PS FAQ:  Iraqi Politics 2006-2010 (Since Elections of 12/15/05)

The lead up to Iraqi elections of December 15, 2005 are thoroughly examined at Iraqi Politics 2005.  As politics and violence seemed more linked than ever in 2006, also see "Post-Zarqawi Violence" 2006 FAQ.

The Washington Post updates their stories on the Iraq government.

President Bush hailed the elections of late 2005 as a key turning point in the progress in Iraq.  He feels voters have "defied the terrorists,"  he had threatened those who did not boycott. 225,000 Iraqis guarded the polls on a day that was "strikingly peaceful"  Also see much more at US Politics Since the Elections.

Whereas the January 2005 elections involved 300 attacks, there were only 52 this time.  The Times front page story reported that the day "seemed a significant triumph for Iraqi officials and for the Bush administration."  The President added, "This is a major stop forward in achieving our objective, which is having a democratic Iraq, a county able to sustain itself and defend itself." 

Of the 275 Assembly seats, 58 are in the Baghdad area.  The other large representations come from Ninevah (19) in the north and Basra (16) in the south. This Parliament will be in power for four years, so much is at stake.

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A few post-election questions that seemed most important:
1.  Would Sunnis take to the political process and lessen their support for the insurgency?
2.  Would the Constitution be amended to an extent sufficient to bring Sunnis further into the process? They were wooed to vote with promises to amend the document. (Retired General Robert Gard likens the document to the US after the American Revolution, it is a "Confederation").  In a bad sign, Hakim, the most powerful Shiite leader, announced on Jan. 11 that there would actually be no changes. He said bluntly, "We will stop anyone who tries to change the Constitution."  This leads one to think few if any Sunni parties would join the Shiites. 
3.  Will Iraqi become a Shiite theocracy, allied with Iran?

4.  Who will become Iraqis new Prime Minister?  The pro-Iranian Shiite, Hakim? What compromises will be needed?

Adel Abdul Mehdi is also prominently mentioned for Prime Minister, as a leader of The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  Hakim was one of my predictions before the elections. Also see pre-election predictions.  

Which groups will control Parliament?  Of the 275 seats, 59 go to the Baghdad province and 19 to Ninevah, while all others are 16 or less. Early returns, just four days after the elections, showed a big showing for the religious Shiite coalitions.  Allawi and Chalabi did poorly,  with Allawi gaining about 10% of the seats and Chalabi many fewer. 

90 candidates were barred by an Iraqi court from serving in Parliament.  

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Sunnis and Allawi claimed violence and voter fraud.  Actually,  both Iraqi and international officials concluded that fraud was widespread.  Sunnis were especially upset by this, and some are demanding a re-vote.  Of the 692 complaints of campaign violence or voter fraud, 20 are considered to potentially affect the election results. Those numbers increased to 1500 complaints and 39 series, 

On December 23 were reports of thousands of Iraqis protesting the results.  The protests were peaceful.  The Sunni demands were twofold:  Demand of a manual recount and re-voting in parts of Baghdad. In later and separate protests, 60 parties with 10,000 followers of Allawi and others protested for a unified government with Sunnis and secular Shiites.

The UN chief of elections officially announced just after Christmas that the fraud was not widespread, there would be no need for a re-vote, and results were "credible."  Would Sunnis agree and join the process? However, a few days later the international elections monitoring group which had preliminarily endorsed the elections agreed to send observers back to investigate allegations by Sunni and secular Shiite groups.  Allawi appeared mollified.  

We learned in mid January that 227 ballot boxes, fewer than 1%, will not be counted because they include fake ballots or had more votes than authorized.  The international monitoring team brought in to review the elections, the International Mission for Iraqi Elections,  concluded the next day that elections were flawed but new elections were not needed

In early January, it appeared that Sunni groups had split.  In a related story, there were new reports of  US was actively negotiating with some of the insurgent leaders. "US said to meet rebels" was the lead New York Times headline of January 7.  Americans are trying to exploit a rift and sometimes communicating with intermediaries.  A source said since the fall of 2005 talks have been taking place inside and outside of Iraq.  Insurgents are demanding a timetable for withdrawal, which is a sticking point.  Interviews show that Sunni insurgents hate Al Qaeda, which are blamed for suicide bombings of many civilians and are mostly foreigners.  The US is challenges to properly identify guerilla leaders and "asked many questions about Al Qaeda." 

Reaction to the December 15 elections came from editorials, such as the New York Times editorial  which opens, "Iraq's Election Day was a glorious success.  Now on to the hard part," which consists of a new Parliament choosing a committee to rewrite the "brand-new but fatally flawed" constitution.  A large challenge will be to "establish security forces that are more professional, law-abiding, and religiously and ethnically diverse.  If it fails to do that, the new Parliament...may turn into an irrelevant sideshow." 

The Times January 2 piece, with two weeks of perspective, again urges Sunnis to accept that in a democracy they are a minority and "the special privileges they enjoyed" from the Ottoman and British through to Saddam," are not a birthright."  The paper also feels that the US needs to also press the Shiites and Kurds "to take a far more inclusive approach toward the Sunnis."

In "The third act in Iraq" The Chicago Tribune's  asks what is at stake "Everything."  Much more optimistic that the above Times piece, the Chicago paper talk of " Iraq's fledging democracy" which is thriving.  "With this election, the promise of a truly democratic Iraq comes to full bloom."  The paper outlines the key questions for the future:

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2.  Whether to "tinker with the new constitution and change, among other things, for formula for divvying up oil proceeds."  
3.  Expanding the role is Islam in government and law.
4.  The role of Baathists and militias.

The Tribune concludes with a broad brush: "The progress has been astonishingly  swift."  In a reference to the title of the piece, "The invasion and toppling of Saddam Hussein was the first act.  The second act witnessed the rising insurgency, the election of an interim parliament in January and the grueling negotiations for a new Iraqi constitution.  Now the curtain rises on the third, and pivotal act...With each national election, more Iraqis invest in the goal of a country worth fighting for.  Worth dying for."

The Washington Post' "Iraq's Election Results" (12/22) further contributed to the analysis. 

From the British Independent came comment from Patrick Cockburn, who writes frequently on Iraq.  He examines "a divided nation" which is "disintegrating."

How are Iraqis feeling about their country and the US?  In his post-election prime-time speech the President cited polls which concluded that 2/3 expect things to improve in the next year.

However, the President left out other polls, (BBC, commissioned by the British military) including:
--60% say US and allies have done a bad job;
--Almost 2/3 oppose the foreign presence;
--25% say US should leave now
--20% additional say US should leave when the new Parliament comes to power

"Will It Be Different Now?", the lead story in the Times Week in Review (Dexter Filkins) examined the possible post-election developments.  Iraq is a "confounding place" which "never really comes into focus.  It simply turns and twists and rearranges itself, its multitude of parts falling into a new and different pattern, like so many bits of colored glass.  We think  we have seen this before, and in a way we have."  Other events that "seemed monumental at the time" included:
--the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003;
--the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty in June 2004;
--the first voting in January 2005.

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"But nothing in Iraq has ever been predictable; the picture dissolves too fast....the January elections were met with a similar wave of mayhem; by Dec. 1 of this year, more than 400 suicide bombers had blown themselves up by car and by truck, on bike and on foot...Less than three years ago, Iraqis lived in a state of near-permanent terror.  Today, Iraqis live in a society that is free but anarchic, full of hope and full of death, in the first stages of constructing a democratic polity that every week seems to flower and collapse." 

War critic and Tribune columnist Steve Chapman weighed in with his Dec. 22 column.  The group Freedom House says that in 2005 "There were modest but notable increases" in political rights and civil liberties" with Kuwait grant the vote to women, "leaving Saudi Arabia, as Chapman quips, " to hold the line against female suffrage."  He adds, "Anyone who thinks Islam is congenitally hostile to democracy, however, will have to explain Indonesia, the world' biggest Muslim-dominated nation, which is now categorized as free."

Will Kurds break away?  This appeared more likely after the December 2005 elections for two reasons.  First, the Constitution allows a referendum in 2007 on their future.  Second, Kurds are resulting in areas were Saddam moved in Arabs and he evicted Kurds and Turkmens.   Some Arabs are being forced to sell their land for less than market value. The last accurate census, in 1957, showed that the Turkmens, who governed the area under the Ottoman Empire, were the majority. Thousands came to Kirkuk in just the past few months, sometimes financed by the Kurdish parties.  Of course, Kirkuk has 10-20% of Iraqi oil reserves. Other estimates are over 40% of the oil and gas. Kirkuk and surrounding areas are part of a huge building boom. Business people fly into northern Iraq, where it is safer. Kurds are open about Kirkuk becoming part of the future Kurdistan, a city of 800,000.  As the Times reports on Dec. 29, "No single issue is dear to Kurdish leaders as they negotiate their political future."

Violence in Kirkuk increased in January 2006, between Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen.  Some analysts saw an underground civil war there, with kidnapping, assassinations, and car bombs.   The Arabization of the region by Saddam Hussein did not allow non-Arabs are not allowed to own houses or get oil jobs.  In early 2006 the process of Arabization has become Kurdification.  In April 2007, Iraq announced plans to relocate Arabs of Kirkuk. Kurds dominate the local government.  

A deadline of December 31, 2007 passed without action on a referendum over Kirkuk. One option is for the city to become the fourth province in the semiautonomous Kurdish region.

Americans are very popular in Kurdistan, learned Chicagoan and DePaul Human Rights executive director, Daniel Rothenberg. (Tribune, 1/23/06) Kurds call the war "the liberation" and credit the US in helping their rapidly expanding economy.  

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It's possible that Shiites and Kurds together would not make up 2/3 of Parliament and would thus need some Sunni support.  Shiites probably won fewer than half the seats, though they are about 60% of the population. The US hopes to bring more Sunnis into the political process and bring them out of the insurgency. 

On January 20 more results were announced.  The Shiite United Iraqi Alliance was deemed the winner, as expected.  However, they earned fewer than 50% of the seats.  Would the Kurds become their ally in Parliament?  It surprised many that the Kurds and Shiites together would fall just short of the 2/3 needed to form and government a have veto-proof power.  Though some observers immediately suggested this meant the Sunni (who won 58 seats) would have to be included, there were a number a minor parties who have enough seats that the Sunnis could be locked out.  The US was pushing hard for a true coalition government with Sunni representation.  The hope, of course, was that Sunni political involvement would lead to less military support of the Sunni-led insurgency. Negotiations were expected to continue possibly throughout the entire month of February. Pentagon favorite Chalabi did not win a single seat, though he could still serve. 

The total seats in the Assembly were 275:

As these results were elected, the Jan. 21 Times editorialized about encouraging trends and expanded Sunni participation.  On including Sunnis, the paper warned, "Majorities rule in democrat elections, but they rule successfully only if they reach out to minorities and respond generously to their legitimate concerns.  Iraq has now consolidated a crude electoral democracy.  but it remains a democracy that is glaringly deficient in women's rights, minority, rights, physical security and economic opportunity.  Many of these deficiencies can and should  now be addressed." The paper concluded, "Conducting successful democratic elections in a county that has know mainly dictatorship is a substantial advance  Moving ahead to create a functioning, inclusive democracy would be a far more consequential achievement."

See more below on the Kurds in 2008 and beyond.

The US was embarrassed by the late 2005 story of paid propaganda in the Iraqi press.
As a sort of addendum to that story came the January 2 front-page report that Iraqi Islamic leaders were paid to aid US propaganda.  Some published reports were not sourced to the US military. The Lincoln group was again involved in the $144,000 campaign said to have involved only 3 or 4 clerics.   These Sunni scholars were to offer advice and write reports form military commanders on the content of propaganda campaigns.  The Pentagon defended the program by saying, "We meet with a wide variety of people to get their input.

In March 2006 an inquiry finds that no military policy was violated.    

When will the new Parliament be announced?  For the interim Parliament, it took three months to conclude.  By late January, five weeks after the elections, there were no signs of a breakthrough.

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The moderate Shiite won over Adel Abdul Mahdi, of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.  Mahdi was seen as stronger than Jaafari and a better consensus builder. Jaafari gained the important support of Moktada al-Sadr.  Mahdi was preferred by most Sunni and Kurds, mostly because Jaafari was accused of supporting death squads.  Many had criticized al-Jaafari as a weak leader.  Maybe the Shiites feel as though they can control him.

One reaction to Jaafari selection came from Iraqi veteran politician, Adnan Pachachi who was surprised.  "If he follows what the Sadrists want we will not be able to have a government of national unity." 

Sadr the politician toured the middle east in late February. 

By mid-March, three months after the elections, the Parliament had still not yet met. There were plans to meet during the next few days, but delays continued.  Finally, on March 15, Parliament was sworn in, inside the Red Zone of Baghdad.  They met for about 30 minutes.  There is no leadership or cabinet.  The U.S. is pushing for a national unity government.  A new Policy Council was announced in March.  The 19-member body would be separate from Parliament and will operative parallel to the cabinet.  

In one of his March speeches President Bush again pressed the Iraqis to form a unity government after the January elections.

Khalilzad became stronger in pushing for a unity government and in blaming militias for the violence. In return, Iraqi leaders "lashed out" at the US ambassador because Shiites feel they need militias to protest themselves, especially after the mosque bombing of February.  In late March there was a move to oust the Shiite Prime Minister, Jaafari.  President Bush even called him "not acceptable."  Ambassador Khalilzad said Mr. Bush "'doesn't want, doesn't' support, doesn't accept'" Jaafari. Is this "Regime Change II"?  Jaafari accused the Bush administration of meddling. 

Though Sunnis and Kurds have generally not been supportive of Jaafari staying on as Prime Minister, in early April some Shiites were starting to agree.  If Jaafari steps down, would another Shiite take his place?  Who could that be?

"Three Years of War",  a special graphic from the Post, focuses on the political milestones from March 2003 to March 2006. 

Political fallout from the violence (see detailed "Violence 2005-2006" FAQ) included the largest Shiite Party suspending talks over government in late March due the alleged and controversial attack of US and Iraqi  forces on a compound/mosque.  

In April Mubarak suggested that some Iraqis parties were more loyal to Iran than Iraq.  Al-Sistani was among the Iraqis who reacted harshly.

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April 7 brought us Thomas Friedman's views on three three main factions trying to unite politically.  If they can "forge their own social contact, democracy is possible in this part of the world  If they can't, then it's kings and dictators as far as the eye can see....Our job was to do one thing right:  provide a secure environment so that Iraqis could have a reasonably rational, peaceful horizontal dialogue, which is difficult enough given their legacy of fear from the Saddam years.  We failed to do that."

See more on Friedman and other columnists at "Op-Ed" 

As politics and violence seemed more linked than ever in 2006, also see "Post-Zarqawi Violence" 2006 FAQ.

The move to oust al-Jaafari resulted in renewed and increased pressure throughout April.  Finally, on April 21 he offered to step down so his Shiite majority could appoint a different Prime Minister.  The new Prime Minister designate was Jawad al-Maliki.  Rice labeled the move "an important milestone."  As always, the key cabinet positions we continue to wait for our Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Oil. al-Maliki, 56, has one month to name a cabinet.  Talabani looks to stay on in the role of President. What is his plan to stop the violence?  Can he stand up to Shiite militia?

"The art of compromise in Iraq" was the lead Chicago Tribune editorial of April 24.  The staff of the paper was optimistic and felt that the naming of al-Maliki "is an achievement that ranks with writing a new constitution and holding a series of inspiring democratic elections."  Iraqi leaders have learned compromise but "we'll soon see if these new leaders have the clout and fortitude to back tough words with tough actions...After waiting four months for anew prime minister, Iraqis can be proud.  Their fledgling democracy has cleared every hurdle.  Its politicians haven't quit in the face of formidable odds and stomach-turning violence."

The biggest challenge facing al-Maliki, according to the lead Times editorial of April 30, is to "break the power of the Shiite party militias operating inside and outside the official security forces...It is now more than four months since Iraqis voted...and while the politicians dickered, the county has been falling apart.  Mr. Maliki needs to Choose both quickly and wisely."

The Times also examined moments of optimism and how they have frequently been dashed by spikes in violence.  Five cases include:
--May 1, 2003: "Mission Accomplished"
--June 28, 2004:  Restoration of Iraqi Sovereignty
--January 30, 2005:  First democratic elections
--Fall, 2005:  Referendum and new Constitution
--December 15, 2005:  Parliamentary elections.

Into mid-May we waited for the new Prime Minister to announce his cabinet.  What role would be played by the three main groups?  Who would get the powerful positions of minister of oil and interior?

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Finally, five months after the elections, we woke up on May 20 to hear of the new cabinet.  U.S. Ambassador complemented the Iraqis while President Bush came to Chicago on May 22 to make a speech hailing the "unity government." (Also see US Politics '06 FAQ) The controversial ministers of defense and interior were appointed only temporarily by Maliki.  Some Sunni groups were upset with the announcement.

Maliki finally added permanent Interior and Defense cabinet members in early June 2006, on the same day that we heard of the killing of Zarqawi. See "Post-Zarqawi Violence" In the Washington Post, Maliki wrote a piece called, "Our Strategy for a Democratic Iraq." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060801532.html

When Bush visited Baghdad in June 2006, during his surprise trip, he wanted to meet Maliki and "look him in the eye." The President told Maliki that he was "impressed by the strength of your character and your desire to succeed."

Maliki began a well-publicized crackdown in Baghdad over the summer.

In late August Maliki announced a "pact of honor" with hundreds of the nation's tribal chiefs. As part of a reconciliation plan, he hopes to preserve the unity of Iraq. The chiefs pledged to "work hard to stop the bloodletting and...sectarian killings that we have nothing to do with our values." Sadly, when Parliament came back into session in early September, 1/3 of the legislators failed to show up.

Iraqi politics and violence are, of course, intertwined. The New York Times lead editorial of September 1 pointed this out. Besides US forces, there are two armies in Iraq, the Iraqi national army and Sadr's Mahdi Army. (The editorial does not mention the numerous militia). Prime Minister Al-Maliki is politically connected and indebted to Sadr and his Shiites and faces "an essential choice" as to which army he supports when they fight against each other.

US officials criticized al Maliki, wondering, in a front-page Times story, whether the Prime Minister has the political muscle and decisiveness to avoid a full-scale civil war. Is this the start of the end of Maliki's short rule, starting in May? After four months leader Iraq, officials question whether he would risk alienating Shiite fundamentalist leaders. Can he woo Sunnis away from the insurgency? Iraqis complain of lack of electricity, lack of security, and other shortages. Said one official, "The thing you hear the most is that he never makes any decisions...And that drives Bush crazy."

Within a few weeks, Maliki and Bush spoke by phone, with the President assuring the Prime Minister of his confidence and that he would not seek a timetable for troop withdrawal. In mid-October, Maliki also flew to the holy city of Najaf to ask for the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to influence Shiites. The power of Sistani is explored in Colbert King's Post commentary, "The Grand Ayatollah Behind The Curtain", a reference to the mysterious powers of the Wizard of Oz.

As politics and violence seemed more linked than ever in 2006, also see "Post-Zarqawi Violence" 2006 FAQ.

James Baker, who led an Advisory Panel set to report in November, feels that al-Maliki needs to quick improvements in three areas: --improve security and reduce sectarian killings; --reduce corruption; and --deliver basic services

What do Iraqis want? According to polls compiled by the University of Michigan in April and released in August, 90% of Iraqis want Americans out, 41% want separation of religion and politics, and 28% of Iraqis said, "I am an Iraqi above all" other factors, such as tribal or religious. Sunni and Shiite do not have a greater mistrust of each other since 2004, despite the increased violence. They do have a growing sense of powerlessness and pessimism. Iraqi unity is in doubt on many levels. Juan Cole, University of Michigan expert on Islam and Iraq, writes that among the best-selling jewelry is "a pendant consisting of a whole map of the country. It's the symbol of a national unity many Iraqis see slipping away, because now even the majority Shiites are fighting among themselves."

In December after the Iraqi Study Group recommendations, Ellen Goodman of the Boston Globe wrote, "Let the Iraqis Decide" about US troops, via a referendum.

Updated polls from September of 2006 show that 71% of Iraqis want US troops out within a year. Other University of Maryland poll results show:
--37% feel that US troops should withdraw in a shorter time-frame, six months; a majority of Sunnis feel this way
-- 78% of Iraqis feel that US forces are "provoking more conflict" than they are preventing and should be withdrawn within a year.
The US is making them less safe.
--A majority (61%) of Iraqis now favoring attacks on Americans, including 92% of Sunnis
--Kurds support Americans and generally want them to stay.

Democracy needs a press press, yet journalists are jailed and killed. As of September 2006, 130 journalists had been shot, beaten, or tortured to death. Dozens have been kidnapped. At least Iraqis journalists have been imprisoned for writing articles deemed "criminally offensive" such as ridiculing the government or its officials. Some of the new laws are "resurrected verbatim from Saddam Hussein's penal code," reported the front page Times article. Malaki has shut down some news organizations

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The Iraqi Parliament voted to move toward three autonomous regions with a controversial October 12 vote. Though Sunni lawmakers and some Shiites stormed out in protest and tried to deny a quorum, the measure passed 141-0, though there are 275 members of Parliament. Sunnis fear not having any oil revenue in their central region. Many areas of Iraq have more than one group living together, though hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have fled their homes, perhaps anticipating this vote. The law calls for no division for at least 18 months. Among the Shiites who oppose the bill are Sadr. Other opponents of the bill, such as this Sunni leader of the National Accordance Front, said, "This is the beginning of the plan to divide Iraq. We hope there won't be an increase in violence. The vote was seen as a victory for Hakim, leader of the dominant Shiite block.

By mid-December there was talk of political agreement on sharing oil revenue. The cabinet and Parliament would also need to approve any deal.

Juan Cole, Shiite expert and University of Michigan professor, often appears on the news shows. On the News Hour in mid-October he stated that Shiites and Kurds will not compromise while U.S. troops remain as their ally.

The family of Iraqi leaders are being killed. For example, in mid-October the Vice Presidents third sibling was killed.

As politics and violence seemed more linked than ever in 2006, also see "Post-Zarqawi Violence" 2006 FAQ. For example, two weeks before the U.S. election, Maliki began acting to reign in militias. He will have a very difficult time doing so, because the Badr and Mahdi Army are his political allies.

Timetables became the new slogan in the two weeks before the US election. The US Ambassador, Generals, and al-Maliki disagreed as to if there were timetables established, to the astonishment of the US. A "growing schism," the Times described it. US and Iraqi leaders also disagreed about US raids. As the Tribune front-page headline read, "Iraq says no to US timetable; Premier rejects deadlines, blasts raid in Sadr City." What if Iraqis do not meet the timetables? Can Maliki, in power since April 2006, really disarm the militias? Three Iraqi Prime Ministers have been promising to move against the militias since 2004. Also see related FAQ, "US Troops Out?"

Shiite rulers and Americans continued to disagree. Ironically, they have a common enemy, Sunni insurgents. Further proof of the animosity is the blame Maliki put on Americans for the security problems. He demanded a more rapid transfer of power to Iraqi forces. In late November US negative views of Maliki surfaced again as Security Adviser Hadley, in a leak to the press, doubted that the Prime Minister is "the answer." Ironically, Nuri al-Maliki's inititials remind us of another difficult US war, NAM.

Is Maliki the long-term solution? The Times Week in Review of Nov. 12 headline pondered, "Stability vs. Democracy: Could a New Strongman Help?" Citing the many Iraqis "now crave a leader to end the chaos, even at a cost to liberties." I wonder if such a man or woman exists, given the militias and the violence. Perhaps Allawi is that man, suggests the paper. He was appointed Prime Minister by the US in 2004. Sistani "is keenly aware" that in the 1920s when Shiites split, the anti-British rebellion led to the minority Sunni taking over.

On the US election day, Iraqi leaders suggested that they might allow former Baath party members to gain some of their past jobs. Thousands could be reinstated. Paul Bremer, US leader, had fired all former Baath Party members from their jobs.

Also on election day, 57 Iraqis were charged with abuse. The charges were a first, and brought by Iraqi Interior Ministry. Iraqis have been accused of torture for many months now at numerous locations, including "site 4" in eastern Baghdad. Some were still at large, though the arrest warrants were issued as long as two months ago. During the next week, the most influential Sunni cleric was issued an arrest warrant, for citing violence and supporting terrorism. Harith al-Dhari is leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars. This move could further anger Sunnis. Powerful Sunni sheiks denounced al-Dhari, who had criticized the tribal leaders for taking a stand against al-Qaeda in Anbar. The fundamentalist members of al-Qaeda have, according to a Times report, "tried imposing Taliban-like rule" on parts of Anbar province.

After the US election, some Parliament members were concerned that US troops might leave too soon, as described in the Tribune's lead headline, "Iraq girds for shift in US policy."

What happened to Amhed Chalabi? The former leader of the INC before the war surfaced again on the NPR show "Fresh Air With Teri Gross." Her November 2006 program analyzes Chalabi's role in Iraq "after Plan A." The audio runs about 14 minutes.

Sadr threatened to boycott the government if Maliki went ahead with his meeting with Bush in Jordan. Sadr controls a large Shiite bloc in Parliament and three cabinet posts. Sadr's power comes partly from his military might but also, like Hamas, from his financial support of school and health clinics. He hopes to win the "hearts and minds" of Shiites. Propane distribution is also controlled by the populist politician and his allies. Most experts agree that Sadr desires Iraq to become an Islamic State. For more on Sadr, see "Violence '05-06" and other FAQs.

Sadr was on the cover of Newsweek in late November, as "The Most Dangerous Man in Iraq."

What do the Iraqi factions desire? Sistani, another powerful Shiite leader, wants to keep all the Shiites united. Could Sistani step in to force the parties to make peace? Sadr is among the number of Shiites who resent being forced by the US to share power with Sunnis. Sunnis, in turn, are upset that the invasion took them from power. Sunnis are also upset that the "faulty" Constituion they voted for has not been revised, as promised. Secular politicians see the religious parties taking their power. As if speaking to these struggles, Maliki said in November, "The crisis is political and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocent people are the politicians." One analyst believes that if Maliki moves to fast he alienates Sadr and if he moves too slowly he alienates Sunnis and their insurgency. Maliki wants control of the 140,000-man Iraqi army, now under US control. Kurds seem to continue to lay low in the north of the country.

Sunni sheiks are beginning to ally with the US, because those who started to support Americans were killed. Children of shieks in Anbar were beheaded and their bodies left at their homes.

In relations with Iran, in late November, President Talabani visited Tehran and spoke with Ahmadinejad, who expressed a desire to help Iraq gain stability. Said the Iranian leader, "We have no limits in offering our help to our brothers in Iraq, the Iraqi nation and the Iraqi government. If there is peace and stability in Iraq, there is peace and stability in Iran, and there would be peace and stability i the region." The US and Britain, the Iranian leader said, "have been trapped in your quagmire and locked in your place with nowhere to go. The Iranian nation is ready to help you to get out of the quagmire, on condition that you resume behaving gin a just manner and avoid bullying and invading." Iran has taken in thousands of refugees. Talabani wants help in "fighting terrorism...We are desperately in need of help form our neighbors and brothers in Iran."

President Bush visited with Maliki in Jordan. After the Nov. 29 leaking of a NSA Stephen Hadley memo, critical of the Maliki, the Prime Minster canceled an evening summit with Bush, even though they were both in the same Amman hotel. One commentator poetically reacted, "The White House insists the scrubbing of the meeting was not a snubbing." The critical NSA memo raised serious doubts about the capacity of Maliki's leadership. "The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggest Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action...He may simply not have the political or security capabilities to take such steps." Other criticisms of the Iraqi leadership, sounding ironically like those who criticize the US administration, are that the leader is surrounded by a narrow circle of advisers from his party which may skew the information he receives.

The administration did not seem upset with the leaked memo. Rather, Bush repeatedly his assurances of the Prime Minister as "the right guy for Iraq." For his own domestic consumption, Maliki might have preferred to not appear so close to the American leader, or seem like a US puppet. Iraqi expert Kenneth Pollack was more blunt: "I don't think it's clear that Maliki needs Bush." Of course, Maliki is trying to placate his ally, Sadr, who leads one the most violent Shiite militias.

Reaction to the summit came from Iraqis, who wondered, "Is that all? Was that even worth the fuel consumed by their airplanes. Iraqis are losing faith in their government. Others see hollow promises. One wonders about a poll that would show Maliki's approval rating. Said another Iraqi, quoted in the same Times report, "Nothing will happen, and we will get no results and no solutions."

Maliki wants a regional conference, an ideas rejected by Talabini and Hakim. A similar conference was held in Egypt in 2004, with few lasting results. Hakim fears Sunni Arab countries and Talabani fears Turkey.

Next up in Bush's renewed diplomacy is a meeting with al-Hashemi, the Sunni VP who heads to Iraqi Islamic Party. Bush also plans to meet with another powerful Shiite leader, Abdul Azis al-Hakim, (at right) who heads the largest party in Iraq, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI. Hakim's black turban sybolizes his descent from the Prophet Muhammed. Hakim party leader Abdul Mehdi was among the few final candidates for Prime Minister, detailed toward the top of this page. If Hakim would lend his support to Maliki, Maliki could no longer need Sadr. So closely tied to Iran, SCIRI was shunned by Washington a few years ago. SCIRI was founded in Iran and its armed wing is the Badr Brigade, which fought agaisnt Iraq in the Iraq-Iraq war of 1980-1988. The US favored Saddam in the war. Hakim "spoke bluntly," declared the Post. Hakim is pushing for the paritition of Iraq, which Bush does not support. He urged Bush to "reject the extremists that are trying to stop the advance of this young democracy." Bush replied that he was "not satisfied" with the pace of progress but was "rpoud of the courage of the Iraqi people." The Washington Post interviewed Hakim during his visit.

Hakim's Baghdad compound was raided by US forces, just a few weeks after he met with Presient Bush. Were they searching for Hakim links to Iran? It was reminicent of the raid on Chalabi's office a few years earlier.

Hakim's son was arrested by US forces in an embarrassing incident in late February. Amar al-Hakim was returning for Iran and allegedly had an expired passport, which he strongly disputes. The US also alleges that members of the convoy did not cooperate with US forces. Tensions heightened and street protests followed in Basra and Najaf. Maliki said he intervened to gain Hakim's release. Amar al-Hakim said he was handcuffed, blindfolded, treated roughly, and sent to a US base, reported the front page Times story. Some of his guards were beaten. Educated mostly in Iran and in his 30s, Amar is seen as the heir to his father. President Talabani was sharply critical of the detention and demanded that American soldiers be held accountable.

Father Hakim wants to give autonomy to 9 Iraqi provinces to form a Shiite state in the south. Sadr is among the Shiites who oppose the plan.

December reports were also of the US reaching out to insurgents, which supposedly has already been occurring for months.

The Iraq Study Group, with its December 6 report, put pressure on the Iraqi government to meet milestones or see less US support. If they do not "make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security and governance, the US should reduce its political military or economic support." For much more on the Iraq Study Group, see "US Troops Come Home?" FAQ.

Reaction to the report came from politicians, experts, and citizens. Anthony Cordesman Iraqi expert, feels that the study group "is threatening to weaken a weak government...The report does not address what happens if events spiral out of control."

"Policy of 'realism' fraught with peril" titles Krauthammer's Dec. 4 piece picked up by the Tribune. While we are trying to bring "democracy" to Iraq, the Maliki government "has failed". We should try to get a new government that might succeed. "It's been clear for at least a year that a military solution to the insurgency was out of our reach." Maliki needs to get his act together in two months or we need a new coalition and US will move its troops to Kurdistan. What of bringing in Syria and Iran to the conversation? This is "the height of fantasy" because"they want chaos." Also see "Op-Ed Views" FAQ.

Reaction to the ISG within Iraq included President Talabani, a Kurd, rejected the report and calling it "dangerous, unfair, unjust." Training Iraqis has been a failure, partly due to poor screening of recruits. Previously, Talabani has been a strong US ally. In retrospect, since the Bush administration has criticized the report, Talabani's comments were likely pleasing to the White House. A Sunni Parliamentary member criticized the report as having too much emphasis on training Iraqis and not enough at reigning in militias. Another MP said, "These recommendations might be a solution for the American crisis in Iraq but not a solution for the Iraqi crisis."

Rumors flew on December 11 that the US and some Iraqis wanted to work out a new coalition without Sadr and his 60,000 militia. This would upset Sistani, the Grand Ayatollah, who wants all Shiites to remain united. Maliki might join with Hakim or Hakim's deputy, Adel Abdul Mehdi, (at left) could become the new Prime Minister. Last spring Mehdi was favored by the White House to be the P.M. This coalition could also be without some Sunni groups. Could there be a military assault on Sadr? Sadr's allies rejoined Parliament after a three-week boycott.

In late February, Mehdi was injured in an assassination attempt. A bomb was placed under a chair, a few meet from where Maliki ended up sitting at a ceremony in the neighborhood of Mansour. There had been at least two previous assassination attempt upon him since 2004. His brother was assassinated in 2005.

A summit called by Maliki was not attended by many of the powers in Iraq. They are still struggling with how to reign in these mostly Shiite militia. Though actions often speak louder than words in Iraq and the Middle East, Sistani appeared to signal that he could ally with non-Shiites in a future coalition.

A former CIA officer questions the usefulness of a political attack on Sadr. "Let's fight one war at a time," Mr. Gerecht writes in the 12/21 Times. While Mahdi is a French educated economist, the Sunni insurgency would remain as would al Qaeda. The "Sunni War" should be fought and won before taking on Sadr. First, secure Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, he argues, to limit Shiite radicalization.

"Iraq needs a Pinochet", writes Jonah Goldberg in his Tribune commentary of December 15. soon after the former Chilean dictator died. While Pinochet had weaknesses in terms of civil rights and torturing, "Pinochet's abuses hleped create a civil society" with free-market reforms and a healthy democracy. While a strong leader would have problems, in Iraq, "that's all we face....bad options." \

The Shiite-Sunni split was been exacerbated by the Ottomans, The British, Saddam, and now the U.S. NPR's Morning Edition did a series on Islam on February 2007, especially this one, on learning the religious lessons of history.

On the military front, Iraq presented the US with a plan for Iraqis to assume security over Baghdad in early 2007. Could this "proposal" be just trying to get Sunnis to compromise? Sunnis would logically fear that Shiite-led police and militias would continue "cleansing" of their neighborhoods. Responded the Sunni Speaker of Parliament, "It will be a disaster. I think the Americans are not so stupid as to do that. The city would be a safe place for the militias." Forcing those from their homes who took over for sectarians reasons, public policy expert and author Samantha Power replies that it is "putting the cart before the horse...Unless you create security first, you are paving the way for a potential massacre of returnees."

In reaction to Bush's mid-January surge speech, Maliki did not show up at a press conference. Later is said Iraqi has about enough US troops. "But if there seems to be more, need, we will ask for more troops." Bush could not have been happy with this comment.

About a week after the Bush speech, a top aide to Sadr was arrested. Does this signify a crackdown on Sadr's militia? Will Sadr's militia simply lay low during the upcoming US offensive in Baghdad? Maliki keeps talking about now or soon not needing US troops in Baghdad. Maliki is also torn by the attacks on Shiites, because he is being pressured to allow Shiite militias to help protect Shiite neighborhoods. The US, in contrast, wants to disband all militias. Maliki called the huge Baghdad bombing in early February the work of "Saddamists" and other Sunni insurgents. The Times reported that onlookers to this worst single bombing during the entire war cursed the Iraqi government for not protecting them from Sunni militants. "Maliki and the Americans are the sons of dogs because they do nothing to protect us."

For at least a few weeks in February, Sadr was reported to be in Iran, where he has gone before. Some guessed he was running and afraid of US troops. It is very doubtful that the US would arrest or harm him, for fear of creating a martyr. In late February Sadr predicted that the US surge would fail as long as it was directed by the American military. "There is no good that comes from a security plan controlled by our enemies, the occupiers." In contrast, Maliki has called the security plan "a dazzling success." Sadr continues to demand that US forces leave immediately. He probably feels pressure from his Shiite followers because violence against Shiites has not decreased enough.

Shiite pilgrims were on their to Karbala to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein, Mohammed's grandson. 115 died in two suicide bombers and nearly 150 died throught the bloody day of March 6. Will Sadr's Mahdi Army, quiet in Baghdad in early March, feel the need to respond?

Sadr became more active around Easter weekend, 2007, after being quiet since the surge was announced in January. 100,000 protested for US withdrawal in Najaf. His forceful condemnation was during a battle in Diwaniya: "Oh, my brothers in the Mahdi Army and my bothers in the security forces, stop fighting and killing b because that is what our enemy and your enemy and even God's enemy hope for." Readers of this site will recall that Sadr led two rebellions against the US in 2004, emerging more powerful despite the death of thousands of his fighters.

Sadr returned to the public light with a sermon on May 24. His allies said he had always been in Kufu, and had not traveled to Iran.

Will Iraqi troops show up? Maliki has again promised, but in the summer of 2006, only 2 of 6 brigades showed up in Baghdad. Early returns show many Kurds deserting, rather than fight what some see as the Shiite-Sunni civil war. Most Kurds don't speak Arabic. The Chicago Tribune reported on Jan. 21 that those who show up may flee is the situation becomes too difficult. Said one Kurd, "I joined the army to be a soldier in my homeland [Kurdistan], among my people. Not to fight for others who I have nothing to do with." Admitted Maliki in early February, earlier security plans in Baghdad have been full of errors.

Do Iraqis show up to Parliament? Sadly, despite hopes for a functioning democracy, Parliament from November 2006 to January 2007 rarely had a quorum and so could not officially meet. Yet, lists are not made public for fear of retribution. Why aren't the members showing up? Security was a huge issue as was a feeling of hopelessness and disenchantment. As the front page Times story reported in Jan. 24, "As chaos has deepened, Parliament's relevance has gradually receded." Said veteran politician Pachichi, "The government seems to be incapable of doing anything despite all the promises. Pachachi, provided with 20 armed guards, feels this does not provide him with security. Parliamentary members are paid salaries and benefits worth $120,000. Parliament met for a few days in late January, but much of it was a shouting match with bitter exchanges.

In early March there was talk of a Shiite group, the Fadhila Party, leaving the fragile alliance. There were also March rumors of a "soft coup" against Maliki. Former interim Prime Minsiter Allawi's name was mentioned as creating a National Salvation Front. Was this moved likely, or just used to pressure Maliki? Allawi is a Shiite and US ally. I predict that if Allawi were to come to power, the administration would argue that he needs to be "given a chance" for at least a few months, thus delaying again any possible reduction in US troops.

An Iraqi member of Parliament was convicted in Kuwait of 1983 bombings which killed 5 Americans at their embassy. This was during the Iran-Iraq war. An early February Times report. Mr. Ebrahimi, a Shiite, was sentenced to death in absentia, but had gone to Iran. Previously he was security adviser to Prime Minister Jafaari.

In March another member of Parliament has his offices raided by Shiite-dominated security forces. They seized weapons and traces of explosives. Dhafir al-Ani, a Sunni, has loudly criticized Shiite militias and "Shiite chauvinism" in the security forces.

Who will control Iraqi oil? The Iraqi Study Group suggests privatizing Iraqi oil and ending government subsidies. The Iraqi government would not own the oil. The Iraqi Parliament was set to agree to a 30 year deal with US oil companies to control most of the future drilling. In mid-January, a draft proposal starting working its way up to the cabinet and Parliament which would more evenly share the revenue with Sunni areas. Some studies suggested that there were oil fields in Sunni areas. The draft oil law came one step closer to passing with the approval of the Kurds. A compromise involved regional approval with a possible central body vetoing. In late February the Iraqi cabinet approved the oil law, so it was sent to the full Parliament. The law would distribute oil revenue based on population, but even this is controversial as there is no official census. Most believe that Sunni make up about 20% of the population, but some Sunnis think they are actually the majority. Regional oil companies or government would gain contracts "opening the door for investment by foreign companies," reports the front page Times. Some Iraqis worry that foreigners would reap too much of the oil wealth. Yet, energy experts point out that oil companies need security and a government they can trust. "Given the level of anti-american sentiment, any major American oil company perceived to tate advantage of their relations in government would be seen as being part of the so-called conspiracy to take over Iraq's natural resources. The Oil Ministry, led by Chalabi, is ripe with corruption.

Oil production peaked in 1979, the year Saddam Hussein came to power and before the start of the Iran-Iraq War. The 3.7 million barrels/day decreased to 2.6 million at the start of the 2003 war. It has dropped since.

Reaction to the proposed oil law came in a Times editorial on the last day of February. Labeled as "a big step forward" if passed, it is still a long way from being approved. "There's little surprise that the White House is trying to claim the draft oil law as progress. There is no other good new to report."

"Whose oil is it, anyway?" asks a watchdog group member (3/13/07, Times op-ed). Cheney and US energy companies have desired since at least March 2001 that middle east oil to be "opened up..to foreign investment...One invasion and a great deal of political engineering by the Bush administration later, this is exactly what the proposed Iraqi oil law would achieve It does so to the benefit of the companies , but to the great detriment of Iraq' economy, democracy, and sovereignty." The benefits of the law are "radically undercut. 2/3 of all known and all undiscovered oil fields "are open to foreign control" because the Iraq National Oil Company would have little power. "The foreign companies would hot have to invest their earning in the Iraqi economy, partner with Iraqi companies, hire Iraqi workers or share new technologies" Iraqis neighbors have nationalized oil, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran and have "outlawed foreign control," adds Antonia Juhasz, an analyst with Oil Change International.

Cheney pressured Iraqis to accept the oil bill during his multiple day visit in mid-May, 2007. On WBEZ's Worldview, Jereme McDonald interviewed an author who criticized the bill. She feels it is a great deal for US oil companies and "highly uncommon", as only 12% of the world's oil is controlled in such a manner. Iraqis would get little in this privatization plan and will not be required to employ Iraqis. Oil companies have said that they won't help Iraqis gain more oil unless this law is passed. Though Presidential candidate Kucinich brought up this "war for oil" issue, the mainstream press generally stayed away from the issue or used the adminstration talking points that they wanted all Iraqis to agree to "equitable distribution" of oil.

"The war is largely about oil," said former head of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. (9/07)

The compromise oil law, tentatively agreed to in February, seemed to be collapsing in mid-September.

One of the leaders of the Iraqi Oil ministry is Ahmed Chalabi. The former pre-war top source for faulty intel is a leader in the Iraqi government. Chalabi's role was the focus of Terri Gross's NPR program in March 2008, Fresh Air.

In November 2009 US diplomat Peter Galbraith faced charges of making huge profits advising Kurds on oil issues and their constitution. He vigorously defended himself and said there was not conflict on interest. He had advised oil companies. Back in the 1980s, Galbraith got to know Kurds as part of his staff position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

What is the state of the Iraqi air force? Americans will defend Iraqi air force for years to come, if a Feb. 5, 2007 report in the New York Times is any indication. Newly built and expanded airfields are not for the Iraqi air force, with just a few old helicopters which aren't supposed the leave the base. The Air Force once had 500 planes. There are no fighter planes and none are expected for at least a few years.

When Rice visited Baghdad in February, Maliki commented that the new security plan "has been a dazzling success during its first days." Some of this reduced violence was attributed to militants lying low in response to a greater US presence. After two weeks, some of the violence had not decreased. "The most important step need to be taken by the Iraqi government", reiterates a Times editorial of late February. Maliki needs to unifying a nation torn apart rather than "further inflame" divisions, and needs to purge security forces "of sectarian fighters."

The new US ambassador in late March was Ryan Crocker. An Arabic speaker, he said on his first day on the job, "President Bush's policy is the right one. There has been progress; there is also much more to be done." Nearly 180 Iraqis were killed on his first day, most when five suicide bombers attacked Shiite marketplaces.

As the British announced in February a withdrawal of about 30% of their troops, we were reminded that their area in and around Basra is controlled by fundamentalist parties enforcing Islamic law. As the Tribune reported, "few women dare go out without a head scarf."

Highlights from the spring of 2007 include the withdraw of Sadr allies from the cabinet in mid-April. Malki's coalition looked ever more fragile. The next month the Shiite Sadr delivered a speech urging less violence and sounding more Nationalistic. "I should not forget to remind you all that's it's haram [prohibited by Islam] for the Iraqis to kill any Iraqi Sunni or Christian...Let each of you be the brother of the other one." The cleric continues to demand a US withdrawal, blaming the fighting on "the invador" has "has separated us." He chanted with his followers, "No, no, no to Satan! No, no, no to America! No, no, no to occupation! No, no, no to Israel! Sadr's rival, Hakim, had gone to Iran for cancer treatment.

Another group of cabinet ministers quite in early August, this time a Sunni boycott. A Kurd, remaining in the cabinet called the action "the most serious political crisis we have faced since the passage of the constitution." A Sunni leader called the Maliki govnerment arrogant and "slamming the door to any meaningful reforms." In stating the obvious, Sec. Gates said on Meet the Press, "I think we perhaps all underestimated the depth of the misunderstanding and mistrust among these sections, among these factions in Baghdad..."

The lead Times editorial of May 7, "The Soft Bigotry of Iraq", feels that the US needs to stop talking and get tough with the Iraqi government. "Whether out of blind loyalty or blind denial, most Congressional Republicans are prepared to back up President Bush's veto of the Iraq spending bill." Maliki has been "dodging" national reconciliation promises concerning three issues: Iraqis security forces, oil revenue and anti-Baathist laws. "Without these steps, Mr. Maliki and his allies cannot even minimally claim to be a real national government. With them, there is at least a chance that Iraqis can muster the strength to contain the chaos when, as is inevitable, American forces begin to leave...Each time Baghdad fails a test, Mr. Bush lowers his requirements and postpones his target dates--the kind of destructive denial Mr. Bush called, in another context, the soft bigotry of low expectations" Recently, Maliki helped fired some security officers who took on Shiite militias. On an oil agreement, "The Bush administration prematurely popped champagne corks in February."

Some Iraqis do admit to wanting Shiite domination. In a May 7 Times op-ed, one says, "We think America did a great thing by toppling Saddam. But now they should hand us the county and leave...Then the Shiites will rule Iraq...Now it is our chance to hit back and rule."

An Iraqi man was found guilty in Des Plaines, Illinois of being an Iraqi spy. Sami Latchin was found guilty in mid-April, 2007.

Sec. Gates visited Iraq in April and Rice met with Maliki in early May in Egypt. Speaking of oil and Iraqi politics, VP Cheney visited Iraq in mid-May for a multi day visit. One of his top goals was to pressure Iraqi leaders to make significant changes. They gave him no specific time committments, but Cheney was optimistic: "I do believe that there is a greater sense of urgency now." Crowds supported by Sadr protested the visit, calling Cheney, "one of the world's most evil infidels."

Gates stated perhaps the obvious in early August when he admited that the administration "might have misjudged" the difficulty of achieving reconciliation among sectarian groups.

While the US Congress was having timetable bills vetoed by the President, the Iraqi Parliament signed a draft bill with timetables for US withdrawal. The majority of Americans in May wanted to continue funding the war as long as the Iraqi government met specific goals. There continued to be little or so progress on those in throughout the summer of 2007.

Security Minister al-Rubaie visited DC in May, 2007 to urge Congress to be patient and to keep supporting the government. He was soon followed by a former Baathist, Sunni member of Parliament with a very different view, Muhammad al-Daini, who says he has survived 8 assassination attempts. "The problem in Iraq is the Americans," says al-Daini. "What brought terrorism , what brought Al Qaeda and what brought Iranian influence is the Americans." The Times further reports that while some Sunnis fear a quick US pullout, al Daini sees support of Maliki as merely prolonging the bloodshed. Al-Daini helped to expose a prison for torture which held mostly Sunnis. He says his family was subsequently targeted.

"Give Them a Break", urges Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations, in Times commentary (5/22) . The Iraqi Parliament is considering a two-month recess, but this is not a problem since the "serious work" gets done behind the scenes. Boot has forgotten that many members of Parliament often leave the country, according to previous reports. Yet, he feels that "we shouldn't kid ourselves that even in the unlikely event" that all the important bills are approved "by September, they will mark a turning point in the war...The top prioirty...is for Iraqi and American troops to bring Baghdad under control. Absent a greater degree of security, any deals reached in Parliament wouldn't be worth the paper they're printed on, because the factions would not trust one another to carry them out and they would still feel compelled to settle their differences at gunpoint. First you have to win the war, or at least start to win it. Then come the negotiations Not the other wa around."

Boot asks about the incentives Iraqis have to compromise "with mortal enemies if they think US forces are about to depart and a major civil war is about to erupt. "Iraqi politicians will make serious concession only if they feel a reasonable degree of assurance that the rule of law, not the rule of bomb-makers and throat-slitters, will previal...This is not meant to be an excuse for Iraqi politicians, who should be doing more."

The US continued, in the spring of 2007, to ask the Iraqis to compromise and make the tough decisions. However, Andrew Cockburn points out in his 2006 book, Occupation, that the government of Maliki has no power. Power is with militias or various of the three main groups.

In August of 2007, the USA Today editorial feels there is little political progress in Iraq. The Iraqi Parliament, often lacking a quorum, took a one month"ill timed" recess. Many in Parliament already spend long stretches outside the country. When US troops leave, will any success evaporate? Some Iraqi politicians felt there was little more they could do. One Sunni complained to the Times, "The Americans support only the government, not the Parliament."

In response, the USA Today printed commentary by Clifford May of a policy institute. Having given the Iraqis the right to vote, other instututions will develop "over time...As long as the Iraqis think we are heading for the exit, what possible incentive do they have to make painful political compromises...We should never surrender to al Qaeda." He concludes, "If you think the government in Baghdad coudn't be worse, think again."

Could Maliki be replaced? If so, might former Prime Minister Allawi be a possibility? Bush's support of Maliki appeared to be waning in August. Columnist Arianna Huffington predicted a US sponsored Allawi "coup" in late August. Indeed, Allawi's political alliance withdrew from the government in late August. The former interim Prime Minister commented, "I don't see that we are getting closer to reconciliation. I don't see that we are getting closer to getting rid of militias. I am not seeing that we are getting closer to having an assertive polices, foreign polices, which would not allow Iran to intervene in Iraqi affairs."

Sen. Carl Levin joined those urging him to quit. Though Republicans have criticized Maliki, he responded to Levin and Hillary Clinton, urging them to "start making sense." His stridency included the accusation that the Senators had spoken "as if Iraq is one of their cities."

The National Security Estimate, a consensus view from 16 US intelligence groups, concluded in late August that the Iraqi government is "paralyzed" and "casts strong doubts", writes the front page Times, on Bush's strategy. Democratic plans for withdrawal are also implicitly criticized, with fear of "eroding security gains" and a spiral toward more sectarian violence, "most likely" making things worse.

The Chicago Tribune also blames Maliki (8/27/07 lead editorial) for the "power failure...He's failed so far to kindle enough cooperation among sectarian factions to pass key laws. In the way, al-Maliki and his government may prove to be far more effective in pushing Americans out of Iraq than Al Qaeda could ever dream to be." For many more Tribune editorials, see PS Editorials section.

"The Problem Isn't Mr. Maliki" asserted the lead Times editorial of August 24. Blaming the President of Iraq rather than the President of the US, "for the spectacular failure of American policy, is cynical politics, pure and simple." Like Jaafari before him, Maliki's sectarian government has supported pro-Shiite security forces and militias. "He is the logical product of the system the US created" all but sure to produce "a sectarian Shiite far more interested in settling scores than in recoiling all Iraqis to share power in a unified and peaceful democracy."

Charles Krauthammer is "thinking beyond" Maliki more often in the late summer of 2007. The pro-war columnist labels the Prime Minister as weak and unreliable. If Maliki was replaced, I wonder if the administration would ask for time (months?) for the new Prime Minister to make progress. "Give him a chance" could be the new slogan.

Are benchmarks being met? In late August the Government Accountability Report concluded that of the 18 benchmarks set by the US, there was failure in all but three. There is disagreement between the GAO and the White House, as this graphic exemplifies. The recent White House analysis was more positive.

Another National Intelligence Report (NIE), out the same week, was entitled "Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive."

Some ex-Baathists could regain their jobs, in a deal worked out. Sunnis were not mollified and claimed that "nothing had changed" in the Sunni group's decision to quit the government. This Iraqi Consensus Front wanted other demands met such as prisoner amnesty, revising the Baghdad security plan, and curbing militias dominated by Shiites. "We live in a crisis...This is a wedding without a bride."

Saddam's legacy continued in the news in November. Sadr's political allies called on paid compensation for the relatives of Saddam's victims. He suggested this occur prior to any deBaathification. The relatives should receive $40,000 and a weekly pension. Political prisoners should receive $24,000. It was likely the bill would not be approved.

Shiite and Sunni leaders met in October 2007, making it the first time Shiite leaders had traveled to Anbar to speak with sheiks. Meanwhile, the US is trying to us more Sunni police, as neighborhood watch groups. However, the Shiite-dominated national government has not been supportive.

The Iraqi government seized Sunni headquarter of the most influential of the Sunni clerical groups.

Among the stories of November was members of Parliament walking out to protest US treatment. Dozens who walked out feel that the US military in the Green Zone is "arrogant and impolite." The US said they are just doing their job.

The largest Sunni block walked out in early December to protest the arrest of one of their leaders, al-Dulaimi, head of the Accordance Front. MP's are supposed to have immunity from prosecution. Shiites suspect al-Dulaimi's guards are involved in acts of violence such as booby-trapped cars near his office. The political crisis deepened. The walkout lasted only a few days. We still are left to wonder if Sunnis can be brought into the Shiite-dominated power structure.

Tribal militias, allying with US against al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, were starting to demand jobs and influence in security forces. Religious and political leader Hakim was resistant to these demands. The Iraqi government announced plans to disband these Sunni groups. They are known as the Awakening Councils or Concerned Local Citizens. See more at Violence 2007-08.

Al-Hakim was more conciliatory toward Sunnis in early January, 2008. His comments were much less soft in December. He and other Shiite leaders are concerned and afraid that by arming Sunnis the US is creating an armed force who could turn itself away from al-Qaeda and toward Shiites. Though the Iraqi government promises to disband the Sunni forces and integrate some into official security, this might prove difficult. In the past, the US promised to disband armed militias, and this never occurred.

Is Democracy realistic for Iraq? Writing in Harpers and interviewed on NPR (12/2/07) , Professor Robin Fox is dubious. Democracy, he feels, is fragile and not natural, especially with the historic tribal powers in Iraq. His Harpers article is "The Kindness of Strangers." \

Former Iraqi Amb. and now US assistant Sec. of State Negroponte urged Iraqis to "take advantage of the lull" in violence. He emphasized two bills, on oil and de-Baathification. Local elections were not emphasized.

Do Kurds still want independence? Many Kurds probably feel that they have gained much independence since the mid-90s under Saddam. In the fall of 2007, with Turkey threatening to invade, Kurds appear to be re-thinking independence. See much more on Turkey.

The mostly Kurdish city of Kirkuk was supposed to have a referendum about its future by the end of 2007. Will Kirkuk become part of Kurdistan, though Saddam forced Arabs to settle there during his rule? Since then, 60,000 Arabs have left. The deadline was not met, but a six month delay was granted. The rewriting of the Iraqi Constitution, promised by the US to get Sunnis to vote for the Constitution in 2005, was also scrapped. The delay was the fourth.

Into the new year, the Kurdish role in the government made front page news in the Times (2/1/2008). Policies which antagonize Sunnis and Shiites include signing independent oil deals and seizing Kirkuk. Kurds see the central government as dragging its feet on an oil deal, so they are moving ahead with their own. With no census in decades, it is not even clear how many Kurds there are. Generally estimated at about 20% Kurdish, 20% Sunni, and 60% Shiite, the actual Kurdish population could range from 13-23% of Iraq.

With Tukey bombing Kurdish regions of Iraq in 2007 and 2008, Kirkuk stayed in the news, where Kurds consider making the city theirs "an article of faith" (NYTimes, 2/5/08). They hope to "right the wrongs" and persecution by Saddam. Turkman groups came out against a referendum in February 2008.

The Parliament finally passed a de-Baathification bill in early January 2008. "US Benchmark is met," declared the Times in their lead story from page 1. The two other laws involved future elections and a budget. All three major groups could claim victory. Reconciliation was helped. Yet, important details were postponed.

President Bush praised the major bill. However, there was disagreement about how many Sunnis would really be allowed into government positions. Only just over half of Parliament was present for the vote.

Sunni criticism included concern that the law would restrict "many scientists, professors, doctors, engineers, and other competent men." Praise tended to come from Shiites, feeling that strong curbs on former Baathists would remain in place. ""There will be more restrictions." If these Shiites or the Sunnis are right, the law is not what the US says it needs. Another Iraqi official said only 3500 former Baath Party members would be prevented from serving in the government. Others would be vetted by a different committee and have another step of judicial review. Amb. Crocker takes a broader view, because "reconciliation is more than national legislation." Any new oil law was again deferred.

It is "unclear", the Times writes, "how many of the former officials would be kept out office or allowed back in." The law seems to allow for some to gain their pensions but not their jobs. They would be forced into retirement from Ministry and Defense, says an aide to Chalabi. A senior US diplomat added, "The law is about as clear as mud."

The next day the Times dug deeper than their "benchmark is met" headline, in "Ex-Baathists Get a Break. Or Do They?" The Justice and Accountability Law is "confusing and controversial...riddled with loopholes and caveats." It could "exclude more former Baathists than it lets back in," especially in the areas of security. US officials have been "mostly silent" because they "still have to go through it. There are seven levels of Baathists. Previously, the top four were barred, and the new law would theoretically limit that to three. Shiites tend to see it as "an olive branch" whereas most Sunni see it of it as best incremental improvement or maybe even harsher. How will the measure be applied?

The Times Jan. 15 lead editorial "In Search of Answers" notes the no one knows what the new law will do. It is "shrouded in mystery and confusion." The surge was a "way to create the space for Iraqis to bridge sectarian divisions." De-baathification by US officials in 2003 "shredded the country's bureaucracy" and "embittered Sunnis, many of whom joined the insurgency." As we know, many Baathists only joined the party "out of self-preservation--the only way" to get work in their profession. "Administration officials continually lower the bar for Iraq...Iraqis are going to have to do a lot better to make their country work. Withdrawing American troops may finally persuade them to do this."

Also see "Troops Home 2008?" FAQ section.

The Washington Post updates their stories on the Iraq government.

Editorial reaction to the new law came from the Post a few days later. (1/18/08). Even if reconciliation is not making progress, that is no reason to give up, the paper argues in "Iraqi Mirages." We've seen breakthroughs before on oil or regional power but "on close inspection, they reveal the same unresolved differneces...The Shiite government and Sunni leaders once again appeared to have agreed on a text that papers over rather than resolves the key differences." How did the US react? "Revealingly," statements are that "the proof...would be in its implementation; in other words, the underlying problem of Shiite resistance to sharing power with Sunnis has yet to be overcome." The US should further press Maliki, the Post feels. Painting with a broader brush, the editorial concludes, "Limited and over-promoted as it was, the vote...also provided a contrast to...full-scale civil war...appeared to be unstopable...The worst mistake the US could make would be to allow its frustration with Iraqi political leaders to cause it to abandon the military strategy that has delivered that progress As long as Baghdad neighborhoods are continuing to recover refugees are trickling home,and Sunni and Shiite militias are helping to keep the peace rather than hinting each other, the US mission in Iraq will be serving a vital purpose."

One should recall that under Amb. Bremer thousands of former Baathists were banned from government jobs or fired, even teachers and professors who joined the party out of necessity. The Times reminds us that this move, supported later by the new Shiite-dominated government "fueled Sunnis mistrust ont eh government and helped drive the early stages of the Sunni insurgency." The article concludes that other "benchmark" laws continue to be stalled. These include provincial elections, constitutional changed promised to and sought by Sunnis, and oil revenue distribution.

In early February the new law was still being analyzed by the press. Sunnis were quoted as saying the law would do "more harm than good." In politics, often perception is reality. The Sunni VP is pitted against CIA and US ally Chalabi, a leader in vast debaathification. Chalabi, a Shiite feels that 7000 Sunnis now serving in security would lose their jobs.

One broad February 2008 Times editorial was titled "Making (Some) Progress in Iraq." Parliamentary laws passed in progress. "As always in Iraq, it is best to read the fine print" because we need to see how the laws are implemented. Sunnis are 80% of detainees so amnesty will likely help them the most. The oil revenue bill still needs to be improved.

The UN offered to help with the October elections. However, the new law on provincial elections, passed with great fanfare, was later vetoed by the presidency counsel. The bill will be returned to Parliament. Shiites appear more often split between those who follow Sadr and The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC).

President Bush feels that the veto is actually a positive sign and evidence of political progress. "It was a very interesting moment in Iraqi constitutional history. I thought it was a healthy sign that people are thinking through the legistlation that's passed, and they're worrying about making sure that laws are constitutional."

One school of thought feels that most of the US media is examining Iraq from the wrong perspective. This thinking is that Iraq is splitting not just along religious lines. Rather, the splits are between nationalists and separatists.

Iraqi law and courts are struggling. Witness are killed, threatened, or fail to show at trial. Panels of judges need replacing. One witness who was not too afraid to testify, said she had been so intimidated that she had given up her permanent address. Another changed his testimony. Ongoing is the much-watched first trial of Shiite officials charged with sectarian crimes with militias. Their leader is former deputy Health Ministry Hakim al-Zamili, charged with killing and kidnapping hundreds of Sunnis at hospitals.

Prisons are overcrowded. The justice system is lacking tens of thousands of beds, investigative judges or lawyers. The Times reports that more than half of the 26,000 prisoners are still awaiting trial with some "languishing for years." The US blames Iraqi government inaction, corruption and sectarianism. Just a few weeks later, we learned that in the US, 1/100 adults are currently in jail.

"Not sufficient progress" is how Gen. Petraeus described the Iraqi government in late March, a few weeks before he was set to testify again before Congress.

With little progress in national politics, in March we started hearing more about the prospect of provincial elections. Sunnis might participate more than in the past, when they boycotted January 2005. Two days after a Cheney visit, the decision was made to have elections by October 1. I predict in early April that a date very close to September 11 will be chosen.

In late April, members of Parliament peacefully protested against violence in Sadr City, urging dialogue. Maliki told Sadr he will stop fighting if Sadr's complies on four levels: hand over heavy weapons, stop fighting the security forces, stop menacing government workers, and hand over "outlaws." Sadr would likely not comply. Sadr's group are paying hundreds of dollars to families of those killed and wounded.

High level Iraqi corruption was ignored by the US, reported two former State Department employees in May of 2008. Fraud monitors were being fired, we learned in mid-November. The front page Times story examines the "systematic" dismissal of Iraqi oversight officials who were supposed to "fight corruption." The US had ordered the officials be installed. Rather than western accountability, Iraq was becoming more of a "graft-ridden bureaucracy. One Iraqi official testified to Congress that $13 billion of US funds had been lost to "fraud, embezzlement, theft and waste" by Iraqi government officials. Also see "Are the Iraqi People Better Off?"

The Washington Post updates their stories on the Iraq government.

Iraqis protested against an Iraqi-US troops "status of forces" deal, being negotiated rather secretly, in May. Sadr called on his followers to take to the streets every Friday after prayer, and thousands did so. The negotiating is done in secret. Some Iraqi leaders want any agreement to be put to a referendum before all Iraqis. Sistani will support an agreement "over my dead body." Sadr also announced that his Mahdi Army was being divided between a social service wing, Momahidoun and an armed wing of elite fighters who would attack only non-Iraqis. The armed group has been named Ilyoom Al Mawoud, or The Promised Day Brigade."

The US had an extensive spying operation on Prime Minister Maliki and his staff it was disclosed in early September 2008. Bob Woodward divulged the program in his new book, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008.

In late October an Iraqi court sentenced three Iraqis to die for killing 3 US GI's. This was the first such case.

One piece of good news was that Egypt send a foreign minister to Iraq for the first time in two years. Their embassy would be re-opened. Leaders of Lebanon and Jordan also made visits in the fall of 2008.

The long negotiations over the future of US troops continued past the Obama election victory of early November. A "final draft" often seemed just around the corner. This is called the Status of Forces Agreement, which expires at the end of 2008, having been granted by the UN. Would the US turn over detainees to Iraq? Would the US need Iraqi permission to make any arrest?

Maliki got his timetable in mid-November 2008, with the long-negotiated Iraq-US Security Agreement. It mandated all US combat troops out in three years, forces staying out of cities and towns after June, to US attacks on neighboring countries from Iraq, some Iraqi permission for operations within Iraq, and US troops liable to Iraq law for crimes committed while off duty.

Sadr, a Shiite leader, was strongly against the agreement, leading protests and calling for armed resistance to the continued US "occupation." Through a spokesman, Sadr proclaimed, "I repeat my demand to the occupier to leave our land without keeping bases or signing agreements. If they keep bases, then I would support honorable resistance. Some US lawmakers spoke out against it. The Iraq Parliament needed to approve the agreement. Sunnis who were upset want amnesty for their prisoners held by the US. They also want a national referendum on the agreement. Sunnis fear a permanent domination by the majority Shiites. Some Iraqis refer to the agreement as "the withdrawal agreement." How would Sistani react? He generally supports non-violence. He would lend his support given three conditions: full Iraqi sovereignty, transparency, and majority support for the pact. During another delay in Paliament voting, the deputy prime minister commented, "In Iraq things have not happened at the 11th hour, but at the 13th hour." The UN mandate ends December 31.

Parliament ratified the pact on November 27, Thanksgiving Day. The Times put Iraq back on its front page. With a vote of 149-35, Maliki proclaimed that "This is the day of our sovereignty. Together we will go forward toward a free, prosperous and glorious Iraq, where Iraqis can live with pride and dignity and can be proud that they are sons of this beloved country." One Shiite leaded added, "In 2003, we didn't have a right to decide, but now we have a chance to deal with reality and to deal with the occupation forces."

President Bush congratulated Parliament, saying, "Today's vote affirms the growth of Iraq's democracy and increasing ability to secure itslef...Two years ago [with such violence] this day seemed unlikely." Though some lawmakers did not show up for the vote, Sistani was pleased with the broad consensus. We also learned that the pact will indeed be put to a referendum of the people sometime before July 2009. Referendums are "easier to mandate than to carry out.", however. Prior to this will be provincial elections of January, 2009. Sadr and some Sunnis are upset that Iraq has made a deal with the country they see as waging illegal war. Others were against the pact because it helped Maliki's government. In all, negotiations for the pact began in August 2007.

How democratic is the pact? The Times pointed out that those serving in Parliament were elected in 2005, when many Sunnis and Sadr Shiites were boycotting the elections.

Reaction to the pact came in "So We've Got A Date" from the New York Times. "The good news" is that there is an agreement to withdraw troops. The bad news is that the Bush administration delayed so long in being willing to set a date and that "Iraq's domestic politics are still so dysfunctional that its leaders can't agree on much more than that they want the Americans gone." Iraqis leaders are trying not to come across as too pro-American leading up to January elections.

The Sunni-Shia divide was featured in late November on the NPR program "Speaking of Faith."

Further divide was seen in mid-December, when the top New York Times story (12/18) was of 35 Iraqi officials arrested from the Ministry of Interior. Are they corrupt and planning a coup or is Maliki trying to gain power prior to January elections? Some of those arrested are generals, who are alleged to have been planning to bring back the outlawed Baath Party.

Kurds and Maliki traded accusations. In late November Maliki's speech claimed Kurds were being unconstitutional with their oil contracts, opening relations with other countries, and their defense forces. The Times reminded readers that Saddam Hussein had killed 50,000-100,000 Kurds. Can the Maliki-Kurd alliance be maintained?

Kirkuk remains tense. As Time pointed out (12/15/08), "What Lies Beneath" the surface, oil, is causing conflict. After the status-of-forces agreement of Nov. 27, a Political Scientist at Baghdad University notes that Iraqis will soon no longer "have foreigners to blame for our problems--or to solve them. Iraq will be walking on its own feet." But "don't expect peace to break out anytime soon" because of many unanswered questions. Will Iraq have a powerful central government, which Turkomans and Arabs favor, or "highly autonomous region" favored by Kurds? Turkey backs the Turkomans but not the Kurds, and Iran also opposes greater Kurdish power. Both countries border northern Iraq were most of the Kurds live.

Is there a true risk of civil war. The Time piece points out that the Kurds warn that "there many be a civil war if they don't get their way; there will be if they do, say the Turkomans and Arabs." With no census since 1957 and Saddam moving in Arabs in the 1970s, who really has the right to decide. Tensions remain high over the Kurds who came after the war begun and claimed right to their own lands. Opponents of the Kurds feel that they were sent to influence a future census and win a referendum, which the Constitution required. "Today Kirkuk remains in limbo."

Will the Iraqi government need to settle more claims of Americans from the Persian Gulf War? This would cost millions. Some Americans were arrested by Saddam's government in 1991 and brought to Iraq during that war. A total of 240 were held. Some were held as "human shields." $100 million has already been paid out but the Bush administration wants to block further claims because they could bankrupt the Iraqi economy and thus hurt its pro-American government.

Also see US Politics

An Iraqi journalist hurls his shoes at President Bush during a news conference in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone on December 14. It would be Bush's fourth and last visit to the country. The video was played over and over in the US but even more so in the Arab world. Bush was denounced on live TV has a "dog" who had delivered death and sorrow for nearly six years. The journalist, Muntader al-Zaidi, was a correspondent for an independent Iraqi TV station. 12 feet from the President, he stood up and shouted in Arabic, "This is a gift from the Iraqis; this is the farewell kiss, you dog." Bush ducked and was not hit. Upon hurling his second shoe, the reporter yelled, "This is from the widows, the orphans and those who were killed in Iraq.' al-Zaidi was wrestled to the ground and beaten. A reporter for a station owned by Maliki described that al-Zaidi was kicked and beaten "until he was crying like a woman." He was taken to jail and could be tried and sentenced to 7 years in prison for "offending the head of a foreign state."

Why throw a shoe? In Iraq and other areas of the middle east, hitting someone with a shoe is considered "the supreme insult" because the target is even lower than the shoe. Back in the April of 2003, Iraqis in Firdos Square beat Saddam's statue with their shoes. The Times reports that "more recently in the same square a far bigger crowd flung their shoes at an effigy" of Bush before burning it. They were upset with the agreement allowing US troops to remain until the end of 2011. Maliki said that al-Zaidi was urged to throw the shoe by "a terrorist...who beheads people." Al-Zaidi's family counters that he was only acting out of his own frustration. Shoe sales throughout the Middle East grew quickly as al-Zaidi became a folk hero to many.

Bush's response was to link the incident to growing democracy in Iraq. "That's what people do in a free society, draw attention to themselves." The President wanted to last visit to have a different emphasis with the press. At Camp Victory, for example, he called the troop increase of 2007 "one of the greatest success in the history of the United States military ...There is still more work to be done" but "with the courage of the Iraqi people, and the Iraqi troops and the American troops and civilian personal, it is decisively on its way to be won." One US commentator suggested that Bush could pardon al-Zaidi.

Was the shoe thrower tortured? His family and lawyers could at first not visit him. Then, his brother, who visited him in prison, alleges that he was. Burned with cigarettes, badly beaten, stitches to his forehead, and having a tooth knocked out. His jailers demanded that he confess that he had been ordered to throw the shoes by enemies of the Prime Minister. After the torture, his brother reported, al-Zaidi told them, "I am ready to say I am a terrorist or whatever you want." A government officials also claimed that he had apologized and was seeking a pardon. Later, a spokesman said that al-Zaidi "did not ask to be submitted and did not tell the judge that he was tortured or register a complaint against anyone." Perhaps he was threatened with more torture if he told.

Some in Parliament thought he should be released. Meanwhile, though his trial was set to begin on December, I saw few reports of a trial into the first week of January.

Yet, the Bush shoe story continued to have legs. The black leather oxfords became in great demand throughout the Middle East. A Turkish cobbler claimed he had made the pair, but other claims came from Lebanon, China, and Iraq. As an sign of Bush's great unpopularity in the region, the design formerly knows as Ducati Model 271, it was renamed "The Bush Shoe". The Times reports that 5000 posters advertising the shoes were on their way to the Middle East and Turkey. "Goodbye Bush, Welcome Democracy" read the posters, in Turkish, English, and Arabic. The Turkish cobbler, commenting on their light weight was amazed "by their aerodynamics.

The shoe thrower trial began in February, and was quickly ajourned until mid-March after about one hour. Testified the defendant, "I felt the blook of the innocents was flowing under his feet while he was smiling that smile...I felt that this person was the reason for the killing of my people, and I am a part." Zaidi has 25 lawyers, who claim that Bush wasn't a guest of the country since he was in the US controlled Green Zone.

On other "non-shoe" issues, the lead Times editorial (12/24/08) sees little political progress. Bush goal of a "model democracy...never realistic, remains elusive." Iraq's parties "still resist sharing power." Bush's "unconditional support" for Maliki is "fueling his nationalistic rhetoric and divisive policies." The paper urges Obama to stick to his pledge all combat troops out in 16 mon

On Christmas day we learned that the Speaker of the House suddenly resigned. He had done so before, only to un-resign. He criticized the US, saying it had "handed us a ruined state." Mr. Hashhadani described US troops as "hateful occupation forces" who were "destroying everything in Iraq...The Iraqi people forced the American forces to sign a humiliating withdrawal agreement."

Iraq as a Shakespearean drama, describes the front page Times story the day after Christmas. Poltiical troubles keep it from becoming a democracy. "There is talk of a coup" against Maliki, the Speaker of Parliament resigned, and there have been sweeping arrests. Some accuse Maliki of becoming a dictator. His Dawa party is seeking more influence in the provinces. Sunni parties mostly feel "distrusted, slighted and left out of decsion making." Many remain in detention despite an amnesty law. Kurds are upset that a vote in their region has been delayed and the fear a balance of power shift against Kurds and in favor of Arabs. Not all Shiites like Maliki. There could be a vote of no confidence. Yet, who would take over? Back in 2005, Iraq was left without a Prime Minister for months after Jaafari was removed.

After a week, an Iraqi judge dismissed the charged of the 24 and order the Iraqi officials released. Iraqi government officials contradicted each other as to why the suspects are being held. In fact, the Interior Ministry, "in a bold gesture of defiance" proclaimed that all his men were innocent. Mr. al-Bolani credited the arrests to "the competition of the provincial elections" coming in January.

The Green Zone returned to Iraqi control as 2009 dawned. This large zone in the capital, about 5 1/2 square miles, was long controlled by US forces. It is described by the Times as a "surreal village of Peruvian and Ugandan guards, Filipino launderers, British military contractors, American soldiers ad diplomats, and Iraqi politicians." Iraqis number in the thousands. Now Americans will begin paying rent.

Starting in December, our attention focused more often on the local elections. We assumed that Sunnis would participate this time, rather than boycott, as many did in the last provincial elections. This time, Iraqi politicians sometimes campaigned in the open and even had their own names on the ballot, not just their party.

Maliki visited Iran and again met with Ahmadinejad in early January. Maliki vowed that his government "would not allow Iraq to be used as a base to threaten its neighbors." There was no immediate US reaction to the visit.

With oil prices much lower of the second half of 2008, the Iraq budget suffered.

January 31, 2009, provincial elections occured with little violence, except for Mosul and Kirkuk. Six candidates were murdered. Maliki and secular parties seemed to do well in early returns, as well as parties allied with Iran, like Maliki's Dawa Party. Many women ran for office. Turnout was about 50%. Sunnis and Kurds complained about being left off the voter rolls, complicated by the fact that many no longer live in their original home. In violent Mosul, one candidate proclaimed, "This is our fate. There is no politics when there is chaos and car bombing." Mosul has long been divided between Arabs and Kurds.

Sunni Awakening tribes, who became allied with US forces, are upset about corruption as they vie for power. "It's a mess," complains one.

On May 4,2009 the lead Times editorial sees lack of political progress to be blamed on the failure of the Shiite government to make the political changes to hold the country together. Sunnis need jobs, especially those former Baathists. "Old rivalries and hatreds are difficult to put aside. The decine in oil revenue makes it especially hard to expand government employment." The paper is concerned that disaffected Sunnis could cause huge problems in the future. The US had no ambassador for two montths. A long delayed oil law should be adopted. How will the four million refugees be returned?

40 police officers were to face charges of prison abuse. Sadr supporters began a hunger strike over a prison.

Corruption continues to erode confidence in the government, while there are no anticorruption laws on the books. Some legistlation has awaited passage in Parliament for as long as three years.

National elections are scheduled next for January 2010. Do Iraqi politicians want US troops do stay? What do Iraqi citizens desire? Since it is still unpopular to support US troops in Iraq, politicians tend to speak against the continued presence.

As June 30 approaches, both Iraq leaders and US military pronounced that the Iraqis were ready to take on their own security in cities. On June 30 the US officially left all Iraqi cities. Iraqis celebrated with parades, fireworks, and a national holiday. Obama thought they were right to celebrate. Prime Minister Maliki, an ally of the US, made no mention of the 130,000 US troops which remain at that level through at least September. That day a bombing in Kirkuk killed 33.

Who will pump Iraq's oil? Contracts will go to companies, many US, and profits will not be owned by the Iraqi governemnt, as is true in nearly every other OPEC nation.If oil production starts increasing, this will probably help the Iraqi people. Large oil companies are limitting their profits now with hopes of larger profits in the years to come. Iraqis recall the colonial area when they had little control over the profits.

Corruption continued to make the news in the summer of 2009. Their trade minister resigned in late May, as Maliki tries to "clean" his cabinet against corruption. Under the minister's guideance, food supplies were often received spoiled, including sugar that had turned black. Two of the minister's brothers were guards and alleged to have received millions in kickbacks on imported food.

The only editorial from the Times back on June 30 was the lengthy "The First Deadline." "After six bloody, ruinously costly years, there is an end in sight to the American occupation." Obama has pledged all combat troops out by August 2010 and all US troops out by the end of 2011. "For a badly overstretched American military it will certainly be time to go...The Iraq War--an unnecessary war--has diverted critically needed resources away from Afghanistan, the real front in the war on terrorism. Many Iraqis are eager to see the Americans gone." There are six major areas were progress is badly needed and not much time to do it. There is continued violence, little political compromise and perhaps not enough attention from the current administration. The paper detailed these six concerns:
1. Iraqi Readiness: The army is still corrupt and ineffective. The police and interior need even more work. The Army is still greatly dependent on the US, and has little navy or air force. The 2011 deadline will need to be extended on these two fronts.
2. Sunni Anger: The "bitter resentment" comes partly from former Baath party members. Awakening Councils, mostly Sunnis, have been badly treated.
3. Kurdish Ambition: Tensions are high in northern Iraq with Arabs. Boundaries and oil add to the conflict, especially in Mosul. Things are worse in Kirkuk, the "oil rich, multi-ethnic" city.
4. Refugees: 1/10 Iraqis have left their homes, about 4 million. 100,000 have "trickled back" and a still smaller number have been allowed to settle abroad. "They all need the chance to return safely. Iraq needs their talents."
5. Governing: "More than anything, Iraq needs competent, inclusive government" which provides basic services to its citizens. They lack skilled managers and suffer from "pervasive corruption." A January election provides hope. "There are growing concerns" that Maliki "may be accumulating too much power, undercutting rivals and building a cadre of military and intelligence offers loyal only to him."
6. Neighbors: Iran and Syria are constantly meddling. Tehran wants to control Iraqi's Shiite-dominated government. Sunni-led Saudi Arabia has not named an ambassador.
The lengthy editorial concludes, "The US cannot fix Iraq. That is up to the Iraqis. But in the time left, this country has a responsibility and a strong strategic interest to do its best to help Iraq emerge from this disaster as a functioning, sovereign and reasonably democratic state."

Can Sunnis and Shiites live in peace? Can Shiites give some power to Sunnis? This was the topic of the lead Times editorial of 8/14/09. The Shiites have gone too far and "marginalizes and discriminates" against the Sunnis. For years, the US "did almost nothing to restrain them. The civil war that nearly tore Iraq apart in 2006 and 2007 has receded, but the resentments have not." Examining the increased violence of July and August the "paper of record" seems the new attacks on Shiites and Shiites mosques as trying to "reignite sectarian warfare." Thus far, Shiites have refused to be provoked. "But the unresolved tension...is a problem that Washington cannot ignore. How can the US help convince Sunnis that they can thrive? Maliki is playing "a very dangerous game." Three issues need to be addressed. First, there is still no law on sharing oil revenue. Second the law allowing former Baathists to get back their jobs or pensions has not been carried out. Third, The nearly 100,000 members of the Sunni Awakening Councils, former insurgents, have not gotten the pay and jobs program.

Will investors be attracted to Iraq? A day day conference in October in Washington alerted the world that Iraq is open for business, and not just oil. Obstacles include security and corruption issues, but also include poor roads, sporadic electricity, bureaucracy, and an inability to compete with cheap imports form Iran and Turkey. Iraq has already completed the first new hotel in Baghdad since Saddam's days.

The horrific bombings of mid-August in Baghdad led Iraqi officials to point fingers at each other. Various agencies control the security forces. Corruption is common. Maliki promises a full investigation and will replace the blastwalls and checkpoints he had removed. Iraq seems less ready to defend itself without the help of US forces, who were quietly called in after the bombings. The positive spin from the US was the "the Iraqis were fully in the lead." The attacks do not appear to be sectarian in nature.

In a rare act, Maliki came quickly to the site of twin suicide bombings in October 25. Over 150 were killed and about 500 wounded. Some Iraqis blamed Maliki for not providing enough security. Blast walls had recently been moved or removed in the area. The Times quotes one witness that the entire area "was filled with bloody human flesh. Large pools of blood were everywhere, in addition to the remains of burned cars. It was horrible."

Will this effect Maliki's popularity in the January elections? One Iraqi replied, "Why should I vote for Maliki? He has done nothing except bring explosions and corruption?" One or two year ago, this violence would have been blamed on the Americans. 61 police officers were arrested.

Corruption in the fall of 2009 continued to make the news, especially after the above attacks in Baghdad. Checkpoint guards are bribed and security services enrich themselves, according to dozens of interviews by the Times. Even the Interior Ministry sees problems. "Ghost police officers are listed on payrolls so commanders can take the salaries...Criminals and insurgents are freed with a well-placed bribe, criminal records are expunged for payment, detainees are abused by guards in order to extort money from relatives. Some people on the payroll don't show up for work but just come in the collect their paycheck. The Interior Ministry point to progress, such as the elimination of death squads. The corruption is both political and financial.

January 16, 2010 elections loomed in the fall. There was front page newspaper talk of "national unity" but others were skeptical. Perhaps religious and sectarian parties will have less power.

Stalemate returned to Iraqi politics in October, to the surprise a few careful observers. Kirkuk was a key issue, over Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. What would the election law become? Agreement, due by October 15, was made in late October. A few days later, the agreement was off. The Times points out that while the US is "looking for credible elections in Afghanistan, possibly to justify sending more troops there, in Iraq it is looking for credible elections to justify removing more troops." In the past, voters could only vote for a party and not a person.

Parliament passed a national vote in November but they was a veto threat by the Kurdish President. The election would be only the second national election since the fall of Saddam. That 2005 vote was boycotted by most Sunnis. The agreement will allow vote for candidates not just a party. 1/4 of Parliament seats are still reserved for women. There was a warning that minorities in the north are threatened, including Shabaks, Christains, and Yazidis.

There was a veto, despite US pressure. By late November it looked as though elections would not be held in January, as mandated by the Iraqi constitution. After 11 delays,, a date was set for March of 2010. With no census, there is not an accurate count of Iraqi citizens or voters. Under the agreement, Parliament will expand from 275 to 325. Politicians continue to be assassinated.

A lengthy Times editorial (12/18/09) urged the US to keep pressure on the Kurds not to break away. The US has supported the Kurds for years and thus should press against a grab for Kirkuk.

In early January, 500 Iraqis were barred from the March elections, for alleged ties to the Baathist Party. Most were Sunni, including the current Defense Minister allied with former Prime Minsiter Allawi. Others were expected to do well in the elections. Who banned them? A Committee called the Iraq Accountabliity and Justice Commission, developed under US occupation, has members have not been approved by Parliament. Sectarian tensions rose as well as protests. Maliki is trying to appear hard on Baathists. One lawmaker used the phrase "Baathophobia." US and UN officials were caught by surprise and spoke off the record of a lack of transparency. A few days later, Biden suggested that they be allowed to run but be disqualified only if they win and are found to have illegal ties to Baathists. There were 6500 total candidates, so about 1/13 were banned.

Many Sunnis boycotted 2005 elections out of fear or protest. Sunnis them were poorly represented in Parliament. By late Febraury some Sunni were calling for another boycott. Can ballots be made in time for early March?

The matter was still not resolved by mid-February, when the election commission announced that all but 26 of the 515 barred candidates would remain barred. Sunnis fume about injustice: "It has become clear to Iraqis that this political campaign is fake." As Communist party membership was once deemed necessary in the USSR, so it was with the Baath Party of Saddam's Iraq.

A new secular coalition was formed in mid-January. Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi leads the group, which includes Sunnis and Shiites and hopes to compete with Maliki's Shiite group. One of the leaders was deemed unqualified, due to his past support for the Baath party.

Gen. Odeirno, Iraq's senior commander, bluntly stated that Ahmed Chalabi and Ali Faisal al-Lami have ties to Iran. They are involved in blocking some Sunnis from the ballot. Close readings of the site, will recall Chalabi large role in pre-war intelligence on WMD.

In the weeks leading up to the March 6 election, party headquarters were bombed and two candidates were killed by mid-February. Anbar was especially violent. Eight Christians were murdered in less than two weeks. About 20,000 Christians still live in Mosul.

One week before the elections, 20,000 Saddam-era Army officers were reinstated. This would likely makes Sunnis more likely to vote for Maliki. Their dismisal had helped fuel the insurgency beginning in 2003.

The March 6 elections loomed. Who might win? Will Maliki be re-elected? Could a secular party or a coaltion have a strong chance? Would anyone be able to defeat a Shiite religious party? Traditionally, the exit from power has been "the coup or the coffin." One Kurdish official described his allegiance: "First ethnicity, second poltiical party." If the vote splits along familiar lines, Iraq could be seen like a Lebanon, with parties vying for power along ethnic and sectarian lines. Political paralysis could insue. For example, Ninevah, and ancient city, is still split between Arab and Kurdish controlled areas.

Sistani, a leading religious figure, refused to endorse anyone, unlike previous elections. In the past he urged Iraqis to cooperate with Americans. The Shiite has stongly urged Iraqis to vote.

Gifts from candidates to voters were common. Some included heating oil, rice, running shoes, toys for children, phone cards, blankets, and frozen chickens. After all the feasts and gifts, the price of meat has risen. Cash bribes are given, but are usually discreet. Rallies are rare, due to poor security. At the end of one rally, doves were released to symbolize peace. Unfortunately, fireworks burst at the same time, killing many of the birds. Maliki gave tribal leaders pistols emblazoned with a personal stamp. Gen. David Petraeus calls this "Iraqracy." There are no campaign spending laws.

Turnout was high, at 62%, but lower than the 76% from December 2005. As votes were being counted, Maliki's rivals seemed to fall behind. They shouted fraud, and alleged some some ballots had been dumped in the garbage. Maliki dismissed allegations of fraud. He was leading in many Shiite areas.

It took about two weeks for the results to be announced on March 26. Maliki had been defeated by former Prime Minster Ayad Allawi. The vote was close, with Allawi winning by only 11,000 votes out of 12 million. Maliki cried fowl and demanded a recount, as did Kurdish leader Talibani, who trailed Allawi in Kurdish areas. The US and other international ovservors felt the elections were fair. Allawi, who had earlier charged fruad, merely alleged that there was indeed fraud, and that he would have won by more if the election had been fair. Allawi is a secular Shiite, with allies among Sunni groups. His party is the Iraqiya coaltion. As Allawi attempts to form his government, we wonder of the king-making ability of the Kurds and of Sadr, still in exile in Iran. Parliament's 325 seats may not be decided for weeks. Allawi has 91 seats to Maliki's 89,but needs 163 of the 325 to form a government. For how long will Maliki be a lame duck? What if Allawi cannot form a government. It could take months. As a member of Parliament, Allawi seldom if ever showed up. He was once criticized as an American puppet. However, those who supported the US invasion or were long-time exiles did not fare as well. See much more on Allawi as Prime Minister back in 2005.