that day look at "evidence [that] remains anecdotal".  Others felt that Europe's ally from the fall of 2002 had became a Hawk. A friend of Powell told the Times later that he had felt constantly undercut by hawks in the administration (3/14). While the speech did impress many, it didn't change the views of many governments at the UN but did have an impact on U.S. public opinion.  (See "Should We" FAQ section on public opinion polls).  

President Bush, two days after the speech, warned, "The game is over" and believed that Hussein was only feigning cooperation to stall for time. The week following his UN speech, Powell reiterated, "America comes in peace."

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The U.S. knew at the time that supporting the speech will be UK, Spain, and others.  Specifically, British foreign secretary Jack Straw was supportive and demanded that Hussein had 8 days left to prove he was complying. (The Guardian, 2/6/03). Straw further warned of appeasement.  During the League of Nation in the 1930s, "...small evils went unchecked.  Tyrants became emboldened.  Then greater evils were unleashed."  Any extra time for inspectors is "a recipe for procrastination and delay" (The Guardian, 2/11/03). Straw would likely have agreed with the ideas of Iraq trying to say, "the dog ate my homework [missing weapons]."

At the UN, the US hopes that among those countries swayed by his presentation were Canada, France, Germany, Russia, China, Syria, and others. China, Russia, France, and Germany called for more time for inspections.  Many UN nations reacted to Powell's speech.

France admitted that Iraq was not it total cooperation and admitted the likelihood of biological weapons, but saw no long range missiles to deliver.  De Villepin asked, "To what extent to the nature and scope of the threat justify the use of force?" (NYTimes, 2/6/03). Also see "Allies" FAQ section and "Weapons Inspectors" FAQ section.

Among criticism of Powell's speech were Steve Chapman, who felt that news of obstruction and unaccounted for weapons "is not news...It's very little and very late" (Speech at Winnetka, IL Presbyterian Church, 2/8/03). Other criticism comes from Phyllis Bennis (Foreign Policy in Focus and Institute for Policy Studies, 2/6/03)  Bennis adds details in "Powell's Dubious Case for War".  Bennis feels that Powell is asking Americans to risk lives, civilian death, and chaos "because he thinks maybe in the future Iraq might rebuild its weapons system and might decide to deploy weapons or might give those weapons to someone else who might use them against someone we like or give them to someone else we don't like." "Even if everything Powell said was true, there is simply not enough evidence for war."  

Examining whether Powell's evidence ads up is a special (8 page) analysis by a variety of 12 arms experts on such topics as missing chemicals, aluminum, centrifuges, biological weapons, mobile production, dispersal mechanisms, missiles, rocket engines, long-range missiles, UAVs, hiding of rockets and launchers, terrorism, Ansar, bin Laden, concealment, and deception. 

Bennis would probably like to remember that in his autobiography My American Journey Powell wrote of Vietnam:  "Many in my generation vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reason that the American people could not understand." (The Guardian, 2/6/03). 

Other Powell critics included Pulitzer Prize winner Charles J. Hanley, AP correspondent, writing in August 2003, who felt that Powell's case for war had fallen apart. 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0811-09.htm

Iraq called the accusations "incorrect.", alleging "incorrect allegation, unnamed sources, unknown sources" (NYTimes, 2/6/03).  Powell's speech and Blix's Jan. 27 report made war seem more likely but then Rumsfeld's "old Europe" comments helped lead Europe to push for more weapons inspections. 

In February the author of this web site examined the possibility that the U.S. had trouble taking "yes" for an answer and focused on the lack of proof of the destruction of old weapons.  Iraq continued to surprise the world with their level of cooperation.  For example, Iraq had:
-- accepted the UN resolution of November before the deadline;  
--provided its (criticized) report to the UN by the deadline;
--allowed weapons inspectors to return;
--allowed unfettered access to all sites;
--urged scientist to be interviewed and some were interviewed;
--agreed to destroy their own al-Samoud missiles;
--given a list of scientists to the UN

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9.  What was the administration saying in the weeks before the war?  (Also see "weapons inspectors" FAQ section) 

Aside from Powell's Feb. 5 UN speech, the following day President Bush said, "The game is over." and Rumsfeld echoed on Feb. 7, "The [UNSC] has got to make up its mind soon." The previous month, Russia, France, and China argued that a second UN vote was necessary before going to war.

To the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Powell commented: "If he was really serious about it, he would be telling us what happened to the anthrax, what happened to the bombs...That's not what he's done" (Chicago Tribune, 2/9/03). In his Feb. 8 weekly radio address, the President further his cause: "Saddam Hussein was required to make a full declaration of his weapons program.  He has not done so.  Saddam Hussein was required to fully cooperate in the disarming of his regime.  Has has not done so.  Saddam Hussein was given a final chance.  He is throwing away that chance" (Chicago Tribune, 2/9/03). Then on Feb. 20 Bush emphasized the Iraqi people:  "For the oppressed people of Iraq...the day of freedom is drawing near...."  Indeed the day was drawing near, as the Post  reported nearly a month before the war,  even if Hussein left Iraq, the U.S. still had plans to invade to destroy the WMD and to establish long-term stability (WashPost, 2/21). 

The President's Feb. 26 speech spoke less of WMD and Al Qaeda links and more of regime change of Friedmanesque sounding democracy:  "A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom and transform that vital region. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom..."  

This Middle East domino theory espoused by Bush, Wolfowitz (at left), Friedman, and others, maintains that overthrowing Hussein will lead to democratic reform in the Arab world.  But a classified State Department document, reported the LA Times one week before the war, concluded that this theory is unlikely. The State Department report said, "Liberal democracy would be difficult to achieve...Electoral democracy, were it to emerge, could well be subject to exploitation by anti-American elements" (NYTimes, 3/14).

Bush's February speech continued, "In Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons....The same tyrant has close ties to terrorist organizations and could supply them with he terrible means to strike this country and America will not permit it...We will also lead in carrying out the urgent and dangerous work of destroying chemical and biological weapons...The notion of Iraq, with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people, is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom..."  On allies the President said, "I've listened carefully as people and leaders around the world have made known their desire for peace. All of us want peace."  The President concluded with a look toward a positive future:  "We go forward with confidence because we trust in the power of freedom and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty.  Free people will set the course of history and free people will keep the peace of the world."  

Bush's comments the following week emphasized protecting America, including a March 6 news conference highlighting weapons inspections, the threat of Hussein, North Korea, and allies.  "No matter what the whip count is we're calling for a vote [for second UN resolution]."  The next morning's Chicago Tribune blared, "Bush to UN:  Show your cards:  U.S. to seek vote, but council's backing called unneeded."  The next day as the countdown to war quickened the "clock [was] ticking on UN decision", for the U.S. sought a March 17 deadline. 

As Blix delivered his Feb. 28 report to the UN, President Bush said the only way to prevent war was disarmament and deposing of Hussein, this linking regime change with WMD.  The UN resolution had not referred to any regime change.  Bush echoed the words of Winston Churchill by describing Hussein's "token" moves as "propaganda, wrapped in a lie, inside a falsehood" (NYTimes, 3/1, "U.S. Says Hussein Must Cede Power to Head Off War"). 

Powell's early March comments reflected divisions in the Security Council over the second resolution.  He felt that this lack of unity "will only convince Saddam Hussein that he is right" (NYTimes, 3/1).  Four days later the Times reported that U.S. officials said the UN inspectors had discovered a "new variety of rocket" that could be filed with chemical or biological agents (3/10).  Powell also warned the Senate, "This is the time we have to deal with this kind of threat, not after we have seen thousands of people die as a result of the use of some of these horrible weapons" (NYTimes, 3/6). 

Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on March 5, Powell spoke of time for inspectors and the sacrifice of war:  "The question is" whether Hussein is fully disarming.  

In another alleged new threat, the CIA warned in mid-March that "terrorists based in Iraq are planning attacks against American and allied forces inside the country after any invasion."  These groups may attack American forces trying to stabilize after the war (NYTimes, 3/9).

In early March, Bush added to his list of demands.  Not only must Hussein fully disarm to avoid a war, but regime change is also clearly back on the table.  Perhaps the President was concerned that Hussein was destroying his missiles, as the UN had demanded. The three U.S. "tasks" of mid-February were unfettered interviews with scientists, unimpeded U2 flights, and destruction of rockets.  By early March, there was progress on all three.  Would the U.S. be satisfied?  

On March 6, the President held a rare prime-time news conference, (see full text, Part I and Part II) his first in 17 months and only 8th overall.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4620218-110878,00.html
His father had 58 news conferences at this point in his term and Clinton had 30.  The president labeled the inspections "a willful charade" and said that Hussein would be disarmed "in the name of peace."  At times, the war seemed "a fait accompli" (Wash Post, 3/7).  His press conference was scheduled just ours before a Blix report to the UN "to pre-empt Blix (NYTimes, 3/7).  Blix then said that Iraq had been increasingly cooperative.  

Biological and chemical weapon agents have been moved every 12-24 hours, the president told the nation.  The Post reported that he "followed a script of names in choosing which reporters could ask him a question."  The news conference offered "no new arguments and no new evidence", though he called Hussein "a direct threat. I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons."  Bush wanted Blix to "answer a single question [posed in Powell's speech the day before]:  Has the Iraqi regime fully...disarmed, as required by resolution 1441, or has it not?"

Bush further warned that "the risk of doing nothing, the risk of hoping that Hussein changes his mind a become a gentle soul, the risk that somehow that inaction will make the world safer, is a risk that I'm not willing to take for the American people...Our mission is very clear:  disarmament" (NYTimes, 3/7). 

The President's opening remarks also included:  "If the Iraqi regime were disarming, we would know it, because we would see it...Inspection teams do not need more time, or more personnel...Saddam Hussein...processes weapons of terror...Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country."  When asked why our allies who have access to the same intelligence information don't see that threat as "so imminent", the President brought up 9/11.  "Saddam Hussein is a threat to our nation.  September the 11th changed the strategic thinking, at least, as far as was concerned, for how to protect our country."  Later he replied to a question about "seeing the evidence":  "The American people know that Saddam Hussein has WMD...there is a poison plant in northeast Iraq" [run by the Ansar group]."

Shortly before the war the President added, "We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons, the very weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have." 

We only learned in early November 2003 that a last effort to avoid war was not considered by the administration.  Through an intermediary, Hussein agreed to allow thousands of U.S. troops to search for the WMD he promised he didn't have, to hold elections, and to turn over a 1993 World Trade Center suspect held in Iraqi prison.  Richard Perle, who met with the intermediary, reported that the administration showed no interest.  Perle had been strongly pushing for war long before 9/11.  The New York Times editorial "Rush to War, Revisited" (11/7/03) suggested that by March the administration "was showing little patience for diplomacy or anything else that might delay what it envisioned as a swift and easy military triumph, with jubilant Iraqis cheering American troops, a model Middle Eastern democracy rising in Baghdad, reconstruction paid for by Iraqi oil revenue and not lengthy military occupation...Washington should have put to the test its own words about using the threat of force to coerce concessions." 

Dana Milbank co-wrote "Bush Is Ready to Go Without UN" on March 7. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A54012-2003Mar6?language=printer
Post colleague Walter Pincus analyzed how the "U.S. Lacks Specifics on Banned Weapons" (3/16):  "They have only circumstantial evidence...nothing that proves this amount or that," said an individual who has regularly been briefed by the CIA.  The administration feels they will only be able to prove WMD after an invasion.  "They are clearly hiding weapons," alleged one senior intelligence official. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30601-2003Mar15?language=printer

Less than a week before the war, President Bush flew to the Azores in the Atlantic for a meeting with his top two allies, UK and Spain.  The President stated, "Tomorrow is a moment of truth for the world."  He recalled that exactly 15 years ago Hussein "launched a chemical attack on...Halabja...killing thousands...without mercy or without shame...The dictator of Iraq and his [WMD] are a threat to the security of free nations.  He is a danger to his neighbors.  He is a sponsor of terrorism.  He is an obstacle to progress in the Middle East.  For decades he has been the cruel, cruel, oppressor of the Iraq people...Saddam Hussein has proven he is capable of any crime.  We must not permit his crimes to reach across the world.  Saddam Hussein has a history of mass murder.  He possesses the weapons of mass murder...Saddam Hussein can leave the county if he is interested in peace" (NYTimes, "Excerpts From Joint News Conference", 3/17).

Reaction to the Azores came from at least three different sources. A dubious Michael O'Hanlon of Brookings commented, "I think they are doing it because they have to say they tried but they know it's over diplomatically" (Chicago Tribune, 3/15). Second, the Washington Post's Karen DeYoung wrote that the three leaders appeared to "be merely going through the motions of diplomacy." The Azores summit was labeled a "Council of Despair" by Britain's Liberal Democratic party leader Charles Kennedy.  "If the President and Prime Minister were serious about finding a  serious solution, they'd be in New York talking with Kofi Annan not talking with each other" (Wash Post, 3/16). Finally, reaction came from Robert Scheer in The Nation, who opens "A Naked Bid to Redraw World Map"  (3/18, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030331&s=scheer20030318) with: "The island bit over the weekend was a revealing farce.  The three wannabe liberators, determined to export popular rule to Iraq, had to flee the protest of their own people to an inaccessible retreat in the Azores.  How fitting to choose an island chain originally settled by a Portuguese Crusader whose goal was to encircle the Muslim world with Christian armies." 

On Meet The Press the last Sunday before war, Cheney returned the administration to its original goal not of disarmament but of regime change.  The objective is "clearly to get rid of his government and put new one in its place.  And that's what we think is required in order to achieve the objectives of eliminating his WMD" (Wash Post, "U.S. Officials Make It Clear:  Exile of War", 3/17). http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35410-2003Mar16?language=printer

On March 17, the President said Hussein had "48 hours" to leave the country with his sons. "The danger is clear." Bush said to 73 millions Americans, "using chemical, biological, or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other...The [UNSC] has not lived up to its responsibly so we will rise to ours...In a free Iraq there will be not more war of aggression against your neighbors , no more poison factories, no more execution of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms.  The tyrant will soon be gone.  The day of your liberation is near."

New York Times writer David Sanger analyzed the world's reaction to the speech:  "President Bush...turned America's first new national  security strategy in 50 years--the doctrine of pre-emptive military action against foes--into the rational for America's latest war." 

A pilotless drones charge was made again the week before war, leveled by Powell.  New York Times reporter John Burns, two time Pulitzer Prize winner, reported from Iraq.  He was more entertained than concerned.  "To the laymen's eye, the public unveiling of the Iraqi prototype seemed to lend the crisis over Iraq' weapons an aura less of deadly threat than of farce" (3/13). 

Hussein rejected the 48 hour ultimatum and predicted a "holy war" that would "wipe out the ranks" of the invading American troops, reported the Times John Burns from Baghdad on March 19.  Iraq's envoy to the UN said the ultimatum, according to the Times, "marked the first time in history that the president of one nation has ordered another to leave his own country" (3/19). 

Finally, the President's March 19 speech marking the beginning of war told the nation that the war was "to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger" (NYTimes, 3/19). 

10.  What is “regime change”?  Did the U.S. hope to assassinate Hussein before the war?
Regime change is a euphemism for overthrowing a leader. The "palace coup" or "silver bullet" strategies did not lead to Hussein's assassination. CIA Director Tenet thinks an assassination has only a 10-15% chance of succeeding. Illinois Senator Peter Fitzgerald raised a controversial shared discussion with the President on Air Force One that Bush would revoke the executive order banning the assassination of foreign leaders if the U.S. had a clear shot at Hussein.  In 203 instances in March and April, that new policy proved to be in force. 

Spokesman Ari Fleisher said that "A bullet would be much cheaper" than an invasion, in essence publicly urging the Iraqis to assassinate Hussein. Nicholas Kristof argues in "The Osirak Option"  that contrary to popular belief, "American law does not ban assassination, as Kenneth Pollack notes in his superb new book on Iraq, The Threatening Storm."  A policy of regime change in Iraq is older than 9/11.  On January 26, 1998, Tribune syndicated columnist Muwakkil reminds us, a group of influential Americans sent a letter to President Clinton, urging regime change in Iraq.  Among those signing the letter were private citizens Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfwowitz, Perle, and Armitage. 

After the UN resolution passed on November 8, the U.S. revealed more detailed war plans. (See "War" FAQs) Bush tells us the war plans "are not on my desk" but Bob Woodward reveals that CIA plans included killing Hussein "only in self defense."  However, this is not a new policy.  Back in 1991, the first President Bush issued a "finding" authorizing the CIA to "create the conditions for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power."  Counters the White House spokesman, "The U.S. does not impose its will on other nations." During the Gulf War, bombing "command and control centers" where Hussein may have been, did not killed him.  Bush and Rumsfeld have spoken since June of taking "pre-emptive action" and "first strike policy".  The pre-emption policy seems like, "If you build it we will come."  How dangerously would India/Pakistan or China/Taiwan use this policy as a precedent for their conflicts? 

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11.  Why was the administration leaking stories which seem to incriminate Hussein but were later proven to be false?  (Also see nuclear issues and see al Qaeda issues) 
What would be the two most chilling arguments in favor of war?  These two were also the most dubious: that Hussein had or might soon have nuclear weapons and that Hussein was connected to 9/11 and/or terrorism.  Thus, one can see further evidence of desire for war through the administration leaks of information critical of Saddam Hussein that has later been deemed irrelevant or wrong. Three examples follow:
1.)  The alleged meeting in Prague in 2001 between lead suicide bomber Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi agent.  Also see "Saddam Hussein" FAQ.
2.)  The December 2002 import requested by Iraq of atrophe, allegedly to protect soldiers in a chemical attack.   Actually, the U.S. has previously approved such similar amounts of importation, for heart patients.  Thus, one cannot deduce that Hussein has and/or plans to use chemical weapons. Argued The Guardian, "The atrophe story also serves to stir up war fever and for that reason, if no other, it should be treated with suspicion." 
3.)  The mid-December 2002 story/rumor that a group with alleged links to Al-Qaeda, operating in northern Iraq, obtained a chemical weapon. Even the administration denied any evidence within 24 hours.  Who is leaking these stories? 

So, are the three false rumors supposed to add up to some damning truth?  Comments Brooking Institute Stephen Hess, "What worries me about some of these [mistakes] is they appear to be with foresight.  This is about public policy in its grandest sense, about potential wars and who is our enemy, and a president has a special obligation to getting it right" (10/22/02).  

In "For Bush, Facts Are Malleable", the Washington Post's Dana Milbank reports on other specific instances from September and October:
1.  On September 7 the President said, "'When inspectors were...denied, finally denied access, a report came out of ....IAEA...that they were six months away from developing a weapon.  I don't know what more evidence we need.'  The IAEA 1998 report declared that Iraq was 'six to 24 months away from nuclear capability before the 1991 Gulf War.'"  
2.  Bush's October 7 speech includes, "'One senior al Qaeda leader who received medial treatment in Baghdad this year.'  Yet, U.S. intelligence officers acknowledged that Zarqawi was 'no longer in Iraq and that there was no hard evidence Hussein's government knew he was there or had contact with him.'"
3.  Later in the same October 7 speech, he said, "Iraq has a growing fleet" of unmanned aircraft (UAVs) and was worried about them "targeting the U.S."  The CIA says that he doesn't have long-range capabilities and the aircraft of more of an "experiment".  

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Responded Ari Fleisher to all of these criticisms, "The President's statements are well documented and supported by the facts" concerning UAV's (to conceivable be used after being smuggled to the U.S.) , "It is the Post's reporting that is dubious, if not wrong" (10/24/02). 

On the day before the war, Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus co-authored "Bush Clings To Dubious Allegation About Iraq."  The allegations have been challenged "and in some cases disproved."  Among the dubious allegations are the Iraq link to 9/11.  Cheney's "Iraq had reconstituted nuclear weapons" claim a few days earlier on Meet the Press and the aluminum tube allegation, both contradicted IAEA head elBaradei.  Powell's use of British's plagiarized and old dossier, and Bush's October claim of missiles which could reach Turkey and Israel were other problems. 

In commentary from Stephen Chapman of The Chicago Tribune, "We're going to war regardless.  But the administration figures if it offers enough reason to go after Saddam Hussein, people won't notice that none of them is convincing.  A hundred times zero is zero in math, but in politics, nothing piled on nothing can eventually add up to something."

The Tribune's Don Wycliff (12/19/02) talks of the lack of credible reports and credible sources in "Government intervention?  Anonymous call to arms vs. Iraq."  and The Guardian (12/16/02) feels that "spinners are now out of control.": "We're going to war on their say-so.  Except they won't say-so.  We're asked to decide on the evidence.  Except we can't see it.  Here come the weapons of mass assertion without attribution..." (Read more of Chapman's and Wycliff's views in "Should We Go to War" FAQ Section.)

The Guardian further analyzes an original Post story on this entire issue in "The papers that cried wolf.":  "The Post story is carefully written and meticulously researched,  but it's basically worthless...Stories in the Post are instantly regurgitated by other news organization around the world, usually at much shorter length and without all the cautionary nuances of the original...One day, perhaps one of these scary stories may turn out to be true--but don't hold your breath waiting for it."

This misinformation is consistent with Rumsfeld's attempt to establish a new Pentagon bureau, The Office of Strategic Influence."  When it was learned that the office "was considering ways to plant false information with unwitting foreign journalist," the office was closed (NYTimes, 12/17/02). 

A similar Pentagon Office of Special Plans funneled information from Chalabi, and tried to make the case for war that the Pentagon was frustrated that the CIA would or could not make.  The "OPS", beginning in the fall of 2001, was led by Abram Shulsky and by spring of 2003 had grown to 18 members. Yet, after the war Rumsfeld admitted to Congress that, according to the Chicago Tribune, "no significant new evidence about Iraq's alleged [WMD] had been uncovered during the current administration" (7/19/03).  In July, 8 examples of administration claims/facts/spin are detailed in TomPaine, concerning nukes, alQaeda, and other misleading ideas. 

A postwar in depth analysis by Washington Post's Walter Pincus shows incomplete quoting leads to improper conclusion.  For example, a white paper from the administration quoted a first half of a sentence from a Blix interview in Time.  "'You can see hundreds of new roofs in the photos.'  The second half of the sentence, not quoted by the administration, was: ...'but you don't know what's under them." 

Also see historical parallels of misinformation, from the Gulf of Tonkin to Havana Harbor, in "In Doubt We Trust." 

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