Iraq's Nuclear and Al Qaeda Connections
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Last updated  12/19/2005

1.  What was the nuclear evidence put forth by the administration? (Also see "P.S." FAQs for summer 2003 updates)  
2.  What was the terrorism/al Qaeda/9-11 evidence put forth by the administration?  Why was it controversial?  (Also see "P.S." FAQs for 2003 updates)

The administration probably realized that for Americans in the post-9/11 world, Hussein would cause fear most easily with talk about nuclear weapons and links to terrorism. 

Many of the administration's accusations included often vague statements by Cheney and Rumsfeld, and comments about aluminum tubes and uranium from Africa (Niger) and prediction as to how soon Hussein could get nukes, given various variables.

During the Gulf War, the CIA had misread how close Hussein was to developing nuclear weapons; he was about 6 months away not 5 or 6 years.

The tone of CIA analysis on Iraq shifted with the Bush administration, the Chicago Tribune reported in the summer of 2003 (7/19/03). The annual CIA report in 1997 under Clinton had "just 3 paragraphs on Iraq" and made "no mention" of a nuclear weapons program.  "Last year [2002] the CIA section on Iraq ran seven times longer" though Rumsfeld admitted to Congress after the war that  "no significant new evidence about Iraq's alleged WMD had been uncovered during the current administration."  The Tribune discusses how "cautionary caveats" are absent in the Bush era reports.

Hussein may have chemical weapons and would probably like to eventually counter Israel's significant nuclear capabilities, estimated at 200 nuclear weapons.  The UK report also says that Hussein is five years away from producing nuclear weapons on its own, though it alleges that he has been buying "significant quantities" of uranium from Africa, a charge later found false and based on a forgery.  

Defector Khidhir Hamza, a former top scientist in the nuclear field, and often quoted in Hawkish circles, feels Hussein is developing nuclear weapons, but even the CIA estimates that he is about 5 years away (USA Today, 7/12/02).  He labels defectors as "Saddam's Achilles' heal" (NYTimes, 11/10/02). Hamza's book, "Saddam's Bombmaker" reflects his work with the program until 1991.  Earlier, Hamza attended MIT and Florida State University in the 1960s. Concurred Rumsfeld, "To the extent they have kept their nuclear scientist together and working on these efforts, one has to assume they've not been playing tiddlywinks" (Post, 9/4/02).  But two weeks later El Baradei said that without on-site inspections, "We cannot verify whether Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program" (NYTimes, 9/16/02. 

Other studies show Hussein would need to acquire material on the black market. The think tank The International Institute for Strategic Studies is described in the Post as, "Wait and the threat will grow; strike and the threat may be used." In their 80-page, September 2002 study, the Institute's detailed study concluded that Iraq "has stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons but could not build nuclear weapons for years [The CIA says 5 years or more (NYTimes, 9/9/02] unless obtained on the black market.  Likewise, he could build a nuclear weapon within months if he received radioactive materials.  The study also warned that Iraq "had retained about a dozen short-range missiles that could be fitted with biological and chemical warheads."  One of The Guardian's detailed articles about the study is entitled, "The Iraqi threat: real or imagined?"

In August of 2002, the Vice President feared Hussein would "fairly soon" have nuclear weapons. Most U.S. intelligence disagreed with Cheney and had no evidence of progress since Iraq's nuclear program was destroyed in the '90s.  Newsweek (9/16) further points out that "nuclear production is difficult to hide."  He also said, "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction."

In early September Cheney spoke of evidence:  "We don't have all the evidence...We don't know how much...He is, in fact, actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons" (Post, 9/8/02).  Powell seemed to agree with Cheney and said in September, "the intelligence case is clear, that they have WMD" (Newsweek, 9/16). Cheney returned to these accusations in the week before war on Meet The Press.  The Washington Post's Dana Milbank describes the Vice-president's "serious new allegation that implied Hussein already has nuclear weapons."  Declared Cheney, "We know he's been absolutely devoted in trying to acquire nuclear weapons and we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons".  The IAEA Director General ElBaradei found no evidence on a clear program; Cheney called his conclusions "wrong" (3/17)

As described above, in "For Bush, Facts Are Malleable", the Washington Post's Dana Milbank reports on  specific instances in the fall of nuclear mis-statements:
On September 7 to the UN, the President said, "'When inspectors were...denied, finally denied access, a report came out of ....IAEA...that they were six months away from developing a weapon.  I don't know what more evidence we need.'  The IAEA 1998 report declared that Iraq was 'six to 24 months away from nuclear capability before the 1991 Gulf War.'"  His September speech at the UN included allegations that Iraq made "several attempts" to "buy high-strength aluminum tubes."  On the uranium/Niger claim, the UN's El Baradei said in late January that despite repeated requests to the U.S. for evidence, "we haven't gotten anything specific" (WashPost, 1/28/03). 

The Guardian (UK) reported that he is trying hard to get nuclear weapons; that his nuclear scientists went to Belarus in search of supplies.

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Bush used his October 2002 Cincinnati speech to sum up the case: "the evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.  Saddam Hussein held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his 'nuclear majahadeen'--his nuclear holy warriors.  Satellite photos reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past.  Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment need for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapon."

We learned only after the war that the "attempt to gain uranium from Africa/Niger" claim in his State of the Union speech of January 2003 was deleted by the CIA from this October speech.

The New York Times' January 28 story "Report's Findings Undercut U.S. Arguments" point out that, "Dr. El Baradei's report challenges much of this case," because he reported there were "no indications that Iraq could produce weapons grade nuclear material" in 1998 or now, even after recent radioisotope testing of rivers, canals, and lakes.  The Times describes that "the agency's inspectors also visited all of the buildings that had been identified through satellite photos as possible sites for working on nuclear arms.  "No prohibited nuclear activity have been identified during these inspections.'"  El Baradei also pointed out that documents seized from the home of an Iraqi scientist related to Iraq's nuclear program before 1991. 

Rumsfeld said on January 20, "He has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons."  Three days before Blix and El Baradei's report to the UN of late January, the Washington Post article by Joby Warrick (1/24/02) sheds some light with "U.S. Claim on Iraqi Nuclear Program Is Called Into Question"  On the aluminum tube claims, the Post recalls Bush's UN speech of September describing Iraq's "continued appetite" for nuclear bombs.  According to the President, Iraq tried to buy thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes used "to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." Cheney and Rice repeated the claim but "according to government officials and weapons experts, the claim now appears to be seriously in doubt" and "there were clues from the beginning that should have raised doubts about the claims."  During the same lead-up week, Rice wrote her Times op-ed that the November declaration "fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from abroad" (1/23/03). 

The IAEA and its leader ElBaradei in early January doubted the aluminum tube claim, and, in general, found no evidence of a nuclear program "since its elimination in the 1990s."  An independent panel of Americans, British, and Germans agreed that the tubes were not for nuclear delivery, but rather a perfect fit for their Medusa 81 rockets. Aluminum had not been used for rockets since the 1950s.

In the Post description, "The Bush administration, while acknowledging the IAEA's finding...has not retreated from its earlier statements."  Energy and State departments dissent; CIA agrees with the claims.  At Energy, even the Oak Ridge National Laboratory weighed in .  The Post's Walter Pincus's in-depth postwar analyses sites the views of the founder of the Oak Ridge centrifuge physics department, Houston G. Wood III.  Wood told Pincus, speaking publicly for the first time, "it would have been extremely difficult to make these tubes into centrifuges.  It stretches the imagination to come up with away.  I do not know any real centrifuge experts that feel differently."  In September 2002 the NIE voted about the centrifuge issues, with Energy and State each getting one vote.  So, the estimate said "most analysts" believed the tubes "were suitable and intended for a centrifuge cascade"  Powell's February speech argued that "Maybe Iraqis just maintained their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so."  Powell raised more questions than answers during parts of his speech. 

Britain said in their September 24 dossier that there was "no definitive intelligence" that tubes were for nuclear production. The tube allegation, given in three of the President's speeches, is also analyzed by Dennis Hans: "It is bad enough to take unconfirmed rumors and pass them off on the public as certified facts.  But it is unconscionable to knowingly, willfully mislead the American public and the community of nations in order to trick them into waging a war of aggression"  But is deceiving working?  The Miami Herald reports on a Knight-Ridder poll that "41% of American believe Saddam has nukes."  No administration comment ever directly alleged this.  Hans concludes, "All his career, Colin Powell has been known as  'team player'  but...today he's playing on a team that cheats." 

Other harsh criticism came in the LA Times op-ed by Robert Scheer, "Only by Swallowing Big Lies Can Powell Justify a War", 2/4/03). Feeling that Iraq doesn't threaten the U.S. and recalling the El Baradei says, "no evidence Iraq has revived nuclear program eliminated in the '90s", Scheer concludes with a scary prediction:  "As Powell knows from his Vietnam experience, lies have a way of catching up with you.  Years from now, if the U.S. is still spending billions, trying to micromanage the Middle East and reaping its reward in blood, Bush will be marked indelibly like Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon before him, as a leader who went to war on a lie."

At his UN speech, Powell reiterated, "Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb."  Echoing the President's claims in his State of the Union the previous week, "He...sought nuclear material from several nations." Even the State Department in the fall, in an official intelligence document, labeled the Niger uranium charges as "highly dubious." 

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One expert commented, "It may be technically possible that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium.  but you'd have to believe that Iraq deliberately ordered the wrong stock and intended to spend a great deal of time and money reworking each piece."  The 81 mm tubes had bee used in the 1980s for Iraqi missiles.  The Post's Warrick notes that "As the UN inspectors continue, some weapons experts said the aluminum tube saga could undermine the credibility of claims about Iraq's arsenal."  For example, former IAEA inspector David Albright notes, "If the U.S. government puts out bad information it runs a risk of undermining the good information  it possesses."

On nuclear issues during the January State of the Union, the President spoke again of aluminum tubes and alleged attempts to gain uranium from Africa.  See "State of the Union" above. He repeated an early speech that the "IAEA confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear development program, had a design for a nuclear weapons, and was working on five different methods for enriching uranium for a bomb." Much if not all of this IAEA report, however, was from 1991, and since the mid-1990s IAEA would deny these suspicions. 

The New York Times reported the uranium forgery on March 9, 10 days before the war began.  ElBaradie, the head of IAEA, reported the forgery to the UN Security Council after a short analysis.  The "crude forgery" includes names and titles "that did not match up with the people who held office at the time the letters were purportedly written" (Chicago Tribune, 3/8/03) and one signature was from someone who had been out of that office for 10 years. ElBaradei also rejected other U.S. nuclear claims as the Post explains in "FBI Probes Fake Evidence of Iraq Nuclear Plans" (3/13).
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17888-2003Mar12?language=printer

After the war, we learned that Ambassador Joseph Wilson was asked by Cheney to investigate the Niger uranium claims and reported in March 2002 that no such transaction ever took place. 

See "P.S." FAQs for more details on  the Africa/Wilson/uranium controversy from the summer and fall of 2003.

In addition to Niger uranium and aluminum tubes issues, the administration charged that Hussein could launch WMD in 45 minutes.  This seemed to be based on the allegedly "sexed-up" British dossier, which may have led to the suicide of a British official in the summer of 2003. On August 29, 2003, we learned that Blair's communications chief, Alastair Campbell,  resigned over the dossier.

Leading up to Powell's speech at the UN, "An open letter" detailed all the deceiving, spinning, mishandling, and incorrect evidence put forth by Bush and Powell so far.  Citing New York Times and Washington  Post to back up his claim, one allegation Dennis Hans discounted is Powell's allegation that Iraq is hiding and moving materials .  "If Mr. Blix is correct, this suggests that Powell is willing to deceive on matters that are easily checked.  What about non-verifiable 'evidence'?  Hans predicted that Powell will "present only those tidbits...that strengthen his case while suppressing tidbit that undermine it--and he will have a great advantage over a prosecutor in an American court."  More details are at Institute for Public Accuracy.

One wonders if any of these criticisms were changed by Powell's speech the next day.

A post-war analysis of pre-war intelligence includes Walter Pincus at the Washington Post.  His perceptive nine page "Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence" (8/10/03; try Lexus to search) examines the "pattern" of Bush, Cheney, and others "making various allegations depicting Iraq's nuclear weapons program as more active, more certain and more imminent in its threat than the data they had would support.  On occasion administration advocates withheld evidence that did not conform to their views.  The White House seldom corrected misstatements or acknowledged loss of confidence in information upon which it had previously relied...The escalation of nuclear rhetoric a year ago, including the introduction of the term 'mushroom cloud' into the debate, coincided with the formation of a White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, as task force assignment to 'educate the public' about the threat from Hussein, as a participant put it." 

2.  What was the terrorism/al Qaeda/9-11 evidence put forth by the administration?  Why was it controversial?  (Also see "P.S." FAQs for 2003 updates)

There is no evidence that Hussein had anything to do with 9/11, though an August 2002 poll showed that an amazing 53% of Americans believe he was involved in the September 11 attacks, which he was not.  A majority of Americans even think some or all of September 11 hijackers were Iraqis (none were) (NYTimes, 2/18/03 and 3/2/03). A Pew Research Center poll in October 2002shows that 66% of Americans think Hussein helped the 9/11 terrorists. A February Times/CBS poll dropped these figures to between 42% and 57%.. The LA Times argues in its "Wag the Dog" editorial that "Bush's foreign policy is based on a fairy tale, the persistent if childish hope that all our problems can be solved by one solid blow to the latest Evil Empire, now found in Baghdad.  Someone needs to read the president a better bedtime story." 

Perhaps these polls can be partially explained by a typical  Rumsfeld accusation in September, claiming "bullet-proof evidence" of a Hussein-alQaeda connection.

From September 2001 until Powell's UN speech of February 5, the answer was, in short, no; there was no specific connection, just circumstantial information.  One intelligence source in Washington , upon seeing CIA material on links, described the case as "soft and squishy" (The Guardian, 1/30/03).  

In general, Americans are "famously ill-informed" and "aren't attentive to the details of foreign policy", explain experts.  Professor of Political Science at Boston College remarks, "It might be understandable, then, if some portion of the population picked up only threads of these theories (anthrax, Czech/Atta), and missed the later news debunking them.  Even the suggested links between the Iraqi government and AlQaeda operatives, made by the Bush Administration since [the summer of 2002] can easily be interpreted to mean that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11."  Professor Wolfe adds that "we ought not to expect that most American would know that the Baathists are secular and bin Laden is not, or that Saddam Hussein is too jealous of his power to share it with another person, or than bin Laden has targeted corrupt Arab governments as enemies of Islam."  Claims another expert, "To say that there is no involvement of Saddam Hussein in September 11 is implicitly to question what our leaders are saying" ("How American Link Iraq and Sept. 11", NYTimes, 3/2/03). Part of the administration thinking could also have been that an easy military victory would "renew a humiliated nation's pride" (Philadelphia Inquirer, C. Satwell, 7/28/03). 

What is the Mohammed Atta connection?

Dick Cheney started the Atta story, talking with  NBC on March 24, 2002. Notice how carefully Cheney chooses his words (my italics): "We discovered...the allegation that one of the lead hijackers, Mohammed Atta, had, in fact, met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague" (WashPost, 9/29/03).  This had followed the Czech Republics interior minister in November 2001 publicly stating the meeting took place

One of the few opposing voices on this issue is William Safire whose theory is that the CIA doesn't want to admit their weakness in not catching September 11 leader, Atta. (New York Times, 5/9/02).  The Tribune's Richard Longworth  also felt the debate is still open (5/10/02). In June, 2002, the story of a possible Atta meeting in Prague heated up again with a Prague Post declaration from the Czech Republic's UN envoy: "The meeting took place."  William Safire still wonders "What Else Are We Missing?"  In August it was reported (USA Today, 8/16/02) that even the CIA can't find the "smoking gun." In October it was reported that Czech President Havel told the White House that there was no evidence, after all, of the meeting. (NYTimes, 10/21/02).

Who is Ansar al-Islam?
In August an extremist group with possible ties to al-Qaida, Ansar al-Islam, ("Allies of Islam" or "Supporters of Islam"), created in September 2001, was reported by U.S. officials to be operating in and controlling about 8 villages in the northern Iraq no-fly zone of Kurdistan.  In November the group of 650 fighters (mostly Kurds but about 150 Arabs trained in Afghanistan) attacked Kurds, killing 50. The group appeared to have anecdotal links to the Iraqi government. However, the area has curiously little if any control by Hussein.  The U.S. decided not to attack the group, which puzzled Kurdish leaders. Al-Qaeda is in 65 countries throughout the world, mostly Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also Saudi Arabia and Yemen, other allies of the U.S. In fact, even within the U.S., hundreds have ties to alQaeda, says FBI director Mueller (NYTimes, 2/11/03). 

Answar al-Islam killed a Kurdish leader in mid-February. In the PBS/Wide Angle video "Saddam's Ultimate Solution", (8/02), Unit 999 near Baghdad allegedly trained in WMD and in how to pollute drinking water.  The show provides a detailed description of a visit from bin Laden in 1998. Meanwhile, Safire wrote of "Saddam and Terror" and worry of nuclear blackmail. In late January 2003, Safire's "Clear Ties of Terror" reminds readers that back in September of 2001 he first reported" the clear link between the terrorist in hiding [Osama] and the terrorist in power [Saddam] can be found in Kurdistan."  The CIA would not listen.  Safire contends that Ansar al Islam was "sent in with Saddam's support" and that our NSC members did not learn about "this blood engagement...until they read about it in The Times....Saddam and the followers of bin Laden are bedfellows."  Safire mentioned Zarqawi, who would become a significant part of Powell's UN speech a week later.

The leader of Ansar, Mullah Krekar, living freely in NATO country Norway, said in reply to the alleged link, "I am against Saddam Hussein. I want [Iraq] to change into an Islamic regime" (The Guardian, 2/3/03).  He challenged American authorities to come up with evidence and present it in court (The Guardian, 2/6/03).  Upon a visit to the shabby Ansar terrorist camp, The Observer/UK reveals "truth behind U.S. 'poison factory' claim."  In addition, an expert on alQaeda, Jason Burke, examines Ansar as the possible missing link.

In late September of 2002 the administration began vague accusations of possible Hussein-Al Qaeda connections. "In the war on terror," the President claimed, "you can't distinguish between AlQaeda and Saddam" (WashPost, 9/26/02).  Cheney added, "WMD in the hands of a terror network or a murderous dictator constitute as grave a threat as can be imagined" (Time Magazine, 9/16/02). 

These allegations were consistently denied by Tarq Aziz and other Iraqi officials. Rumsfeld says that American intelligence had found "credible evidence that Al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could (my emphasis) help them acquire [WMD]." Some of the evidence, he admitted, had varying degrees of credibility.  And some came only from one source, including high-ranking detainees, likely held in Cuba by the U.S.  Allegations include Iraq "training Al Qaeda in chemical weapons development", says Rice.  One "Senior official", (sounding much like Rumsfeld in style), said, "We have dots.  Now we have more dots...Can we say Saddam Hussein welcomed [al Qaeda].  We can't say that...Intelligence analysis ...is very subjective" (Post, 9/27/02). 

A Post editorial comments at the time, "The administration has hung too much weight on the likelihood that "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group.'"  In "Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda Are Not Allies" (NYTimes, 9/30/02), a former NCS member wrote in response to Bush's "you can't distinguish between AlQaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror." Daniel Benjamin replies, ""Attacking Iraq would not be a continuation of the war against terror but a deviation from it."  He believes that Hussein "would never get involved with a group that cannot be controlled and never give a [WMD] to terrorists who might use it against" him.

Added think tank analyst Phyllis Bennis, "the likelihood that that regime would turn over control of strategic weapons to any other political force simply denies that history of Ba'athist political culture" ("Reply to Bush", 10/02). 

In the week prior to the October Congressional vote, Bush alleged, "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorist...Alliances with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints" (Oct. 7).  How likely were these "could" circumstances?  At the time CIA Tenet's letter to Congress, made public in the fall of 2002,  predicted that Hussein would be likely to launch an attack only if he was first attacked by the U.S. (WashPost, 6/22/03). Bush also spoke in Cincinnati of "high-level contacts that go back a decade" but early '90s contacts likely occurred when AlQaeda was just forming and bin Laden was living in Sudan or was a U.S. ally in Afghanistan.

Yet as early as late August, 2002, Bush would have been pleased that 79% of American in a LA Times poll "believe Hussein supports...alQaeda", (reported in the Times of 9/2/02). 

Even by late October, the ties to alQaeda seemed "unconvincing " to the New York Times. "This is no way to justify a war...If the U.S. is to go to war, it had better not do so under false pretenses" (The...Prague Connection").  "How strong is the evidence?" examines Ansar al-Islam, Atta, and Zarqawi. 

Steven Chapman also believed in December that Bush's attempts to link war with Iraq to Al Qaeda has made an impact on public opinion:  "For the last year the administration has used September 11 as an excuse for going to war against Iraq, which makes about as much sense as using a fire extinguisher to battle a flood." (12/19/02 in Tribune)  Chapman reminds us that even Ken Pollack, former CIA analyst and one who favors attacking Iraq, "is honest enough to state plainly that Saddam Hussein 'was not involved in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.'"

Chapman Tribune wondered about their December 13 polls, "For several months, the White House has been telling the American people that there are direct links between Iraq and terrorists, although to date it has offered no conclusive proof." 

On February 8, Chapman wondered why if Hussein would not transfer WMD to AlQaeda when we weren't paying attention, why would he do so now?  Hussein and  AlQaeda are enemies and Hussein feels he can't control them.  Also he would be an immediate suspect following any AlQaeda attack on the U.S, whether he was guilty or not.  Logic tells us that a secular leader like Hussein linking up with "religious diehards" or Islamic fundamentalists, who despise his government is "a very strange notion indeed." 

The Washington Post mid-December headline "US Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent From Iraq", includes this hidden disclaimer:  "On the central question whether...Hussein knew about or authorized such a transaction, U.S. analysts are said to have no evidence."  

Leading up to Powell's February speech, there were "force debates" in the government on how strongly to link Hussein and alQaeda, as White House and Pentagon wanted the link strong but CIA was less certain.  Some administration officials and allies, according to the Washington Post, "believe this is the weakest part of the case...and that emphasizing it serves to undermine their overall credibility"   Resolution 1441 does not refer to Al Qaeda or terrorism.  Powell checked intelligence analysts on "the quality of their information, interpretations, and translations" (2/4/03). Powell's UN speech made more specific accusation of Iraqi links with al Qaeda. Also see The Guardian's "False trails that lead to the al-Qaeda 'links'". 

At the FBI, reports the Times of Feb. 2, "some investigators said they were baffled by the Bush administration's insistence on a solid link between Iraq and bin Laden's network. 'We've been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we just don't think it's there,'" said one government official. Among those eager were Wolfowitz (Defense Deputy) and Stephen Hadley (NSA deputy), whose bosses were Rumsfeld and Rice.

Who is Abu Musab Zarqawi?  In January, Powell mentioned an intelligence breakthrough to a cell operating out of NE Iraq supervised by Abu Mussal al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin who allegedly ran a training camp in Afghanistan in 2000 (NYTimes, 2/6). In late January the administration had kept making a vague link.  For example, Ari Fleisher said as the President prepared for his State of the Union speech, according to the New York Times, "Mr. Bush was determined to protect the American people from any reoccurrence of the September 11 terrorist attacks. (1/27/03).

Zarqawi featured prominently in Powell's Feb. 5 UN speech. The Times further reports that "In December, Jordan said it had a man in custody who had confessed to killing [American diplomat Laurence Foley] on the instructions of Mr. Zarqawi.  

Colin Powell discusses the alleged alQaeda link, describing the role of Jordanian Abu Musab Zarqawi, who trained in Afghanistan and was to have receive medical treatment in Iraq.  Powell said Zarqawi and his associates have "been operating freely in the capital for more than 8 months." His group is known as Al Tawhid.  Like bin Laden, in the '80s Zarqawi fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in support of the Americans.  

Powell believes Zarqawi met with the Ansar group, which is developing biological weapons. Powell's views of this alQaeda "associate" is further examined by the Post.  The Post editorial warned of "the danger that [al Qaeda] has or might acquire such weapons from Saddam Hussein" ("The Case for Action", 2/5/03). 

But on February 12 the administration took a step back from the links and qualified their case.  Tenet told a Senate hearing that Zarqawi was not "under the control" of Hussein and was "independent" of bin Laden. 

See much more on Zarqawi in Post-Saddam FAQs

After Powell's UN speech, and in response, France FM de Villepin said to the UN on Feb. 15, "Nothing allows us to establish such links." and Germany authorities were told that al-Zarqawi opposed AlQaeda.  The German authorities who had been investigating Zarqawi were surprised by Powell's speech (NYTimes, 2/10). However, even Powell's deputy Richard Armitage admitted in late January that the AlQaeda-linked group in Iraq was, according to the Tribune, (1/31) "in areas of Iraq that are outside the control of Baghdad."  Yet in February a European who traveled to Kurdistan acknowledge that Ansar had strong links with AlQaeda "but whether that means Saddam is using the group as a go-between is another question" (The Guardian, 2/5/03).  Some of Ansar sources are Afghan war detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Defending Powell in early February was Tony Blair who expressed certain "links between al Qaeda and Iraq.  Just how far those links to is a matter of speculation."  Foreign Minister Straw think the "permissive environment" allows alQaeda to operate (The Guardian, 2/5/03).  Powell acknowledges that Ansar operates outside of central government control (in Kurdistan) but said that Iraqi agents were working with them.  "Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and alQaeda together."  In Britain, the BBC reports in February that a British intelligence report shows no current links between Iraq and alQaeda.

The Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Gary Milhollin, reacted to Colin Powell's UN speech arguing that he made a strong case "that Iraq is not cooperation with the UN and is in material breach of Resolution 1441..Just because there is a terrorist cell in Iraq does not prove that...Hussein is ready to transfer mass destructive weapons to Al Qaeda for use against the U.S." (NYTimes, 2/6/03). Milhollin felt that what Powell said on Feb. 5 was credible but the big question was "the immediacy of the threat.  If it is remote, you don't need to go to war.  If it is close you do.  El Baradei has declared the nuclear program was eliminated; that's not consistent with the evidence."

In March, the President continued the accusation, as in this excerpt from his March 6 news conference:  "He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists, terrorists who would willingly use [WMD] against America and other peace loving countries.  Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country...The attacks of [9/11] showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes.  We will not wait to see what terrorist or terrorist states could do with [WMD]...I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons...he has trained and financed AlQaeda-type organizations before, AlQaeda and other terrorist organizations" (NYTimes).

Perhaps as reference to Hamas in Israel, the president re-asserted at his March 6 Press Conference, "He has trained and financed AlQaeda type organizations" (NYTimes, 3/7). 

Head of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge raised the alert level two days before war, warning, "The intelligence community believes that terrorists will attempt multiple attacks against U.S. and coalition target worldwide" if war begins (NYTimes, 3/18). 

Would the U.S. become safer after a war?  The Post reported on the eve of war that "specialists inside and outside the government question whether a U.S.-led invasion...would deliver a significant blow against international terrorism.  Experts warn that war and occupation could also have the opposite effect by emboldening radical Islamic groups and adding to their grievances...[as a] recruiting too."  The White House had argued that showing strength and eliminating Hussein would "prevent more terrorism than it would produce" ("Striking Iraq Could Fuel Further Attacks on U.S.", 3/16, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30757-2003Mar15?language=printer).

The bin Laden audio tape labeled the Baathe Party as an "infidel regime" that lost its "legitimacy a long time ago."  Though bin Laden urged Muslims to fight against to U.S. if Iraq was attacked,  Powell felt that the tape showed that bin Laden was "in partnership with Iraq" and Air Fleischer concluded that "this is the nightmare that people have warned about, the linking up of Iraq and al Qaeda"  (NYTimes, 2/12).

Comments The Progressive editor Rothschild, (2/15), "If anything , the tape proves what George Tenet and the CIA were predicting back in October:  that only an imminent U.S. war against Iraq would bring Saddam and bin Laden closer together.  If it's a shotgun marriage, George Bush is holding the shotgun."  Rothschild concludes, Hussein and bin Laden "are old enemies:  bin Laden offered to raise an army for Saudi Arabia to expel Iraq from Kuwait back in 1990." 

What were press opinions on possible AlQaeda or 9/11 connections?  
The Washington Post said in late January, "...linking al Qaeda and Iraq is so murky that even intelligence analyst cannot agree among themselves how strong a tie there is.  This prompted a U.S. official to describe the issue as 'in the eye of the beholder'" (1/29/03). 

Matthew Rothschild describes that "bin Laden actually offered to raise an army to expel Saddam from Kuwait back in '90" (The Progressive, 1/28/03). Others feel that if the US attacks, Hussein might "make an alliance with the devil" if he has nothing to lose. Rothschild further criticizes Bush regarding an early March press conference:  "And at least nine times he mentioned Sept. 11 or the loss of 3000 American o that date, even though there is no credible evident that Iraq had anything to do with those attacks" (3/7/03). 

The Washington Post analyzes the details of these AlQaeda link allegations, writing that although Hussein secret government was once an anathema to bin Laden's militaristic Islamic movement, Powell said that "ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and AlQaeda together."

A Post article  the week before war cited former State Department counterrorism coordinator Robert Oakley:  "Nobody responsible in the intelligence community has demonstrated much of a tie between Iraq and the terrorism we're facing around the world.  The things we're talking about terrorist getting their hands on, terrorists can get from other places" (3/17). 

In the UK's Independent, Robert Fisk points out that with Powell's talk of "decades" of contact between Saddam and Al Qaeda is odd because "Al Qaeda only come into existence five years ago, since bin Laden."  Decades ago bin Laden "was working against Russia for the CIA" in Afghanistan (2/6/02).

Also in February the BBC acknowledges that "There must be a temptation for London and Washington to exaggerate intelligent that fits their view of Iraq.  That is not to say they have given in to it...The danger is that people who are skeptical about the al Qaeda link might be less inclined to believe the America and British case that Saddam Hussein is still concealing WMD." 

The New York Times says that Assistant Sec. of State Richard Armitage, speaking at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early February "acknowledged that the administration had at times relied on inconclusive reports that had not served to strengthen Bush's case" (2/2/03). But 10 days later, CIA's Tenet very specifically claimed to Congress, "Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bombmaking to alQaeda.  It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates" (NYTimes, 2/12/03). 

The Times editorial "Elusive Qaeda Connections" (2/14) examines "little hard evidence of such a connection, and the administration should stop peddling that line to the American people"  Powell's case is "thin" and full of mostly "an assemblage of ambiguous clues".  Zarqawi's stay in Baghdad "does not demonstrate operational ties between him and Iraq." 

New York Times' colleague Maureen Dowd's March 9 column ("The Xanax Cowboy") examined the 9/11 link:  "...Citing 9/11 eight times in his news conference was exploitative given that the administration concedes there is no evidence tying Iraq to the 9/11 plot."  she quotes another writer that "'As a bogus rallying cry, "Remember 9/11' ranks with "Remember the Maine' of 1898 for war with Spain or the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of 1964.'"  Also see "History" FAQs for more on Vietnam.

New York Times reporter David Sanger examines the inevitability issue on the eve of war in "A Decision Made, and Its Consequences", 3/17).  Sanger makes the distinction between this preventive war and pre-emptive war. "Preventive war has not been judged kindly by history."  He concludes, "Wars of liberation are popular in America.  Occupations--long, messy, expensive--are not.  How well Mr. Bush executes the first and manages the second may be the measure of his first term, and his prospects for a second." 

Benjamin Barber, author of Jihad vs. McWorld, looks at experts who see alQaeda having a greater chance of getting weapons from North Korea or Pakistan.  "Total distrust of tyrants does not entail the corollary of total trust in Bush....Every president believes he is being 'honest' at some deeper level when misleading us to rationalize war he thinks vital to national interest"  ("In Doubt We Trust", LATimes, 2/5/03). 

Counters The Guardian editorial/leader that day, "Any claim of a proven link with alQaeda is deeply suspect.  Even U.S. spy agencies don't believe it.  Like Britain's spooks, they complain that intelligence has been 'politicized' used selectively, and is of unrelated  provenance.  In other words, this is clumsy propaganda." 

In "Only by Swallowing Big Lies Can Powell Justify War", Robert Sheer's LA Times op-ed (2/4/03) includes: "Similarly, Powell and the president have employed an irresponsible pattern of exaggeration and innuendo in an attempt to link Iraq and Al Qaeda.  This  shameful canard molds a few extremely fuzzy and circumstantial bits of proto-evidence into an absurdly confident "proof" that taking over Iraq will help prevent anti-American terrorism.  In a New York Times report Sunday, sources inside U.S. intelligence agencies 'said they were baffled by the Bush administration's insistence of a solid link between Iraq and Osama bin Laden's network,' they were upset that 'the intelligence is obviously being politicized' and that' 'we've been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we just don't think its there."  Blix also said there was no evidence Iraq had or planned to supply weapons to Al Qaeda."  

Sheer continues, "All of which brings us to the most outrageous Big Lie of the Bush administration:  that delaying an invasion to wait for the UN to complete inspections would endanger the U.S.   The fact is that more more than a decade the military containment of Iraq has effectively neutered Hussein, and there is no reason to believe that can't continue." 

After the war, General Wesley Clark asserted on Meet the Press, "There was a concerted effort doing the fall of 2001...to pin 9/11 and the terrorism problem on Saddam Hussein."  In fact, Clark was called at home by the White House on 9/11 and told, ""You've got to say this is connected...this has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.'"  Perle, Woolsey, and Kristol used the same language in the following weeks.  Rumsfeld and Cheney were privately pushing in September of 2001 to attack Iraq.  Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz strategized in September without State or CIA invited to the sessions. For more on Clark as candidate, see P.S. FAQ section.

In December after the war, The Weekly Standard looked at the new memo from Douglas Feith of the Pentagon.  Examining the possible link and reminding us of key speeches from Bush and Powell in the lead up to war, the editors concluded, "We at The Weekly Standard have long believed that the war in Iraq was, indeed, central to the broader war on terror.  This argument never depended on particular connections of Saddam and al Qaeda, but such connections are certainly relevant.  Based on all the evidence we have seen, we believe that such connections existed.  Does the Bush administration agree, or doesn't it?
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=3428&R=79E12AE70

Also see "U.S. Not Claiming Iraqi Link to Terror" (Washington Post, 9/10/02), The U.S. tried but failed to link Iraq., "U.S. Drops Last Link of Iraq to 9/11".  Even the CIA can't find a "smoking gun" proving that he has WMD (USA Today, 8/16/02). See Time's "Inside Saddam's World" and  "A Dismal Legacy".

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