The War:  When, How, Likely Aftermath  
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Updated 12/15/2005

Pre-War Military Buildup and Predictions...

1.  Could the U.S. bomb Hussein out of power as quickly and easily as she did the Taliban of Afghanistan?  

What we knew before the war began was March is that after a few days of heavy bombing, there were plans of sending up to 250,000 U.S. ground troops (and 15,000 British troops) dubbed "Desert Storm Lite" by some in the Pentagon.  They would attempt to gain a foothold inside Iraq. It is likely that the Defense Department wanted these war plans leaked in November, as we learn in "Hobbling into War": "The secret within the no-so-secret plan is that the top decision-makers are hoping that Hussein's regime will collapse.  Maybe so.  But wise soldiers don't go to war with hope as their primary weapon....War is not a testing ground for a defense secretary's pet theories.  We tried that in Vietnam.  In war, you pile on, with everything you've got.  Try to fight a war on the cheap, and you're likely to get what you pay for." Concurred Kenneth Pollack is his Brooking Institute paper of December, "There is no compelling strategic argument for trying to defeat Iraq with only a light force."

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The Iraqi National Congress is not the Northern Alliance; the Republican Guard is not the Taliban.  Moving 250,000 troops could take months, though by mid-December the U.S. had about 60,000 troops in the Persian Gulf. Iraq has about 400,000 active troops in 23 divisions, though perhaps a quarter have deserted, say defectors. Their troop totals are about a third the size at the start of the Gulf War of 1991; their Airforce has about 300 planes. "Psychological operations" (PsyOps) before the war would also help in the predicted "quick collapse." 

While six Republican Guard divisions number 80,000- 90,000 (Washington Post). Hussein's ultra-loyal Special Republican Guard has been variously estimated between 12,000 and 26,000 elite troops, stationed in Baghdad and Tikrit.  The Special Republican Guard is controlled by son Qusay and the feared Special Security Organization.  Says Scott Ritter of the SRG, "They're tough, loyal, and will fight to death...It's about tribe, family, influence, and pride." Pentagon War Game "Prominent Hammer", staged in March, concluded that three times the number of National Guard and Reserves would need to be mobilized, but "we found we could do Iraq...though we are stretched" (military officer).  Rumsfeld thinks the war will go well and be over quickly, but The Guardian points out that "Mr. Rumsfeld's prognosis about the speed of an Iraqi army collapse is ideologically driven and strategically ill-informed." 

Paul Wolfowitz, deputy Defense Secretary, has also suggested the war would be quick, and he responds to criticism of that possibility in "United on the Risks of a War." The Air Force is most strongly opposed of the services. Recent military analysis promotes new U.S. abilities to hunt down mobile scud missiles, a strategy which failed in the Gulf War. Plans to early February were for ten times the number of precision-guided missiles in the first 48 hours compared to the Gulf War.  The hope would be that large numbers of troops would surrender or defect.  One Pentagon official described it as, This is not going to be your father's Persian Gulf War" (NYTimes, 2/2).

The International Institute of Strategic Studies suggested that an attack would be "a unique and high-risk military assault" involving a long-term U.S. commitment. The U.S. would benefit from "practice runs" in the fall in the so called no-fly zones. Military expert Anthony Cordesman warned Congress, "...To be perfectly blunt, I think only fools would bet the lives of other men's sons and daughters on their own arrogance and call this [Iraqi] force a cakewalk" (Chicago Tribune, 8/1/02). (Also see #4 below).

In October after his "re-election", Hussein said, "The road of blood takes you to more blood and he who tries to shed the blood of others must expect his blood to be spilled...After [the war], the enemy will fall on its face, despised, condemned, and defeated."

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In August, Iraq's Foreign Minister said Baghdad will "chop off the head" of any aggressor (Washington Post, 8/6/020)...the invaders will be buried in their own coffins."  Tarik Aziz (at left) claims the U.S. will suffer loses "that have not been sustained for decades."  Kenneth Pollack warned that Hussein may be willing "to turn Baghdad into a Mesopotamian Stalingrad [in World War II]...The Iraqis are sending out a message:  If you come into our country, it is going to be a bloodbath" (Post, 12/14/02).  "Vice President Ramadan further warned, "Iraq is not Afghanistan." Says one senior Congressional foreign affairs aide, "If we can't get Afghanistan right, why should anybody believe us in Iraq?"

Adds Thomas Friedman, (1/6/03), "This is not going to be Grenada", the quick war by President Reagan over the small Caribbean island. Thus, many Pentagon leaders are now skeptical of an invasion and seek the status quo because Hussein poses no immediate threat. In late August Richard Perle, as Adviser to the Pentagon, began making the new case for a small invasion to support Iraqis.  Perle feels that Hussein's regime will fall quickly, probably in a matter of days. Also see: Thomas Friedman's "Iraq Without Saddam"; "Reality" and detailed "War Plans" articles in The Washington Post; and "U.S. Seeks Right Equasion to Topple" in Christian Science Monitor.  

2.  How would Hussein's military leaders react to a U.S. invasion? Would Baghdad be a center of fighting?
In December military officials warned about Hussein's possible "Scorched Earth" response to a U.S. war where he would "destroy his country's oil fields, electrical power plants, food storage sites and other facilities while blaming U.S. military forces for the damage" that would "foster international opposition to the war" and may involve "biological or chemical weapons as a last desperate act."  Former CIA counter terrorism chief Vince Cannistraro believes, "It's pretty clear that no one is going to rise up and revolt against Saddam until they see his dead body on the ground" (NYTimes/AP, 5/27/02). The New York Times reports in December that "Even Iraqis who secretly yearn for our help must worry about civilian casualties, about vicious factional reprisals and about a new regime staffed by some of the very thugs who have participated in Saddam's chamber of horrors." Hussein will likely keep his top troops out of Baghdad to limit a possible overthrow and use his trusted  15,000 Special Republican Guard (SRG) to defend him. The Guardian describes these strategies in "Loyalty of Iraq's elite in doubt."  (See "For an Iraqi Amnesty"). In September, one general labeled the key to success as "collapsing the regime in the destruction of the internal security services and the Republican Guard. Once these threats are eliminated, the regular army units will probably defect or surrender and popular support the the regime will evaporate" (Washington Post, 9/21/02). 

Since October, Bush and Rumsfeld have warned Iraqi generals that they will face war crimes if they follow Hussein's order to use WMD  ("there will be consequences for their behavior") and now threatens Iraqi soldiers:  "While we would not want to kill many Iraqi soldiers, if they stupidly fight, we will."  

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Psychological weapons and Operations (PsyOps) were used in the weeks leading up to war, including millions of leaflet drops, mass emails, radio transmissions, and cell phone calls urging senior leaders to break with the government.  "The goal of information warfare is to win without every firing a shot...If action does begin, formation warfare is used to make...it short" (Central Command in Tampa, 2/24/02, NYTimes0.  Iraqi troops were warned not to resist and leaders warned not to sue and WMD.

On November 17, The Guardian reported that Hussein ally General Ali Hasan al-Majid, known as "Chemical Ali" by the Kurds, is trying to arrange for  Hussein's allies (not including Hussein or his son Uday) to seek asylum through Syria and eventually into Algeria, Tunisia, or Libya. The story could be being circulated by western intelligence but is likely to be true.

The U.S. is even studying how Israel fought in Jenin, though Amnesty International accused Israel of war crimes in Jenin. U.S. Generals fear their troops could be drawn into street fighting in Baghdad. Gen. Anthony Zinni warned, "I wouldn't get sucked into cities." In late October the US reportedly refines war plans on cities. Says one Senior official, "If we have to fight a pitched battle in Baghdad, it means we screwed up somewhere along the way."

Threatened a senior member of Hussein's cabinet, "If they want to change the political system in Iraq, they have to come to Baghdad.  We will be waiting for them there" (Washington Post, 9/27/02).  Iraq also threatened to attack Israel if the U.S. invaded. A long battle in Baghdad would stir up opposition in the Middle East and Europe.

The Guardian calls this prospect "the worst-case scenario for US military planners:  an organized, committed, and disciplined force with nowhere to go, defending a highly populated urban area..." See a detailed map of Baghdad. Time's September 16 cover story and the Washington Post analyze "Preparing for Urban Warfare" as in Beirut and Mogadishu. In the Gulf War, thousands of Iraqi civilians died.  If ground troops were sent into Iraq, we would expect the death toll to be much larger on both sides, as possibly bloody urban warfare could ensue. (Also see # 4 below). Barry Posen (NYTimes) worries of "Foreseeing A Bloody Seige in Baghdad":  "The last time American forces tried to take a heavily defended city was in the Vietnam War...[it took] four weeks and [US] suffered more than 600 dead and 3800 wounded to get it back.  They destroyed much of the city in the process...America's main military advantage, technology, isn't as much of an advantage in cities."  Tikrit, a city of about 200,000, is Hussein's birthplace (1937; village of Al-Auja) and stronghold/power center, and a likely early target. 

General Josesph Hoar, the former commander in chief of central command, compared the scene to the last 15 minutes of Saving Private Ryan. 

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3.  If the U.S.  invaded Iraq with the purpose of overthrowing Hussein, how would he respond?  (Also see "Hussein" FAQs)
If one assumes that Hussein's primary goal is to remain in power but he knows he is to be exterminated, in this doomsday scenario, he would lose any incentive for restraint and so might "logically" use any chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons, since "he has no incentive for restraint" ("use 'em or lose 'em"). (See "Pentagon's Worry" in NYTimes). 

CIA director George Tenet in October reported to Congress that Hussein would be "much less constrained" if attacked if he saw "his last chance to exact vengeance" (NYTimes, 10/9/02).  He thus disagreed with Bush is seeing Hussein as an unlikely threat without war. The U.S. attack might "provoke the very thing the President has said he is trying to forestall:  the use of WMD" (Washington Post, reporter Dana Priest, 10/9/02). Senior Bush administration officials also suggested in February that Iraqi agents were preparing an attack on U.S. citizens or embassies if Iraq was attacked (WashPost, 2/40. In mid-February Defense Department official called it "likely" that Hussein would attack Israel and U.S. facilities abroad, would strike Kurds, and use a "scorch-earth strategy" (WashPost, 2/12).

Back in 2000, NSA chief Rice described how the U.S. would react if Iraq acquired WMD.  Writing in Foreign Affairs in the pre-9/11 era, she said, "the first line of defense should be a clean and classical strategy of deterrence--if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them would bring national obliteration."  (Quoted in the December 2002 Foreign Policy by Professors Mearsheimer and Walt). 

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Hussein's  generals might or might not follow his order to use WMD,  According to GlobalSecurity.org, Pentagon planners "are having a very hard time coming up with a workable plan which does not involve chemical or biological weapons versus Israel."  In addition, The Wall Street Journal points out (1/1/03) that "If Saddam's chemical and biological poisons should be hit by a bomb or missile, they might escape into the atmosphere and post a danger to many thousands of people." Army leaders admit that they "can't make enough vaccines for troops" (New York Times, 1/9/03). In late January the BBC obtained handwritten notes which explained that elite Iraqi troops were issued chemical warfare suits and supplies of atropine, a drug to counter nerve gas.  The notes spoke of startling plans to attack U.S. troops with unmanned submarines (The Guardian, 1/24). 

Illinois Representative Jan Schakowsky (D) found it "extremely troubling" when Rumsfeld testified that troops did not have sufficient protective suits (WPost, 11/30/02).  Is it possible that Rumsfeld actually surmised that U.S. troops were not threatened by Hussein's WMD?

The U.S. would likely send antimissile systems to Israel to shoot down Iraqi Scuds. Israelis bought tape and masks for "safe rooms" in case of a missile loaded with chemicals (NYTimes, 3/19). In the weeks before the war Hussein  urged his people to "dig trenches in their gardens...We call on God, to spare us their evil...but if they try to achieve any of the simple goals they are talking about, they should pay with abundant blood" (Wash Post/Reuters, 2/26/03). 

Pre-emptive strikes by precision weapons would be used, reports the New York Times (4/28/02). In December the U.S. administration specifically threatened to respond to any chemical or biological attacks on U.S. troops with a first use a nuclear weapons. Also see "War Games", "This war can't be left to the politicians" and "If Not Hussein" FAQ Section.

"Saddam won't run" explains why irrational Saddam will not flee and provides history as to why the Kurds will not rebel. "Delay and urban battle" was predicted as Hussein tried to survive, reported the New York Times.  American intelligence officials in mid-February also predicted Hussein would use chemical, biological, long-range scuds missiles, and would attack Israel. (2/16).

Hussein could make a last stand or "simply disappear as bin Laden did in Afghanistan and [with his son] become 'shadows' eluding their American pursuers, as Tarik Aziz, predicted in October.  Aziz was one of Hussein's most trusted, long-time advisers (NYTimes, 3/18/03). 

Another problem could be a repeat of the end of the first Gulf War, when an environmental catastrophe ensued after Hussein burned 750 of Kuwait's 1000 oil fields and tons of oil was released into the Persian Gulf. The fires were not extinguished for nine months and cost $20 billion.

U.S. officials alleged that Iraq had placed explosives at the northern Kirkuk oil fields to prevent them from being taken over.  Iraq denied the allegation.  Iraq has 1500 oil wells (WashPost/Reuters, 3/10).  Hussein would hope for another "Somalia" when in 1993 U.S. forces withdrew after a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down in a humanitarian mission and 18 Americans were killed and then dragged through the streets. Also see "History" for many other historical lessons.

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4.  Can we guess how many Iraqi civilians would die in another  war? How many American soldiers might be killed? (See "P.S." FAQ section for post-war updates)

In a January 10 Post article, Bush seemed to already be laying the groundwork for blaming Iraqi deaths on Hussein. The war in Afghanistan has thus far claimed about 5000 civilians and about 40 Americans. Also see "Tricked and bamboozled into war" from The Guardian on the casualties of "Gulf War II".  "Counting The Dead" discusses January estimates.

The UN's chief emergency relief coordinator reported on 2/13 that there will be 600,000 to 1.4 million refugees and asylum seekers as well as 2 million left homeless in the country, and up to 10 million requiring food assistance.  "Approximately 50% of the population may be without access to water." CARE and UNICEF agree that water and sanitation were the top concerns.  UN officials were stockpiling supplies but were worried that about 60% of the population is dependent on state aid for food and cooking fuel (Washington Post, 1/7/03). 

The independent Oxford Research Group predicts 10,000 Iraqi civilian deaths. Needless to say, Iraqis are apprehensive. In the first Gulf War, by comparison, with 43 days of air strikes on over 700 targets, most civilians were incapable of receiving electricity or clear water for months.  "Food became scarce.  Hospitals become unable to provide adequate care.  Outbreaks of cholera, typhoid, and other diseases became common" (WashPost, "This Time Around War Would Hit Iraq Harder", 10/28/02). 

One editorial comments, "The death of innocent civilian Iraqis will be a brutal certainty." In late December UN officials complained that the U.S. administration is refusing to listen to warnings about the scale of the possible humanitarian disaster.  Clare Short, Blair's international development secretary complained "it is proving very difficult to get the U.S. to take on the humanitarian consequences" (The Guardian, 2/13/03). The Iraqi government has increased food distribution so civilians can stockpile food in the event of war. 

On refugees, experts have estimated that over one million persons could be displaced.  Turkey and Jordan "have already indicated they plan to prevent any large influx" (The Progressive, 1/03). Said one UN official, "There is a studied lack of interest in a warning call...to the people planning for war." The UN was preparing for 600,000 refugees.

James Baker's NYTimes Op-Ed spoke of casualties and civilian deaths. Gulf War General Barry McCaffrey predicts "a few thousand U.S. casualties." (NYTimes, 8/26/02). A Post editorial queries, "The administration worries about innocent American civilians. But is it entirely impermissible to wonder about Iraq's innocent civilians?"  Anthony Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies in Tribune 12/30) adds, "No one can predict the casualties that will result...People make estimates and they get put in the papers, but they're meaningless.  We just don't know--especially if Saddam Hussein decides to use his [WMD]."   Howard Zinn movingly emphasizes civilian deaths in "What War Looks Like."  The number of American deaths do not include the 75% chance of terrorist attacks on American soil, predicted by Sen. Bob Graham (12/02), who doesn't think the Congressional resolution goes far enough.  

The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War forecasted in late November that a post-war scene could include civil war, famine, epidemics, millions of refugees, and economic collapse.  The IPPNW organization is strongly against pre-emptive war. 

Inadequate pre-war planning for food and refugees was criticized.  For example, a former assistant Secretary of Defense conclude his Post op-ed thusly:  "The U.S. may be ready for war, but it is not yet ready to help Iraq recover from war" (3/7).  Responded Bush in his March 6 news conference, "We fully intend to make sure that they've got ample food." 

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Historical comparisons on casualties can be helpful. (Also see "History Lessons" FAQ section and P.S. FAQ section for post-war). After the deaths of 58,000 in Vietnam, "air wars" have involved very few Americans killed, and many of those deaths were accidental or by "friendly fire."  For example, in 1983 after marines were bombed in Lebanon, President Reagan withdrew our forces.  In Mogadishu, Somalia, after "Black Hawks Down" killed 29 Americans, President Clinton withdrew.  In the 1990s Kosovo War, the U.S. had zero combat deaths, and in Afghanistan from October 2001 to present, under 40 Americans have died. Even a Defense Department official admitted, "If you get [the toll] into the mid-100s running toward 1000, you will see public sentiment questioning the legitimacy of what we're doing." 

Only on the day war began was there a direct comment from the White House on the costs and risk of war, as Ari Fleisher vaguely warned that "Americans ought to be prepared for loss of life" (NYTimes, 3/19). 

By comparison, the 1991 Gulf War killed about 150,000-200,000 Iraqis and 148 U.S. soldiers.  Perhaps 100,000 died, John Burns (NYTimes)  hears from western experts.  Probably 5000 civilians died in addition to perhaps 100,000 postwar deaths due to violence and health conditions (LATimes, 1/5/03). The Guardian reports that "The UN calculates that between 35,000 and 15,000 civilians died during the Gulf war plus between 100,000 and 120,000 Iraqi troops.  IPPNC "estimates casualties could be five times higher in the new war."  The Guardian concludes that "the wide range of figures comes from different estimates of the degree of Iraqi resistance and the length of the war." 

The Washington Post reported that Ramsey Clark (see "Should We" FAQ section) said of the first Gulf War: "We dropped 88,500 tons of bombs!  That's a Pentagon figure.  That's 7 1/2 Hiroshima's [atom bomb in World War Two]." Clark termed it "a slaughter that 150,000 Iraqi died but only 155 Americans. (12/13/02). 

One hopes there will not be a repeat of the horrors of the February 13, 1991 Amiryia bomb shelter deaths of 300-408 Iraqi civilians, mostly women and children, by U.S. bombs.  Over 130 of those killed were children. This time, al-Jazeera TV will be watching.  A slaughter of Iraqi civilians, says the Tribune on December 30, could "diminish support at home while alienating US allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf, provoke further bloodshed between Israel and Palestinians, and inflame anti-Americans feelings among fundamentalist Muslims." Though the military brags about the increased precision of its bombs now, the Tribune in "A Question of Casualties in Iraq" points out, "recent experts suggest that even this dazzling technology is not perfect," as the U.S. bombed the Chinese Embassy and a passenger train in the Kosovo War and an American gunship shot up a civilian wedding engagement party in Afghanistan, "provoking outrage throughout the Islamic world." The 12 years of ensuing and ongoing sanctions have killed about 700,000 Iraqi children alone.  Just 9% of Gulf War bombs were precision, though from media reports at the time it appeared to be at least a majority. The new war is expected 75% precision (NYTimes, 2/2/03). Post-war reports were of 68%.  Also see P.S. FAQ section for post-war details.

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5.  Will the U.S. again use land mines, cluster bombs, or DU (depleted uranium)?
In December the Washington Post reported that humanitarian organization petitioned President Bush "not to use antipersonnel land mines or deadly cluster bombs...arguing that the danger to civilians and allied soldier during and after a war outweighs the benefits.  Human Rights Watch feels  "the U.S. is isolated" on the land mine issue.  The Pentagon stockpile is 18 million land mines, though 146 countries and nearly all of NATO endorsed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty "banning their production, use, stockpiling, and transfer."  Human Rights Watch added these grim statistics:  In Afghanistan cluster bombs have killed or injured 10 civilians every month.  In the Gulf War I, the U.S. used 118,000 land mines, mostly dropped from planes or fired by artillery (Chicago Tribune, 1/17/03, "Many pressing U.S. not to use mines in Iraq"). In addition, "2.2 million unexploded bomblets left on the battlefield...killed 1600 civilians and injured 2500 more in just two years.  Cluster bombs scatter 202 small bomblets designed to explode on impact but the 5% duds become, in essence, antipersonnel mines.  ("Bush Urged to Limit Weapons in Iraq" , Chicago Tribune, 12/27/02). 

In addition to land mines and cluster bombs, another concern is depleted uranium (DU) made strong from nuclear-waste material to pierce armored vehicles, and is used in bullets and missiles.  But DU leaves the soil contaminated and the wind blows the waste.  Plants and animals are contaminated, becoming part of the food chain.

DU (uranium 238) is "about 40% less radioactive than natural uranium." Its radioactive half life is 4.5 billion years.  A Chicago Tribune report from Feb. 17 "Iraqis believe '91 war is still killing people", described reports of "ghastly birth defects" and "cancer rates in children under...15 have increased 120% in the past decade."  The Basra cancer rate from '88 to '01 increased from 11/100.000 to 116/100,000.  A U.S. army vet put is succinctly, "When you go to war, you to to kill.  The problem with [DU] is that it deep on killing." 

 The Iraqi government says cancer cases have risen 5-fold since 1990.  The European Parliament in 1999 voted to urge NATO to suspend the use of DU munitions "pending results of an independent study."  At the UN Human Rights Convention of August 2002, only tow countries voted against suspending use of DU--Britain and the U.S. The military argues, "If you can't prove it isn't safe, we're going to keep using it" ("Iraq Links Concerns to Uranium Weapons", SF Chronicle, 1/3/03). Does DU cause cancer and Gulf War Syndrome, as many allege, or are the levels so low as to not matter (WHO and Pentagon view)?  "The Weapon [DU] We Gave Iraq" is a veteran's view of the "preponderance of birth defects" in Basra which "defies explanations" (Globe and Mail (Canada), 2/17/03).

For more on Gulf War Syndrome, see "History" FAQs, #7.  For other details on DU, see "A special report on DU" which includes numerous articles debating DU, interactive guide, and online debates.  Also  see The Christian Science Monitor's "A 'silver bullet's' toxic legacy". 

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6.  How would such a war be fought?  What bases would the U.S. use?  (Also see "Allies" FAQ section)
A war plan of "quick strikes and huge force" was reported to be agreed upon just after the November UN resolution (Washington Post, 11/10/02).  In March, this strategy became known as "shock and awe."

The Times has maps and military descriptions of the Gulf region. War plans were supposedly leaked to the Times and Post after the UN vote.  Iraq expert Kenneth Pollack sizes up an invasion of Iraq. The U.S. would attempt to set up forward bases within Iraq and the air campaign would be less than the 5 weeks of the Gulf War. 

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Military experts quoted in the Washington Post's December 28 "Military Forces Ordered to Gulf" suggest an air campaign from several days to a week, with up to 1000 aircraft used in the opening hours of the war.  Proponents of air power such as Col. John Warden, author of The Air War:  Planning for Combat (NPR, The World, 1/8/03) suggest that 90% of weapons would be "smart", but the new plans calls for 60%, compared to only 10% in the Gulf War. The military is giving assurances that traditional infrastructure will be spared. B-2 bombers, based in Britain and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, would be common. Also see the LA Times "Planning an Iraqi War but Not an Outcome."  Ground troops would also be used, as described by Rumsfeld (NYTimes, 7/30/02). In mid-December we learned that landmines are being stockpiled in U.S. bases around the Gulf. 

The U.S. might prefer not to use Saudi bases, due to growing animosity and increasing likelihood of using Turkish bases.  However, U.S. forces would need permission to use Saudi air space, which Saudi Arabia publicly ruled out in August, but has hedged since then. In late December Saudi Arabia seemed to express its willingness to use their bases in all but combat missions.  Their most strategic base in Prince Sultan. Also see "Allies/UN" FAQ section. In 1996 when Hussein moved to crush a Kurdish rebellion to the north, Saudi Arabia and Turkey refused use of their air bases for retaliation. Omani Foreign Minister Yassef said he would never allow a military strike from his territory.  

The Guardian first reported in  March 2002 that the al-Udeid air base in Qatar was being equipped for U.S. bombers.  See Washington Post Qatar Special. This air base is the epicenter of the buildup, with $1.4 billion spent to expand the base.  It now has the longest runways in the Persian Gulf, with runways of 15,000 feet.  Qatar is led by the emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who has become an ally of the U.S. The air strip was build before Qatar even had an air force. Qatar and Bahrain, allies during the Gulf War, came out against an invasion but Qatar later said they might consider a base request.  U.S. troops and personnel in mid-September increase their movements to Qatar, only 400 miles from the southern border of Iraq.  In October it was acknowledged that the U.S. would use bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Qatar. Saudi Arabia would not publicly admit this information.

In December the U.S. and Qatar signed a pact to upgrade military bases. Claimed Rumsfeld, "This agreement is not connected to Iraq."  "Operation Internal Look" which began on  December 9, is a computer-simulated exercise/"war game".  It moves army headquarters from Tampa to Qatar's Central Command Deployable Headquarters.  Qatar, with its capital in Doha, has a population of 700,000, but 2/3 are foreign workers.  The Washington Post (10/24/02) calls Qatar "liberal and democratic" for the region A new $200 million logistics base has opened outside of Kuwait City. In November, desert warfare training of U.S. troops began in Djibouti. Spain publicly allowed use of their bases on January 23. (WashPost/Reuters, 1/23/03). 

However, economic promises to Turkey seemed likely to win them over, argues the administration; this opens up two fronts for the U.S. but in turn upsets the Iraqi Kurds. The LA Times reported plans to helicopter lift thousands of American troops from Turkey into northern Iraq to protect oil fields. (12/22/02 in Tribune). But the Post reported on January 8 that Turkey was feeling more hesitant about support for "the northern front" and their Parliament three weeks before war ended up voting against actively supporting the war.  For more on Turkey see "Allies/UN" FAQ Section. The U.S. also has  increased U.S. troops  in the Persian Gulf to over 60,000 by December, mostly in the five countries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. In addition, thousands more came for "exercises".  A carrier fleet left port in early December. As The Guardian summarizes, "if the deployments over the past few weeks and months have been piecemeal and discreet, they have been no less massive..."  Though in September the Washington Post's military writer Thomas Ricks predicted 100,000 U.S. troops would be needed.

At least 100,000 U.S. troops were expected by January, and 200,000 in February,  including 20,000+ in Kuwait alone.  As the buildup by late December became much more visible, it includes the 1,000-bed hospital ship, the Comfort. In mid-January Rumsfeld ordered the navy to double the number of aircraft carrier battle groups. For perspective, on the eve of Gulf War I, the U.S. had assembled 500,000 troops.  This time the final buildup in Gulf War II was expected to involve up to 250,000 reserve and National Guard members.

As it turns out, by mid-March the U.S. had 300,000 troops poised to begin the war. Just one week before war began the U.S. Air Force tested their largest convention bomb with 18,000 pounds of high explosives.  The bomb is coined "Mother of All Bombs", (MOAB) in reference to Hussein's name for the first Gulf War, "Mother of All Wars." Perhaps the biblical reference is not coincidental.

The rosy scenarios proponents of the war included Vice-President Cheney, according to the New York Times (3/16):  American troops will be greeted as liberators, war will be won within weeks, and postwar troops levels will be under 200,000-300,000.

After the war, we learned in August 2005 that the CIA trained a team of Iraqi paramilitary to aid the US. Code-named Scorpions, they were to "foment rebellion, conduct sabotage, and help CIA...target building and individuals.   Costing millions, the Scorpions painted graffiti on walls and cut electricity.  After the war  the group tried in infiltrate the insurgency.  The Scorpions were authorized by a presidential finding signed by President Bush in February or March of 2002 as part of the policy of "regime change" and were trained in secret in Jordan

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7. When would the war begin? Who would lead U.S. forces in a war with Iraq?  
In the early fall of 2002, General Wesley Powell (NATO Commander during the Kosovo War) predicted the chance of U.S. attacking in 2003 at 65-70% (The Guardian, 8/21/02).  The Center for Defense Information believes war will come after the New Year, "because the inspection process has to be given time to play out."  Christopher Dodd (D) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wants the January 27 report to the UN to "build the same coalition" before a war begins.  The New York Times reported  that avoiding summer combat would be important and the invasion would "probably be delayed until early [2003]."  In November the BBC added that April begins Iraq's windy season with sandstorms.  War planners predicted that April 7 would be the first day in Kuwait above 100 degrees (NYTimes, 2/4/03). The Washington Post suggested in June that "sometime around January" is likely, though others suggest spring, 2003.  Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, ended in early December.    Waiting until late 2003 would risk interfering with a presidential election year "without a victory to report" (MERIP). One wonders if one U.S. plane shot at or shot down over the Iraq no-fly zones would be sufficient cause to launch a war. Also see "Weapons Inspectors" FAQ's for war timing issues. 

In October the Pentagon was said to be favoring January, but the UN debate on weapons inspectors delayed that. My guess since October of 2002 has been the window from December 2002-February 2003, with the month of February seeming most likely. In late January, my prediction was amended to war beginning by March 15 due to moonless nights of early March.  The President began telling us in early February that "it is a matter of weeks not months." The Muslim hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) culminates in mid-February.  For a few days I thought a war might be delayed until the fall of 2003, as Blix gave his "no smoking gun" Jan. 9 report, Turkey and Blair showed hesitant support, and the U.S. hinted that inspectors could have some more time.  However, the countdown to war once again picked up momentum in mid-January. Then with Colin Powell's UN speech of Feb. 5, war seemed more likely, but the Feb. 14 UN report by Blix and the Feb. 15 worldwide protests may have once again slowed down the call for war. 

In mid-December the administration reportedly set late January as their decision date on war. Did they actually decide in January? The last firm deadline imposed by the new UN resolution was January 27, when weapons inspectors report to the UN.  President Bush gives his State of the Union address the following day. (Also see "Will We Go to War" FAQ section) The White House is confident "that it will have completed its diplomatic and military preparations should it decide on war." Yet, on January 13, the U.S. and Britain expressed their desire to avoid an "artificial timetable" for the decision. Anthony Zinni, who was succeeded by General Tommy Franks, wonders "How long do you keep [troops] there before it begins to affect training, morale, and rotation schedules?  It's very costly" (New York Times, 1/12/03).  This same argument made in March news reports, described potential long waits as sapping moral and dulling readiness of troops. 

The U.S. spent about $1 billion per week on the buildup. All the dates are outlined in the November 8 UN resolution.  A war in late January allows more allies to get on board, Bush's advisers concluded. In mid-December, a Senior Pentagon official said, "If the President gives [the order] today, we could start in today." Jim Hoagland writes in the Post that by Christmas the Pentagon will be ready. Senate Intelligence Committee member Bob Graham (D) predicts the chance of war with Iraq over the winter at 70%. 

In early February, the Times Michael Gordon was predicting early to mid-March as optimal for Pentagon timing.  War was appearing ever more imminent in late February as the Brookings Michael O'Hanlon saw five scenarios, an imminent start, war about March 7-10, and war in mid or late March, war in April, or war in autumn.  He looked at diplomacy and surprise issues but "my money is on...a war beginning around...March 17."  The war began on March 19.  Amazingly, in early March betonsprots.com and other sites allowed one to gable on when war would begin (NYTimes, 3/2). 

Army General Tommy Franks, head of CENTCOM, would be in charge. Franks is highlighted in "A Modern Major General" (12/29/02). He was born in Midland Texas, went to High School with Laura Bush, and served with an artillery unit in 1967 in Vietnam.  F Lt. Gen. Paul Mikolashek's US third army would take the lead with Central Command at Camp Doha in Kuwait, where at least 10,000 U.S. troops are based.  Apache and Black Hawk helicopters are part of the buildup in Kuwait. Joining the team in late December was Arabic speaker Lt. Gen. John P. Abizaid, who will be based at Command Headquarter in Qatar. Some top military officers are against a war.

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8.  Postwar Prospects: How would the war end?  Would the U.S. occupy as "peacekeepers"?  Who would pay?  (Also see "P.S" FAQ section for post-war updates) 

Thomas Friedman feels, "Invade Iraq and We Own Iraq." Other descriptions include, "It's like going into a china shop, you break it, you own it." The Atlantic's James Fallows labels post-Hussein Iraq "The Fifty-First State." Urging support of Iraq's democrats and avoiding cynicism of post-war Iraq, but with elections "in a year or so" comes the advice of Jim Hoagland (Wash Post, 3/16; http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27805-2003Mar14?language=printer). "We are talking about a long occupation," adds the leader Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee and the new House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi.  

Sandra Mackey (The Reckoning) worries that if the U.S. invades, "The U.S. will walk into the quicksand of Iraq, to be sucked into the resentment of the Arab world, the hostilities of the Iraqis, and the challenge of nation building in what has become an intensely tribal society (383)...Iraq is a state not a nation."  Another colorful analogy comes from a Bahrain daily Al Ayam paper, which compares U.S. policy to "the work of a surgeon who always leaves before the job is done. 'They open the abdomen, remove the diseased organ and then they leave the abdomen open and walk away'" (NYTimes, 1/30/03). Human Rights Watch worries about "score-settling" between Kurds and Shiites who have suffered under Hussein (Washington Post, 1/15/03). 

As early as September 4, 2002, on op-ed subtitled "Do we really want to occupy Iraq for the next 30 years?" was penned by former Secretary of the Navy and assistant secretary of Defense, James Webb (Washington Post, 9/4/02). Three weeks later a NYTimes editorial desired a more comprehensive discussion of post-Hussein Iraq:  "Picking up the pieces after a war, and installing a government that commands the respect of Iraq's fractious population could prove more difficult than unseating Mr. Hussein" (9/26/02). 

A mid-September Post op-ed began, "The Bush folk have been justly whacked for fighting a war in Afghanistan and then fumbling the reconstruction.  but if they repeat this formula in Iraq, their mistake won't be equal.  It will be worse, much worse. Indeed, it will undermine the whole argument for attacking Iraq in the first place" (Sebastian Mallaby, 9/16/02). 

Brookings Institute Director of Research, Kenneth Pollack, (also see Pollack in "Should" FAQs and "Hussein" FAQs) joined the debate.  A proponent of invasion as containment has failed, Pollack worries of reconstruction:  "If we are not prepared to make a sustained commitment to building Iraq, we will simply be trading one set of problems for another:  chaos, warlordism, turning it into a failed state" (WashPost, 10/9/02 in "Undefined Plans for Post-Hussein Iraq Stir Debate")  Pollack also hoped the UN would head the transitional government.

Clinton assistant Sec. of State James Rubin feels "the prospect of Iraq breaking apart may well be exaggerated." On December 31, Samuel Berger (NSA for Clinton) co-authored a Post op-ed arguing, "The success of a war with Iraq will be measured by its lasting consequences for our security and the security of the region, not by how quickly we get in and out.  The administration's approach--which appears to be 'Iraq first, North Korea later'--is...unrealistic." But Al Gore said in his detailed September speech (see full text of Gore), "If we end the war in Iraq the way we ended the war in Afghanistan, we could easily be worse off than we are today...Despite pledges from President Bush that we would never again abandon Afghanistan, we have done precisely that." 

Another Clinton official, NSC staffer Gary Samore, according to Time (3/10), says he "cannot imagine Iraqis tolerating an American governor for more than a couple of months."   Others fear they won't stay long enough.  President' Bush's 2003 budge "did not even ask Congress" for the money the U.S. pledged this year from Afghanistan reconstruction..  

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Nicholas Kristof (NY Times) feels that "unless we're prepared for the consequences of our invasion, we have no business invading at all.  If we invade Iraq, it must be with eyes wide open." He also explains in "Bait and Switch" that the hope of democracy "is a pipe dream, a marketing ploy to sell a war.  We haven't even been able to nurture full democracy in modern, bustling Kuwait, where women still cannot vote, or in Saudi Arabia, which is more egalitarian--neither men nor women vote." Recent war games show that "hubris kills", according to Kristof . For much more Kristof, see "Columnists Against War" FAQ section.

Another NYTimes columnist Bob Herbert (2/17/03) doubts that democracy will come to Iraq:  "President Bush and his hawkish advisers speak blithely about a U.S.-led invasion leading to a garden of democracy blooming in the desert soil of Iraq.  I wouldn't reach for my gardening tools too quickly.  What the administration has been unwilling to tell the public is the truth about some of the implications of war with Iraq" such as long-term military occupation. In October Bob Herbert's "Dancing in the Dark" (NYTimes, 10/21/02) opened with a quote from Winston Churchill.  "Never, never, never, believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure tides and hurricanes he will encounter.  The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events".  Herbert wondered, "Do we really want to occupy Iraq?  For how long, and at what cost--to what end? ...And what's the plan for locating and securing Saddam's [WMD]?"  For more Herbert views, see "Columnists Against War" FAQ section.

Concurred political science assistant professor at Northwestern University, Risa Brookes, in "War's aftermath can't be an afterthought" (Chicago Tribune, 10/27/02), "Supporting a war is not enough.  Americans need to support a costly and risky peace too...What is crystal clear is that the U.S. is likely to be running Iraq for a long time.

Military expert Anthony Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies) argues that "any peace plan that takes more than six months is a failure from the start" (The Guardian, 2/28).  Cordesman's chilling prediction was that Iraq could start rebuilding WMD after an invasion because "the intellectual capital and skills...will remain" (WashPost, 2/18/03). For more on Cordesman, see "Should We Go To War--Experts" FAQ section.

A foreign policy expert warned in October, "Those who today blow up French tankers off Yemen or bars in Bali will soon be picking off GI's in Basra." The writer also worried about the proliferation of weapons to terrorist "who have no interest in the weapons for their deterrent value; they will just want to use them." (David Benjamin, Op-ed in Wash.Post, 10/31/02, Sr. fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  

A former U.S. General felt that the mood of the war games "reminded him of the mindset in Vietnam:  excessive faith in technology, inadequate appreciation of the fog of war, lack of understanding of the enemy, and simple hubris."   Gen. Hoar worries that "there has been scant discussion about what will take place after...Are we going to turn the country over to another thug who swears fealty to the U.S.?"  (Congressional Testimony, 9/23/02). Another General, Charles Horner, is concerned about "the aftermath." Suggests Jeffrey Smith in his "Paying the Cost in Blood and Treasure", "War requires total national commitment.  Yet the President has not asked us to make the sacrifices necessary to win...Therefore, Congress should adopt two amendment...a tax surcharge...and a limited military draft." 

A warning came from James Fallows in The Atlantic Monthly.  "If we can judge from  past wars, the effects we can't imagine when the fighting begins will prove to be the ones that matter most."  A similar worse-case scenario was described by Washington Post reporter Dana Milbank ten days before war broke out:  "A protracted, messy war and rebuilding in Iraq leads to mass U.S. and Iraq civilian casualties, more terrorism at home, an oil crisis, radicalization of the Middle East and the fall of friendly governments, and an isolated and disliked U.S. whose alliances--even highly valued free-trade arrangements disintegrate"  Bush's "religious devotion encourages...naive optimist." (3/9). 

It turns out that postwar planning began in September, led by #3 at the Pentagon Douglas Feith.  He didn't seek an overseer to run the country until January.  Feith and other planners made at least two key assumptions:  the government would still be in working order and resistance would end quickly.  One of Feith's chief sources was INC leader Chalabi (LATimes, 7/18).

After the war approval vote in Congress in October 2002,  the White House started to go public with some of its still-vague post-Hussein plans,  including Gen. Tommy Franks "replacing" Hussein in a plan for military rule. We learned in January that General Jay Garner was quietly appointed to lead post-war Iraq in aid and reconstruction.  In the first Gulf War he helped resettle Kurds and is described former associates as "caring, compassionate, very people-oriented, and incredibly savvy" The Guardian, 2/24).  Little UN help was planned to be requested by the U.S

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The New York Times reports that the plan would be modeled after postwar occupation of Japan (General MacArthur) and include war crimes trials. Bush took inspiration from Germany and Japan in late-February:  "In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home" (WashPost, 2/27). 

The Washington Post worries that "A MacArthur-like American proconsul could also galvanize anti-American feeling in Iraq and throughout the Middle East; it would appear to confirm the suspicions of Arab nationalists--already widely broadcast around the region--that the real purpose of the Bush administration is to colonize Iraq and seize control of its oil supplies."  The U.S. occupied Japan for seven years.

A Washington Post op-ed in December expresses that post-war lessons of Germany and Japan "are relevant today" and concludes, "We need a MacArthur in Baghdad who will create the institution of a modern state.  Otherwise we will turn over power to elected dictators."  

In his late-February speech the President said that after World War II, many "said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values.  Well they were wrong."  An editorial responds, "In fact, it is Mr. Bush who is wrong...A little historical humility would do the president no harm" ("German lessons:  Bush should not mess with history", The Guardian, 2/28).  The Japan and German model is also a poor historical parallel because the nations of the world strongly supported U.S. occupation 60 years ago.

The Boston Globe's Derrick Jackson quoted Yale Professor Nordhaus, "As the world learned from the [harsh] Carthaginian peace [reference to harsh peace between ancient Rome and Carthage] that settled World War I, the cost of a botched peace may be even higher than the price of a bloody war" (2/7/03). 

Vernon Loeb surmises in late-September that a post-war occupation similar to Germany and Japan was require 300,000 peacekeeping troops in Iraq (the U.S. had about 8000 in 2002) and 100,000 in Iraq. (Post, 9/23/02). 

February estimates from General Eric Shinseki, army chief of staff, were for "several hundred thousand soldiers" in post-war Iraq, many from non-U.S. nations (WashPost, 2/26).  From the Pentagon, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz quickly rejected General Shinseki's estimate as "wildly off the mark"  Some in Congress felt kept in the dark. The Pentagon assumed the U.S. would supply only a small percent of troops in postwar Iraq.  The Post reported in "Cost of War Remains Unanswered Question" (3/1), "The Joint Staff is estimating...45,000 to 60,000" U.S. troops for up to two years."

Former Baghdad diplomat Joseph Wilson in early November worried that the occupation could turn into "a very, very, nasty affair" with revenge killings among Iraqis.  "This war is not going to be over when we get to Baghdad.  In fact, the war will have just essentially begun" (Chicago Tribune, 11/1/02).  For more details on Wilson and his post-war Niger/uranium disclosure, see "P.S." FAQ section.

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How long might U.S. troops stay in Iraq? In January 2003 the White House said troops would stay for about 18 months, but in mid-February the message about its vision of a post-war plan for Iraq suggested that there were no plans for an occupation.  This planning was countered in early February in an op-ed in The Guardian, "The recolonization of Iraq cannot be sold as liberation." After GI's are embraced on the streets of Baghdad, sanctions will end, and atrocities will be unearthed.  However,, "All this will be used to justify what is about to take place.  But, a foreign invasion which is endorsed by only a small minority of Iraqis and which seems certain to lead to long-term occupation. Loss of independence and effective foreign control of the county's oil can scarcely be regarded as national liberation.  

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under Secretary of stat Marc Grossman conceded on Feb. 11 that he did not think, according to The New York Times, "that power could be completely turned over to an Iraqi government in less than two years."  Yet the administration told Newsweek in February that "occupation" would be 30-90 days.  Said the source, "Every day you get past three months, you've got to expect peace-keepers to have a bull's-eye on their head." 

It is also difficult to imagine the US accepting anything but the most' "managed" democracy, given the kind of government genuine elections might well throw up." Officials spoke of a "transition period" of several years before Iraqis will be ready to got to the polls (The Guardian, 3/7/03, Dan Plesch).  A similar article in February analyzed "The Iraq Bush will build" in a 3-stage plan.

By mid-February the administration was becoming more specific with Congress and described its three stages of post-war Iraq, in the Post/AP article, "U.S. Plans Don't Include Iraq Occupation." (2/11/03). The three stages were called stabilization, transition, and transformation. Though plans called for military to transfer control after more than two years, this was not termed an occupation.  The New York Times reported on Feb. 18 that "Mr. Bush' political aides are acutely aware that if Iraq turns into a lengthy military occupation or if stabilization efforts are viewed by the Iraqi people as foreign occupation, those events will quickly be seized upon by Mr. Bush opponents" ("War Planners Begin to Speak of War's Risks").  President Bush spoke of post-war goals of democracy and progress (Wash Post, 2/21). Other administration goals included making sure "the Iraqi people immediately consider themselves better off" than they were the day before the war, and attribute their improved circumstances directly to the U.S. with food and other relief (WashPost, 2/21/03). 

Senator Christopher Dodd (D) reacted to the administration predication of a two-year occupation as "naive...It's going to be very expensive and take a long, long time particularly if we're doing it ourselves" (NYTimes, 2/12). 

"Any future the Iraqi people choose for themselves will be better than the nightmare world that Saddam Hussein has chosen for them," said the President in late February (Chicago Tribune, 2/27). 

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In terms of the length of the war and Americans killed, the administration refused to guess or predict.  The Times reported, "White House aides argue that the president "cannot talk about casualties without scaring Americans.  If, however, either the war or --after the presumed American victory--occupation of Iraq goes badly, such a failure to hint at the problems may come back to haunt in president" ("Bush is undeterred by opposition...", 3/3). 

One expert predicted that a war longer than three weeks will be "real trouble" for President Bush (Andrew Bacevich, retired Army Colonel and teacher of international relation at BU in Wash Post, 3/19, "Duration of War Key to U.S. victory"-L).  A short war with few U.S. KIA would be termed success but experts felt that a war over a month or with over 200 U.S. KIA would be a Bush "public relations disaster." 

In mid March a bi-partisan panel organized by the Council of Foreign Relations came out with their report, co-led by James R. Schlesinger, secretary of defense in the Nixon and Ford administration  Schlesinger worried  about postwar costs and tasks:  "It is not clear to me that the American people understand we are engaged in the long haul if we are to be successful."  The Times described the report as calling "particular attention to the lack of planning and inadequate resources devoted to the humanitarian front after the war" (3/12). 

The James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy stressed the importance of maintaining the Iraq army. Five days before war Rice described the "Iraqi Interim Authority" which would help rule the post-war situation. 

At the U.S. Army War College, the military's independent think tank, issued a February report which "reads [in September '03] like an after-the-fact autopsy: "Having entered into Iraq, the U.S. will find itself unable to leave rapidly, despite the many pressures to do so.  A small number of terrorists could reasonably choose to attack U.S. forces in the hope that they can incite an action-reaction cycle that will enhance their cause and increase their numbers.  If the U.S. assumes control of Iraq, it will assume control of a badly battered economy.  To tear apart the Iraqi army in the war's aftermath could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces for unity within the society."  The report concluded, "Without an overwhelming effort to prepare for occupation, the U.s. may find itself in a radically different wolrd over the next few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow of new problems of America's own making." 

Similarly, an EU commissioner predicted, "It will be that much more difficult for the EU to cooperate fully and on a large scale...in the longer-term reconstruction process if events unfold without proper U.N. cover and if the member states remain divided" (E.J. Dionne, Jr. in Washington Post, 9/9/03). 

"Life After Saddam" was Time magazine's Special Report from March 10 which concluded that the administration "is not very ready for the peace." One week before war the U.S. selected companies to bid on at least $900 million in Iraqi reconstruction.  The groups included Bechtel, Halliburton, and Flour (Wash Post, 3/11). These and other U.S. companies are described in "Who rebuilding Iraq?"
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4623115-103550,00.html  

Vice President Cheney was Halliburton's CEO for five years after his role as Secretary of Defense under Bush 41.  In those years, Halliburton "nearly doubled the amount of business it did with the government" and more than doubled its political contributions...overwhelmingly to Republican candidates."  Cheney was still being paid about $1 million/year by Halliburton when he was Vice President.

For more on Post-war reconstruction, see P.S. FAQ section.

The anti-war "MoveOn.org" website promotes this anti-occupation advertisement. The Christian Science Monitor describes the de-Bathification needed and the exile option. The Washington Post gives this advise in late December, "The administration...needs to make clear...what the U.S. postwar commitment to Iraq would entail." The administration finally spoke publicly on Feb. 11 of an exit strategy estimating that U.S. forces would need at least two years.

A British historian realized that "The U.S. will win the new Iraq war...And then?  Will the U.S. stay?  Unless they are prepared to stay as long as they did in Japan [7 years] Germany, and Korea [over 50 years], they cannot guarantee stability." 

Former Ambassador Edward Peck explains in an NPR interview that reconstruction would be very challenging and he wonders why the U.S. would be invading now. In "Planning Now for a Postwar Iraq", UN Sec. General Annan wondered, "What sort of Iraq do we wake up to after the bombing, and what happens in the region?"  Worries Henry Kissenger, who served in the German occupation by the U.S., "I am viscerally opposed to a prolonged occupation of a Muslim country at the heart of the Muslim world by Western nations who proclaim the right to re-educate that country." "Intoxicated With Power" worries about America's large ego. How long would we stay in Iraq? UK's Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy said that Iraq needed more of a "rehabilitation" strategy than of "decapitation" strategy.  

A RAND corporation terrorism expert fears "an expanded U.S. presence in the region could increase the number of targets."  Georgetown University professor sees potential long-range improvements as U.S. withdraws from Saudi Arabia but worries about there probably being "a large number of disaffected people who don't like American and who are not attacking America, but who might come to think we're pure evil" (Wash Post, 3/17). 

Polls concerning occupation began to surface in mid-February.  Post/ABC found that just 37% support an American occupation if it "stretches for several years and cost $15 billion/year (Chicago Tribune, 2/12/03). In terms who who would pay for the reconstruction/occupation, a coalition before war begins will be critical, explained a New York Times editorial, "The Coalition of the Willing" (2/19/03).  "Mr. Bush's coalition also creates the misleading impression the government around the world are lining up to help pay for the reconstruction of Iraq.  This is not the same coalition that Mr. Bush's father assembled in 1991 to evict Iraq from Kuwait. that fraternity included the Security Council, most of the Arab world, and Japan, and it contributed more than $50 billion to finance the Persian Gulf War." 

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Sandra Mackey concludes her book The Reckoning thus: "The ghosts of Vietnam hover around Iraq...because the U.S. is again in danger of stumbling into the internal conflict of another people, only to become trapped in old feuds it never comprehended.  In this new era of the American experience that began on September 11, 2002, the U.S. can to longer afford to be seduced by its own military power or by a naive faith that foreign worlds always can be simplified and mastered" (396).

9.  Would it be hard to find and kill Saddam Hussein?  Might he leave as a war began? (Also see "P.S." FAQ on Hussein)
Before the war began, Iraqi National Congress leader Chalabi felt Hussein could easily disappear:  "Saddam is one person in 25 million.  He would be more difficult to find than Bin Laden."   The Special Republican Guard is led by Kamal Mustafa.  Former Sec.of State Baker concurs that "finding Hussein will be difficult."  

"There have been at least six coup attempts in the 1990s, and they consistently failed" (NYTimes, 4/28/02). Ari Fleisher, White House spokesman, spoke bluntly in early October, as reported in The article "U.S.[Backed] Hussein's slaying" (Washington Post, 10/2/02): "The cost of one bullet, if the Iraqi people take it on themselves, is substantially less" than going to war.  "Regime change is welcome in whatever from it takes." 

James Fallows of The Atlantic provides unique detail about Post-Saddam Iraq in "The 51st State", composed in late September, 2002.  Fallows wrote of the last days of war when Hussein is desperate, how to take care of the Iraqi people in the short-term, keeping the country united, future leadership, and his "nightmare scenario" that we can't find Hussein.  Former U.S. air force Chief-of-Staff told Fallows, "then we've got Osama and Saddam out there.  Both of them achieving mythical heroic status in the Arab world just be surviving...it ain't over until you've got him in handcuffs" (The Guardian, 9/24/02). 

Added Gulf War General Norman Schwartzkopf, "I think target No. 1...will be Saddam Hussein.  Now that's an easy-say, hard-do thing.  Because we never could find him in the Gulf War" (NYTimes, 10/21/02 on NBC News). 

"Iraq's Dirty Dozen" highlights the likely 12 "most wanted," including Chemical Ali, Tariq Aziz, and Saddam's sons. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4625976-110863,00.html

In late September, Nicholas Kristof (NYTimes),  concluded "fighting Street to Street" (9/27/02) with this warning:  "Is America really prepared for hundreds of casualties, even thousands, in a invasion and subsequent occupation that could last many years?"  He feared possible worse-case scenario of farmers "taking potshots at our troops".  On finding Hussein, Kristof predicted, "Saddam has a hiding place for himself that is better than Osama bin Laden's caves at Tora Bora:  the teaming city of Baghdad, with five million inhabitants, where he already never spends two consecutive nights in the same place...We'll have to hunt for Saddam on the ground--which may be just as hard as finding Osama in Afghanistan. (For more Kristof views, see "Columnnists Against War" FAQ section)

Thomas Friedman ("The Last Cartoon", 12/22/02) elaborated how to avoid war:  "Before Gulf War II is launched, there will be a Russia-France or Arab delegation that flies to Baghdad and tries to persuade Saddam to spare his family, and everyone else, for a war--either by disclosing his weapons or by going into exile under Arab or European protection.  Why?  Because unlike Gulf War I, too many nations don't want gulf War II to happen."  The Times of London has reported that Hussein has paid, "tens of millions of dollars to the Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi, to assure safe haven for Mr. Hussein's family in the event of war." For more Friedman views, see "Columnists Waver on War"  FAQ section.

This argument that exile was not likely queries, "What do you think will happen to the first person in Baghdad who goes up to Saddam Hussein and tells him it's time to spend more time with his family?" (EU commissioner for external relations, Chicago Tribune, 1/21/03). 

A New York Times article maintained that "exile would be an intolerable humiliation for a man who sees his own survival in power and place in history as inextricably bound up with that of Baathist rule and Iraq's regional role" (3/14, "Saddam:  "I Was Born in Iraq and I Will Die in Iraq'"). Others suggested the Republican Guard and his tribe would fight hard because "his death could be theirs" (WashPost, 10/5/02).

October 2002 reports were that Hussein met with the foreign minister of Qatar to try to convince him to go into exile (NYTimes, 10/18/02). Into early January 2003 there was more talk of Hussein leaving on the eve of war.  Rumored destinations include Saudi Arabia, Russia, Algeria, and Libya.  Would he be promised there would be no war crimes trial?  Responds Rumsfeld, "I think that [Hussein leaving] would be a fair trade to avoid war." In mid-February Powell described to Congress US. effort to help Hussein and his top leaders seek asylum. William Safire suggests that Russia might provide Hussein with asylum. In mid-February, Jordan urged the U.S. to push hard for the "exile option."  By early March UAE became the first Arab country to call for him to step down (NYTimes, 3/2), followed by Kuwait.  Bahrain offered him asylum.  In the days before war, the U.S. named the nine Iraqis who would face war crimes trails as Bush reminded the world of the horrible torture and rape of the regime (NYTimes, 3/16). 

"No one writes to the tyrants" examines the exiles of dictator such as Ferdinand Marco, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, and "Baby Doc" Duvalier. 

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10.   How much money would the war cost? (Also see "P.S." FAQ section for post-war updates on costs)
Pre-war estimates of the total cost ranged from $50-$278 billion, and analysis of the cost is a lead Post editorial "The Costs of War." Yale economist William Nordhaus, who served on President Carter's Council of Economic Advisers,  estimates the high end, over 10 years, at $1.6 trillion (Washington Post, 1/8/03). Nordhaus is worried that "the historical record is lettered with failed forecasts about the economic, political, and military outcomes of wars..."  For example, the Civil War cost 13 times more than the worst case and the Pentagon underestimated Vietnam by 90% (Washington Post, 11/30/02).

"With hindsight," Nordhaus continues,..."would the South have seceded and provoked a Civil War if they had known the devastation that would follow?...Would the U.S. have sent half a million men to Vietnam?" (Boston Globe, 2/7/03).  Robert Samuelson, in the Post, thinks the costs are worth it:  "What's the alternative?  If it's peace and prosperity, then war makes no sense.  but if fighting now prevents a costlier war later, it makes much sense.  to be blunt:  If Saddam Hussein gets nuclear weapons and threatens his neighbors (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) or drops one on Tel Aviv, prompting Israel to retaliate, we'll face a horrendous war" (11/26/02).

Polls warned that "Americans are far more willing to wage war than to do what may be necessary to bring a lasting peace to Iraq" (Washington Post, 2/11/03). At one point the total cost, including war, reconstruction, Iraqi salaries, and humanitarian assistance was estimated by Newsweek  at 5 years and $132 billion ("Iraq:  After Saddam"). 

Congressional budget experts (non-partisan CBO) in early October predicted a two month war and five years of occupation totaling $278 billion (Chicago Tribune, 11/1/02), which does not include reconstruction costs. The CBO breakdown would be $9 billion/month and part of the peacekeeping costs at $1-4 billion per month.  Congressional Democrats estimate $93 billion, plus the cost of peacekeeping and rebuilding, bringing the total to over $270 billion (NYTimes/AP, 10/1/02). Some of those billions have already been spent in the 2002-03 buildup in the Gulf. Times' Nicholas Kristof estimates the cost at "$750 to $1500 per American taxpayer...We could do more more our national security by spending the money on education, or by financing a major campaign to promote hybrid cars...and taking other steps toward energy independence."  (Also see "Oil FAQ Section")  

However, the White House lowered their estimate to $50-60 billion at the end of 2002 (Tribune, 1/1/03) but up again to $95 billion in February and the Pentagon estimate had doubled Rumsfeld's previous numbers. We learned in February that the price tag would top $100, which would include aid to Turkey (Chicago Tribune, 2/26). At the end the month, White House officials said not be asked Congress to fund the war until after it began.  "Lawmakers complained that the policy would essentially lock them into a pay-as-you-go-war."  Others claimed Wolfowitz was "deliberately keeping us in the dark" (NYTimes/Reuters, 3/2). 

Yet in March the Pentagon dismissed the $95 billion price tag but declined to give their own figure (NYTimes, 3/3).  In mid-March Wolfowitz estimated war and reconstruction would cost between $10-$100 billion but the buildup to war in 2002 alone was already $10 billion.  In mid-March the estimate rose to $25 for the buildup and for returning the troops home, even without a war (NYTimes, 3/8).  Many cost questions remained unanswered. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A18486-2003Feb28?language=printer
As a Washington Post article succinctly summarized on the eve of war, "Leaders in both parties are expressing increasing frustration that the potential bill for war and rebuilding remains a mystery" Senator Kennedy observed, "The wealthy should have to wait for their tax cuts, at least until the cost of war and reconstruction of Iraq are addressed"  (3/19). 

An independent Washington thin-tank estimated $132 billion, with $45 billion for the U.S. occupation (Time, 3/10).  Some lower estimates were based on post-war rosy scenarios and on using Iraq oil to help pay for reconstruction. 

Part of the cost would be a peacekeeping force of 75,000- 80,000 and an annual cost of $20 billion (USA Today and Chicago Tribune, 8/2/02) to $50 billion (Institute of International Strategic Studies, 2/7/03).  By comparison,  U.S. spent $10 billion in Afghanistan in 2002, which many felt was too little. (NYTimes, 2/15/03). A bi-partisan panel of foreign policy experts felt that the reconstruction would cost $20 billion a year and require the long term deployment of 75,000 to 200,000 troops "to prevent widespread instability and violence..." (NYTimes, 3/12). 

Thomas Friedman discusses oil and energy option in his December editorial. The Washington Post editorials such as "Iraq and the Economy" suggests that "If you think the Iraqi dictator might one day unleash weapons of mass destruction on America or allied targets, removing him at the cost even of $200 billion is well worthwhile." Advises the Washington Post in late December, ""as military preparations proceed, [the administration] must also do more to make clear to American what risks and costs come with a war." Perhaps in response to the Post, on December 31, the administration changed the cost estimate of Bush's former economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey, of $100-200 billion in mid-September, as reported in a Wall Street Journal article (NYTimes, 9/16/02).    Lindsey was replaced on his job. As one senior administration intelligence official put it, "It would be foolish for any of us to put a number on it.  The last person who tried [Lindsay]...lost his job" (Time, 2/28). 

The cost of the war will not be part of the 2004 budget which includes $355 billion in military spending.  The New York Times editorial pointed out that the U.S. spends on defense nearly as much as the rest of the world combined (2/10/03). 

Further, the UN estimated that the first three years of rebuilding Iraq would cost $30 billion. After four years of surplus, the U.S. fiscal year ending September 30, 2002 had a $159 billion deficit, with no prospect for a balanced budget in the near future and a deficit estimated at over $400 billion in 2003. By comparison, in the first Gulf War, 90% of the spending came from U.S. allies, whereas in this war Europe and other Middle East allies may feel upset that they are made to play the unwilling role of "U.S. banker", or, during rebuilding of Iraq, "U.S. cleaning lady."  The first Gulf War costs the U.S. about $7 billion, as much was paid by allies.  Blix liked to point out than inspections cost $80 million a year and war would cost $80 billion a year--"plus bloodshed on both sides" (WashPost, 3/2). 

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11.  What is nuclear blackmail?  What is nuclear proliferation?  
Nuclear blackmail is the idea of threatening to use nuclear weapons in order to obtain a desired response from one's adversary, whereas nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons.  We now know that the "nuclear club" consists of at least the following countries:  U.S., Russia, China, UK, France, Israel, Pakistan, and India.. The CIA reports that one of the "Axis of Evil" countries, North Korea, now has crude nuclear weapons. Rumsfeld believes that those having or developing lethal weapons which might be sold to terrorists include: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea.  Also see "Future and Terrorism" FAQ section. How do we confront or engage all of these nations?

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12.  What is an “axis of evil”?  Who is in the club, according to President Bush?  
Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.  The President explained the axis of evil in his State of The Union Speech of January, 2002.  Including Iran on the list may be losing allies for the U.S.(6/3/02). Yet now we know that North Korea has nuclear weapons and Iran appears much farther along than Iraq in acquiring them. The Guardian suggests a new "Axis of Angst" which is bothering the President and includes Iraq, North Korea, and Israel-Palestinians. 

Other countries who have acquired or sought to acquire WMD include India, Pakistan. Israel, China, and North Korea. See "The Future" FAQ for North Korea details. See "Allies/UN" FAQ for Iranian details.

13.  Now that President Bush has threatened Iraq, if the U.S. doesn’t start a war, do we “lose face” in the war on terrorism?
James Schlesinger (former CIA Director and Secretary of Defense) worries that "our credentials would be badly damaged if the regime change did not take place" (NYTimes). 

Richard Perle (Defense Policy Board head, a Pentagon advisory group) also worried about a "collapse of confidence," has used this credibility logic (WGN Radio interview and other articles).  Perle asks the question, "Do we wait for Saddam and hope for the best...or do we take pre-emptive action?"  Phyllis Bennis responds that the threats become "a self-fulfilling commitment." (NYTimes, 8/20/02). Others argue that demonizing an enemy is not without risks because it is increasingly difficult to back off.

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14.  Are there any alternatives to war?
Former UN under Secretary-General Hans von Sponeck argues, "The place to settle the Iraq conflict is [the UN] and the Arab League, not the battlefield."  The Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) suggests "strengthening the international rule of law, demonstrating respect for human rights, and breaking the cycle of violence." Trying Hussein for crimes has also been suggested. Ruth Rosen writes movingly in "World Without War?" In "What would you suggest" (The Guardian, 2/19/03) the authors suggests "human rights inspections" or to lift sanctions, sell oil through he UN, but only give the oil money to Iraq if the regime makes democratic changes. 

Also see "Alternatives to War" and "Stop The War Before it Starts."  Other sites by the author include "Against War/Sanctions" Web Sites.

Another creative alternative is suggested by World War II Air Force commander Richard Leghorn in NYTimes: "It would be foolhardy to move so precipitately before trying an approach [strikes on known weapons targets] that could well bring about disarmament in a quicker and more acceptable way."  On Feb. 5, former ANC leader and South African President Nelson Mandela said he was willing to go to Iraq to help avert war but only if the UN approved.

In February Saddam Hussein challenged George Bush to a debate, as reported in the Dan Rather interview of the Iraqi leader. 

In March an Episcopal bishop and director of Sojourners co-wrote a Post op-ed "There Is a Third Way".  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A23271-2003Mar13?language=printer
They wish to remove Hussein but protect the Iraqi people, indict and try Hussein, use coercive disarmament, administer Iraq thought the UN, and organize "a massive humanitarian effort for the people of Iraq now" (3/14). 

Turnipseed continued, "It is hard for Americans to understand what a villain Dubya is to the rest of the world because of our extremely ethnocentric and jingoistic corporate media culture...It would be the greatest news/sports event in the history of the world...Since [they] feel so strongly about each other it would be most fitting for them to direct such personal animosity toward each other rather than put so many innocent people in harms way."

15.  Could this war talk and preparation just be a huge bluff?
In mid-December spokesman Ari Fleisher told the world, "I assure you, this President does not bluff."  In The Atlantic's May 2002 issue cover story, author Mark Bowden suggests that elements in the military would assassinate Hussein when an invasion was imminent. They "would not fight to the death to protect him, but rather would...head off an American invasion." Other military experts are less certain. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune suggested in early fall 2002 that there would not even be a war. "The most cynical theory circulating is that Bush isn't really serious about taking on Hussein right now; he's more interested in keeping alive his tough-guy commander-in-chief image through the fall elections..."

However, Tony Blair's' former cabinet member Mo Mowlam realized as early as September (5) that "It is hard now to see how George Bush can withdraw his bellicose words and also save face" (Guardian, 9/5/02).  Some suggest that Blair needed to "talk up war in order to make it less likely." 

16.  Against which countries is the Pentagon making plans to possibly use nuclear weapons?  In what cases would President Bush consider using a "small" nuclear bomb?
In March 2002  the President admitted that Pentagon plans included nuclear targeting Iraq, China, Syria, Libya, North Korea, and others. This policy could lead these countries to develop their own nuclear "response", as we have now seen so clearly from North Korea in the fall of 2002.  In March the President suggested that "all means" would be considered to prevent an attack "on the U.S. or its friends." Cheney has said that "the U.S. does not target nuclear weapons on any nation...[on a] day-to-day basis."  A New York Times editorial calls the policy "reckless folly" and later comments, "Nuclear weapons should never be regarded as just another bigger, more effective bomb" (6/23/02). The U.S. is developing "low-yield" or tactical nuclear weapons that could be used to burrow into the earth in search of chemical or biological weapons. Presidential directive 17, signed by President Bush in September 2002, spoke of using nukes in response to biological and chemical attacks. Also see "Future/Terrorism/Korea" FAQ Section.

17. What is a pre-emptive strike?  What is this new U.S. policy?  Also see "Was the War Inevitable" FAQ section
Getting them before they get us; also, launching nuclear weapons on warning. A new first strike doctrine was issued by the White House on September 20, 2002.  The document was entitled "The National Security Strategy of the United States." A week later, The Tribune's R.C. Longworth, in "The Cheney Doctrine: U.S. asserts 1st-strike option" (9/29 Perspective Section), discusses this new public policy and quotes from the document.  Since "threats can be vague, 'we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries'...If coalitions cannot be formed, 'the U.S. should be postured to act independently.'" Comments Longworth, "Prevention might be a better word than pre-emption.  Pre-emption implies hitting the other guy before he hits you; prevention means hitting him before he even gets the gloves on."  He feels that the new policy is "a prescription for global domination, in essence a worldwide empire." (For more Longworth comments, see "Should/editorial and columnists" FAQs)

Thomas Friedman soon chimed in with comments about tone and substance on U.S. foreign policy ("Tone it Down a Notch", 10/2/02): "...It is too bad that Mr. Bush's instinctive humility has given way lately to Texas cowboy ling...I'm sure it helps whip up crowds at Republican fund-raisers but...it doesn't cross the ocean well.  Beyond tone, there is also substance.  We will never be taken seriously by the world if we go on telling others that they are either with us or against us in the war on terrorism--but that in the war for a greener planet, in the war against global warming, sorry we're not with you..." For more Friedman, see "Columnists Wavering" FAQ section.

On December 10, 2002 the U.S. announced a new pre-emptive strike doctrine, "breaking 50 years of counter-proliferation efforts by authorizing pre-emptive strikes on states and terrorist groups that are close to acquiring" WMD or long-range missiles. Six in ten Americans surveyed in mid-December favor such a response/first use, that is, use nuclear weapons on Iraqi civilians if Iraq uses chemical or biological weapons on U.S. troops.

Criticism of the new policy comes from The Progressive editor Matthew Rothschild's "Bush's nuclear stick": "If Saddam were to use chemical or biological weapons against a U.S. attack--and CIA director Tenet says that's the only likely time Saddam would use them against us--then Bush may drop a nuclear weapon on Baghdad...Bush would be willing to sacrifice the lives of 5 million people who live in Baghdad just to get the one guy who ordered a chemical or biological attack?  This would give new meaning to 'disproportionate response' and would mock all the pious noises out of the Bush administration that it cares so much about the poor Iraqi people."

Rothschild concludes, "That Bush would even contemplate using such a weapon may be the biggest reason of all for opposing this war."  A new national security strategy suggesting the use of first strike was issued on September 20, 2002.  For more Rothschild, see "Columnists Against War" FAQ section.

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18. What is a no-fly zone?  Why were American planes bombing Iraq before the war?  (Also see "Sanctions" FAQ section)

As the Washington Post explains on10/1/02, "No-flight zones...were defined independently by the U.S. and its coalition partners, contending that they were enforcing the general UN resolution requiring Iraq to halt repression of its own people"  

President Clinton expanded the zones in 1998. Hussein considers the no-fly zones a violation of his nation's sovereignty. In November, 2002, Thom Shanker (NYTimes) writes, "Will Americans go to war with Iraq? America already is at war with Iraq?  'The Gulf War did not end in February of 1991.  For a decade now, we've been fighting this low-level war without calling it such'" (Eliot Cohen, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies).  

Usually, this occurred after Iraqi anti-aircraft in no-fly zones aim toward U.S. planes.  However, on September 16, Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld announced that targets in Iraq had already been expanded for weeks, perhaps as a prelude to full scale war or perhaps in a calculated attempt to create an immediate cause for war. That is, attacks are offensive and not just in response to Iraqi "aggression."  

In early March, the U.S. began attacking Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles and rockets, "system that could threaten an American-led invasion force" (NYTimes, 3/2).  These attacks, sometimes outside the US./British established No-Fly Zones, included 600 bombs dropped on 391 targets and was "a comprehensive plan to disrupt Iraq's military command and control system before the war" (NYTimes).  This bombing was likely a violation of international law.

While some argue that through sanctions and no-fly zones, the Gulf War never ended, one could easily make the case that the new Gulf War began in September.  During the first 8 months of 1999, for example, the U.S. fired 11,000 missiles into Iraq (New York Times, 8/13/99). and 457 armed sorties during a four week period in the spring of 2002, according to Iraq. Civilians often die from these U.S. bombings.,  Other bombings this year include August 27, June 29, June 15, and at least five in May.  (May 21,  May 31.)  Some unexploded Gulf War cluster bombs are still killing Iraqis.(NYTimes, 5/4/02).  Iraq estimates that the bombings have led to the deaths of 1400 Iraqis. See more on cluster bombs.

Thom Shanker feels that Iraq will keep firing at U.S. planes in hopes "one of those allied missiles launched in response will be guided less precisely to its target, and will instead strike a mosque, a baby food factory, a school or a hospital" (NYTimes, 11/24/03).  When Iraq claims that U.S. missiles sometimes injure and kill civilians, the  Pentagon replies, "coalition aircraft never target civilian populations or infrastructure and go to painstaking length to avoid injury to civilians" (WashPost, 12/1/02). 

Iraq allegedly shot down an unmanned "Predator" drone plane on December 23.  The plane, costing $4.5 million, was the fourth lost by the U.S. in 18 months.  Iraq claims that it shot down another predator on Jan. 22, a charge denied by the U.S. Though the U.S. claims it only fires "in self defense", during the winter of 2002-2003, it was clear they were more aggressive. The U.S. claimed it retaliated with bombing raids at least 9 times in September and also starting a new policy of bombing major air defense sites. U.S. and Britain war planes bombed over 80 targets just in the southern NFZ in the last five months of 2002 and 27 in the first 90 days of 2003, according to the U.S. military (Chicago Tribune, 3/4). The U.S. claims this is only in retaliation, when their planes are fired on or targeted, but some bombings are hundreds of miles from where planes are shot at. the Washington Post reports that "Iraq says many of the attacks have been on non-military targets and have resulted in civilians deaths."  Anthony Cordesman surmised that the increased attacks are more about containment than retaliation (1/15/03). 

Patrolling the no-fly zones costs US taxpayers $1 billion/year, and involves 10,000 military personnel with 200 planes.  Also see "Was the War Inevitable" FAQs.

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19.  Does Secretary Powell speak for the administration?  Is the Powell Doctrine dead?

During the fall of 2001, Powell was considered a "dove" and opposed Rumsfeld and Bush, but over the summer he clearly stated that he was in favor an attack on Iraq, even if weapons inspectors return.  Since the uproar in August over the Bush unilateralist policy, he has stressed inspectors more than invasion and has appeared, in contrast to Cheney and Rumsfeld, dovish.  Charles Krauthammer analyzes Powell's views of the UN in "Powell and Bush at Cross-Purposes" (Post, 1/10/03). The Powell Doctrine, which applied the lessons of Vietnam to the Gulf War, included:  use of overwhelming force, clear objectives, support of Americans and Congress, and an exit strategy.

In early 2003  few of these criteria would be met.  Dan Plesch's war analysis expresses that "Rumsfeld has set aside the Powell Doctrine in favour of a more adventurous approach" (The Guardian, 2/19/03). 

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20.  Is there a name for this war?
I suggest Gulf War III, since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s was Hussein's first Gulf War, and "Desert Storm" was Gulf War II.  Some suggest "Desert Storm Lite."  Others I suggest, which the Pentagon might prefer to include, are: "Disarm for Peace", "Battle for Peace", "Operation Forcibly Disarm" or "Operation Regime Change." However, surely a more creative name will be coined by the administration. First heard in mid-March was "Operation Iraqi Freedom." That might stick, it seemed.

In the January/February 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs, Fouad Ajami suggests that rather than Desert Storm, "The Arab rulers will want the perfect storm:  a swift war, few casualties..." The invasion of Panama in 1989 (President Bush 41) was "Operation Just Cause" and Afghanistan in 2001 was "Operation Infinite Justice", but quickly changed to "Enduring Freedom" when it was realized the Muslims believe only Allah can determine justice.  One of my students suggested that Operation Iraqi Liberation, perhaps considered, had the unfortunate acronym that would lead many to doubt the intentions of the U.S. (OIL)

ZMagazine recalls that Bush delayed serious war talk until September of 2002, despite August criticism from top Republicans, (See "Congress" FAQ Section) because, as White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card admitted, "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August."

21.  When did CIA operatives begin operation in Iraq?  Is this a violation of international law?
The CIA began operations in October 2002 or earlier.  Most of the over 100 agents were in northern Iraq, where Hussein has no control.  Some agents probably moved into Baghdad.  This "undercover war" is not sanctioned by the UN (Sydney Morning Journal, 1/6/03). Hussein accused the UN weapons inspectors of working with the CIA.  At least two weeks before war, U.S. Marines cut tank-size holes in the fence separating Kuwait and Iraq.  The UN reported "numerous violations" of this sort.