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Last Updated 11/28/2005

Many Iraqis in 2003 were frustrated with the slow progress toward interim government, as Paul Bremer had proposed an Advisory Council.  Local elections had been disallowed by Americans in June, instead installing their own leaders.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42905-2003Jun27?language=printer

After months of anticipation and with Iraqi leaders seemingly running out of patience, an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was announced.  It began with much fanfare as the top story in mid-July 2003.  Kurdish leaders ask for more support and money, in their New York Times Op-ed piece of mid-July. The July 15 New York Times and Chicago Tribune editorials describes the Councils makeup, goals, and challenges. Thomas Friedman's mid-July contribution, not emphasizing the WMD issue, is "Winning the Real War".  The 25 members of the council include the 7 major opposition groups, a majority Shiites (reflecting the makeup of the nation), three women, and one Communist.  (Also see "If not Hussein" FAQ section)  The Council declared April 9, the day when Hussein fell, as a national holiday. 

On the makeup of the IGC, a Post op-ed criticized the small number of women.  "Women in Iraq Decry Decision to Curb Rights" (1/16/04) looks at the legal protection of the past four decades eroding for women. The civil code had prohibited marriage below age 18, arbitrary divorce and male favoritism in child custody and property inheritance disputes.  

Bremer (at left) was the top U.S. "civil administrator" of the "Coalition Provisional Authority."  He was often quoted in the press nearly as often as Bush, Rumsfeld, and Powell.  Bremer replaced Jay Garner  in late May 2003 as Garner's "Office of Reconstruction of Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).  Garner, age 64, though appointed on January 20, did not enter Iraq until April 17, 8 days after the fall of Hussein's statue.  Garner left on June 1, three weeks after Garner arrived.  On June 16 ORHA was dissolved.   In November Garner became more public in  admitting that mistakes were made.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A15278-2003Nov26?language=printer

Bremer's op-ed in the New York Times on July 13 2003, was entitled, "The Road Ahead in Iraq--and How to Navigate It."   Bremer opened his piece with, "American can be proud of the role their fighting men and women played in freeing Iraq of Saddam Hussein and his cronies.  The people of Iraq are now on the road to political and economic independence."  

The Post's E.J. Dionne looks at the public vs. private sector economy options of which Bremer wrote. The challenges for Bremer and his style are well described in the 4-page New York Times article.  Juan Williams of NPR interviewed Bremer on Morning Edition on July 21 (8 minutes).  Upon returning to the U.S. for a few days, Bremer's late August interview was with the Washington Post (see full text). 

Bremer in April  2003 made a rare television appearance in Iraq, warning of the consequences of the increased violence. "Iraq faces a choice," declared the leader with only 8 weeks left in power." If Iraqis sought stability and democracy, that would not succeed unless ordinary Iraqis help.  "If you do not defend your beloved country, it will not be saved."  Was Bremer suggesting that if the process of "Iraqification" failed the fault would not be that of the Americans?

Now is was up to Bremer to veto any changes in those rights.  The changes were approved by the Governing Council in a closed-door session of December 29.  Concluded a leading female Iraqi politician, "There is no immediate threat of the decision becoming law, but after June 30, who knows what can happen?"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21321-2004Jan15?language=printer

In their first week, the Council (IGC) also promised to try Hussein and others of war crimes in a special tribunal.  The group Human Rights Watch, reports The Tribune (7/16), is concerned about the impartiality of the hearing system. 

A Pentagon advisory panel reported to Bremer in mid-July after spending 11 days in Iraq.  They felt that safety and jobs were the top two concerns for his Coalition Provisional Authority, whose "dedication and enthusiasm" were to be saluted.  They saw the timetable of success as only a matter of months. "The next three months are crucial to turning around the security situation." (NYTimes, 7/18/03). 

Bremer has said that the Council would approve a budget, select ministers, appoint diplomats, and begin writing the Constitution.  In mid-July he hoped a constitution could be written as early as September 2003. Bremer could--but may not--veto many Council decisions. None of the meetings will be held in public. Only after a new Constitution is written and approved will national elections be held.  Then, Bremer hopes, U.S. troops will depart and "our work will be done."   Seeming to set the scene for an earlier U.S. exit than some assumed, and less blame on U.S. if the U.S.-appointed Council fails, Bremer said it was not up to Iraqis how long U.S. troops stayed. A successful Council will thus allow troops to leave earlier. 

My best guess, in mid-July 2003, is that the elections will take place after November, 2004.  New ministers were appointed by the Council in early September, as Bremer outlined a seven point plan for democracy in Iraq and eventual U.S. withdrawal. This Washington Post op-ed of 9/8, "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty" included Bremer's thoughts:  "The liberation was a great and noble deed.  It is fair to ask:  What is next?...We believe Iraqis should be given responsibility for their own security, economic development and political system as soon as possible...to hold election Iraq needs a new constitution and it must be written by Iraqis...Nonetheless the path to full Iraqi sovereignty is clear.  The journey has begun and three of the seven steps of this path have already taken place."  Bremer's seven steps include:
1.   the creation 25-member Governing Council;
2.   a committee to decide how and when to write a Constitution;
3.  day-to day operations of the government into Iraqi hands;
4.  the actual writing of the constitution
5.  popular ratification of the constitution
6.  election of a government; and 
7.  dissolving the coalition authority.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A39805-2003Sep7?language=printer

By late September, perhaps under pressure from Germany or France, Powell  said the U.S. would set a deadline of six months for Iraqi leaders to produce a new constitution.  Elections and new leaders taking office would then occur before the U.S. withdrawal (NYTimes, 9/26). 

Leaders of the Council visited the UN in late-July.  and by September 10th had been recognized with a seat on the Arab League.  As some Council members were visiting the UN in late September, another of the 25 members (at left)  was shot and later died.  Ms. Aqila al-Hashimi died on September 24; The Guardian wrote her obituary.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4761552-103550,00.html

In May 2004, just weeks before the turn over of power, a second IGC member was killed, this time the sitting President.  A car bomb killed him and others.

In October Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr, ever anti-American and upset with the U.S.-appointed Governing Council, "threatened to cerate a shadow government in opposition" (Chicago Tribune, 10/17).

President Bush's major speech of November 6, 2003 was at attempt to broaden the goals of the war.  "Iraqi democracy will succeed," he pledged.  If not, terrorists, "will be emboldened." See a complete transcript of the President's speech.

On November 15 came a major change, as Bremer was flown back to Washington for consultation.  Powell announced that the IGC would gain more power before elections were held.  The plans were to "speed up the transfer of sovereignty to a provisional government selected by delegates chosen in town hall meetings" (Chicago Tribune, 11/15).

This transition government, in place by May 2004, would allow the U.S. occupation to be replaced by "military presence."  The provisional government would oversee writing a constitution and convening elections in 2005.  The New York Times describes the new agreement as giving Iraqis control "over their own wealth and political affairs" while allowing troops to assure stability, according to U.S. officials.  Over the next month, this transition date transitioned to "by July 1."  Shiite leaders were upset over the plans for a lack of direct elections.

Caucuses would operate in 18 Iraqi provinces to choose delegates to an Interim National Assembly (INA)  by May 31 and be in place while a permanent Constitution is written. The INA would appoint the interim government.  

In December 2003 we first learned of an attack on Bremer's convoy weeks early.  He assumed he was not specifically targeted because the December 6 meeting he was going to was not scheduled.  No one was hurt in the U.S. convoy.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16371-2003Dec19.html

In January 2004 the U.S. sought help from the UN to put through this plan.  "The long chill between the Bush Administration and the UN over Iraq appears to have warmed considerably," opened the lead New York Times editor of Jan. 16, "Hints of a New Harmony on Iraq."  The paper advises, "Every effort should be made to ensure the broadest possible democratic involvement.  that would keep faith with America's promises of Iraqi democracy and make it more likely that new authorities will be accepted as legitimate." Kofi Annan sent a team to Iraq in early February to help with elections.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10295-2004Feb3?language=printer

The Post's David Ignatius commented on "Bremer's UN Lifeline" and the irony that Bremer was asking the UN, "in effect, to provide political legitimacy for this plan to delay elections until after the planned July 1 handover of sovereignty to Iraq.  Bremer's problem is that America's indispensable ally in Iraq--the Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani--isn't budging in his demand that election precede the handover of sovereignty. In part it's a powergrab by Sistani who knows these elections will lock in the power of Iraq' Shiite majority.  Bremer wants Annan to send a fact-finding team to Iraq to confirm that quick elections are unfeasible.  Annan has already sent a letter advising against a quick poll...So things have come full circle Iraq;  After bypassing the UN on its rush into Iraq, the Bush administration now realizes that it needs Anna's help in getting out." Bremer knows from polls that 57 percent of Iraq would feel "less safe if American troops pulled out tomorrow.  In Baghdad, that figure is 65 percent."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21418-2004Jan15?language=printer

In late December, Bremer spoke of the political transition, with the first steps planned for January of 2004.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21875-2003Dec22?language=printer

However, that week the Post reported the "wide-ranging political plans are in retreat" as attacks on U.S. have escalated.  Also dropped is the earlier demand that Iraq's write a Constitution before a transfer of sovereignty.  In September, Bremer had warned that electing a government without a constitution "'invites confusion and eventual abuse.'"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35053-2003Dec27?language=printer

Further friction came in mid-January with Kurdish demands to return their autonomy gained in the past few years.  Bremer urged them to back down. 

Among those upset with the sped up, indirect elections included the most powerful Shiite in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani.  The Grand Ayatollah complained in late November about the need for direct elections. Shiites are the majority of Iraq, but long excluded from political power. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21909-2003Nov29.html Sistani has his own web site. http://www.sistani.org/html/eng/

This disagreement between Bremer and Sistani continued into 2004.  In mid-January Sistani discussed the agreement for American-led forces to stay in Iraq after political power is turned over to Iraqis by June 30.   He demanded that those forces be approved by directly elected representatives (NYTimes, 1/13/04). 

Another powerful Shiite cleric, Sadr, is detailed in "Americans Being Killed."

By January 2004 Shiite protests numbered 30,000, calling for direct elections.  That month Sistani hinted he might accept a UN-brokered plan.  Shiite demonstrators demanding jobs and services had "thrown stones and homemade explosives at British and European troops in three cities" (WashPost, "U.S. Rebuffs Cleric on Iraqi Vote Plan", 1/13/).  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11368-2004Jan12?language=printer

Sistani was born in Iran and moved to the Shiite holy city of Najaf to study theology in the 1950s.  

Some Iraqis express more concern with crime and insecurity than with elections. Then 100,000 protested in Baghdad, (NYTimes, 1/21/04).  One Shiite cleric proclaimed, "We do not want to resort to violence, but if it reaches a stalemate, then the coalition will face the wrath of the Iraqi people" (Wash Post, 1/16/04). After the Bremer-Annan meeting of January, Sistani called for a temporary halt of demonstrations.  As the Tribune summarized in February, 2005:  "It was al-Sistani who forced...Bremer to shelve plans to defer elections until after a constitution had been written."

In another potential promising sign hopes for elections in 2005, veteran Iraqi diplomat from pre-Hussein years, Adnan Pachachi (see "If Not Hussein" FAQ section) floated an idea. When he was in the U.S. for Bush's State of the Union speech, his compromise involves an "expanded version of handpicked IGC." gaining power and preparing for direct elections (NYTimes, 1/23/04, front page)

Giving some perspective to Democracy and elections was "Electing Chaos", op-ed in the January 18 Post.  Jennifer Bremer (no relation to Paul)  opens, "The Bush administration's timeline for political transition in Iraq, announced only in November, is already in deep trouble.  Although the first of its five milestones--a law defining how to choose constitutional convention delegates--is still nearly tow months away, even administration leaders are sounding doubtful. Will elections lead to a political outcome that is peaceful, democratic and stable, or is it possible the post-election period will find us facing chaos, even civil war?  There are two election scenarios that could lead to disastrous outcomes for the Iraqis and ourselves:  1.  the Shiites win and 2.  the Shiites lose."  

The op-ed also looks at the desires of politically organized Kurds, the disorganized Shiites, and concludes:  "Given the facts in Iraq, it would be foolish to think that free and fair elections will lead straight to a stable government or put U.S. troops on the home stretch toward graceful withdrawal.  Unless and until an Iraqi military is rebuilt with the will and the capacity to hold the country together, U.S. troops may find themselves the only force standing between the Iraqi people and a descent into chaos for a long time to come."  Jennifer Bremer directs the Washington Center of the University of North Carolina's Kennan Institute of Private Enterprise. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A23714-2004Jan16?language=printer

What are the other reasons to avoid a direct election?  The Bush administration could be concerned that if the 60% majority Shiite took over, they might look to Shiite Iran for guidance or inspiration.  Secondly, the administration may not want to admit that they can not provide the security of the millions of voters lined up at the polls.  Either way, July 1 will not bring a sharp reduction in American troops.

The New York Times editorial of January 21, includes: "To much of the world, and not doubt to many Iraqis, that presents a great irony:  The world's model for democracy wants to stall elections in a county it liberated from tyranny."  The Times advised that the U.S. "has not choice but to court al-Sistani, with the assistance, it is hoped of the UN.  And there just may be a way to find a meeting of the minds on how to deliver democracy to Iraq"  ("The Ayatollah and Iraq', 1/21/04). 

The Times followed with "A Growing UN Role in Iraq" (2/22/04):  "President Bush may now better understand why his father, at the end of the first Persian Gulf war, wisely decide not to order victorious American troops to go on to Baghdad.  All the fears that persuaded the first Bush administration to exercise restraint are coming back to haunt the current American occupation...Creating stable and legitimate Iraqi political institutions from scratch is turning out to be a far more daunting, and thankless, task than the Bush administration ever acknowledge  The best--perhaps the only--chance for success depends on the UN.  Fortunately, the White House is finally showing some signs of reconciling itself to reality. It is now painfully clear that Washington gave little serious forethought to how a democratic Iraqi government could be nurtured."  

The paper further expressed concern that the June 30 deadline looks dubious and peacekeeping troops are not forthcoming from populous countries like India, Pakistan, and France.  Though Annan has concluded that elections cannot take place before June 30, "The core issue...remains unsolved.  Handing power to an unelected government could exacerbate internal tensions in Iraq and discourage other nations from recognizing the new Iraqi authorities as legitimate."  While pleased that the U.S. has finally turned to the UN, they concluded, "Obviously it would have been better not to have rushed into invading and occupying Iraq on the basis of flawed intelligence and against the advice of major allies.  But that is now history.  The task now is to make the best of the current reality." 

For a detailed and illustrative look important figures in post-war Iraq, including Bremer, Garner, Chalabi, Hakim, and others, see The Guardian special 

Many Reconstruction projects were put on hold in April with the severe increase in violence.  A big part of this problem could be incomplete electric work as the hot summer months approach.

In terms of media freedom in U.S. occupied Iraq, The Guardian reports (1/8/04) that the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) was told to drop Koran readings.  One reason al-Jazeera was banned in September was that the opposition to the occupation was known as "resistance."  Al-Jazeera by satellite is more popular than the IMN. 

In late March the U.S. closed an Iraqi  newspaper, one the approximately 200, for inciting violence.  Thousands of Iraqis protested, especially Shiite followers of cleric Moqtada Sadr. The New York Times describes the closing as illustrating "the quandary Americans faced in trying to strike a balance between their two main goals--encouraging democracy while maintaining stability."  A few days late Sadr called for his followers to "strike back" at Americans.  For more on Sadr and the violence of April 2004, see "Americans Being Killed".

In February it became increasingly apparent that the November 15 plan by the U.S. for caucuses was confusing, unappealing to Sistani, not popular with the Iraqi Governing Council that had approved it, an even not considered a good option by the UN.  Sistani gave some ground on elections before June 30, but demanded a UN resolution to allow for elections before the end of 2004. So, to whom would to U.S. hand over power on June 30?  What kind of temporary government would it be?

Elections before June 30, deemed unworkable by the U.S., were also seen as not feasible by a special UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, (at left) Kofi Annan announced in mid-February.  One option was to expand the 25-member, U.S. appointed IGC.  Another was to hold a large council, like that in Afghanistan a few months earlier.  The UN and U.S. seemed to be waiting for the other to act first.

As Jim Hoagland commented in the Washington Post, 2/22/04) neither Bremer nor Annan could say "what kind of caretaker government would take charge then or guess at how it would be chosen.  That is a damaging admission this late in the game." He concludes, "Now the entire council is being regularly denounced as feckless and corrupt by anonymous State Department and other U.S. officials...One intended effect of this is to 'establish' that whatever goes wrong in Iraq is the fault of the Iraqis, not the brilliant minds in Washington who were just trying to help."  

In late February Bremer was predicting elections between February and May, 2005. 

The deadline for an interim constitution was only about one week delayed, for around 4:00 a.m. on March 1 the IGC agreed to a constitution protecting freedom of speech, press,  and assembly, among its 63 articles.  Free exercise of religion was also guaranteed though laws would be based on the concepts of Islam; Islam would be a source of legislation. Overall, the document, if adhered to, would be the most progressive in the Arab world. The country would be led by one President and representation would not be based on ethnicity or religion. A "goal" of 25% of the seats in the provisional legislature would be set aside for women. Nationwide elections will be held no later than January 2005 where voters will choose a national assembly, which will then choose a president and two deputies.  Finally, these three will select a prime minister. 

The document was to be signed in a ceremony on March 3 and called the Transitional Administrative Law. After a delay and concern from Shiite groups, the TAL was signed on March 8. It does not specify what type of transitional  government Iraq will have after the July 1 occupation. A summary of the Constitution was posted by the Washington Post

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17535-2004Feb29?language=printer
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39476-2004Mar8.html
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A39701-2004Mar8?language=printer

The Washington Post dedicated their first Iraq editorial in five days to the prospects of Democracy in Iraq, "Countdown in Iraq." (3/30/04). 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A34724-2004Mar29?language=printer

In mid-April, the deadliest month for Americans, the New York Times editorial tried to be optimistic.  "At Last, a Good Development" (4/17/04) applauded the President's use of the UN to foster moves toward democracy.  Noting that ending current uprisings was a critical first step, the paper concluded, "Those who have been loudly demanding a strong UN role, including this page, must acknowledge that simply adding the UN to the mix at this late date is no cure...The alternatives--abandoning Iraq to chaos or maintaining an outright American occupation until a stable Iraqi government can somehow be created--are unacceptable."

With the increased violence of late March and April 2004, in Fallujah and other southern cities, two IGC members suspended their membership in the Council.. One labeled the U.S. offensive on Fallujah, which followed the killing/mutilation of the four U.S. contractors as "mass punishment" on the people of Fallujah.  "It is not right to pu8nish all the people of Falluja and we consider these operation by the American to be unacceptable and illegal."  Reports in mid-April were that 700 Iraqis had died in about two weeks of fighting.  Also see "Americans Being Killed" section.

For a detailed and illustrative look important figures in post-war Iraq, include Bremer, Garner, Chalabi, Hakim, and others, see The Guardian special and the Washington Post special, "Who is Governing Iraq."

Post-occupation plans for July 2004 include U.S. forces to be led by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez. In mid-April, a few days after the President's prime time press conference, we learned that the UN had suggested a plan.  

UN Envoy Brahimi suggests eliminating the Iraqi Governing Council at the official end of occupation.  Though some of the IGC members are not pleased by this, President Bush and others in the administration were quick to commend the work of the UN.  Is was not immediately clear what group would replace the IGC, though they would likely be appointed by the UN after consultation with the U.S. An assembly is in the works for sometime before January 2005. Brahimi's tentative plan was to have a caretaker government of a prime minister, president, and two vice president.  My guess is that the logic behind having four leaders is a four way split in the population, with less than 20% Shiite and Kurd, and about 60% Shiite.  Look for two of the four positions to be held by Shiites. Tony Blair is pushing for another UN resolution.  

In April, in the midst of the deadliest month for American and 10 weeks from the turnover, deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz admitted that the turnover of sovereignty was still mean the U.S. military was free to operate independently. The Chicago Tribune reported that the new Iraqi government could not enact new laws.

Europeans and UN diplomats predicted that the UN would not go along with these conditions.  At one point the State Department called the turnover "limited sovereignty." 

For weeks the State Department and Pentagon assured us that U.S. troops would stay in Iraq through at least 2005.  However, Colin Powell changed tactics when he said that if the new government on July 1 asked all U.S. troops to leave, they would leave. 

Bremer tacitly admitted what critics label a huge mistake when he announced the hiring of former Baathists.  Even 14,000 schoolteachers had been fired simply for being members of the party. They can get their jobs back if they prove they were members in name only. As Iraqis trained by the U.S. did not perform well in police and security roles in April, Gen. Abizaid also announced he was reaching out to former senior Iraqi army officers, all of whom had been fired a year earlier. Critics had long sought these shifts.

Would the June 30 deadline be extended?  Some Republicans began to join some Democrats in suggesting that the President be more flexible on the date to officially end the U.S. occupation.  The President focuses on elections for an Assembly by January 2005.  However, we learned in early May that those elections would have to be postponed unless security improved.  Said the UN official, "We will not participate in any Mickey Mouse elections."

When the official turnover of power took place in the summer of 2004, Bremer left the headlines.

After Bremer leaves power on June 30 2004, John Negroponte will take over as U.S. Ambassador.  Negroponte has years of diplomatic experience at the UN, Vietnam, and Honduras. Details on Negroponte's background and experience are in the Post.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A25448-2004Apr19?language=printer

Bremer in April  made a rare television appearance in Iraq, warning of the consequences of the increased violence. "Iraq faces a choice," declared the leader with only 8 weeks left in power." If Iraqis sought stability and democracy, that would not succeed unless ordinary Iraqis help.  "If you do not defend your beloved country, it will not be saved."  Was Bremer suggesting that if the process of "Iraqification" failed the fault would not be that of the Americans?

The new Iraqi flag even became controversial in April when the flag approved by the Iraqi Governing Council was deemed unfit by some Iraqis.  Below, the old flag is on the left, the new one on the right. Some Iraqis were upset that the flag was the only Middle East flag to have the color blue, with the exception of Israel.  For others it was "the last straw."
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines04/0428-03.htm

We learned on Monday morning (May 17) that the leader of the Iraqi Governing Council was killed in another suicide bombing.  This was the second member of the Council to be killed in the past year.

In late May, longtime Pentagon favorite Chalabi's offices were raided by U.S. and Iraqi forces.  Clearly, he has fallen out of favor with the administration and a favorite of the Pentagon for years.  Chalabi denies the charges of giving secrets to Iranians.  Chalabi was thought to be a leading candidate for future leader of Iraq. See pre-war FAQ section on Iraq's future leaders.

In mid-August the news for Chalabi was even worse.  He was issued an arrest warrant for fraud and counterfeiting.  At the same time his nephew, in charge of Saddam and other trials, was to be arrested as a murder suspect. Chalabi called the charges false and politically motivated.  He returned to Iraq to defend himself.   During the first week of September, Chalabi survived an assassination attempt.

On the diplomatic front at the UN, just prior to the President's May prime time speech, the US/UK resolution was presented to the UN.  It was clear that the resolution would not pass without at least some changes. By early June to US/UK resolution had been revised, with such issues of disagreement being:
1.  How long will U.S. troops stay in Iraq?
2.  Who will control Iraqi troops and security forces?

Also on Monday, May 24, the President delivered a prime-time speech on the political future of Iraq.  He emphasized the positive. Speaking at the Army War College, he reminded Americans that on June 30 the new sovereign Iraqi government would be led by four people:  President, Prime Minister, and two Vice-Presidents.

I predicted a few weeks before this speech, that of the four, there would be two Shiites, one Sunni, and one Kurd.  After reiterating that Iraq is "the central front on the war on terror", the President emphasized five main steps toward Democracy and sought to reassure the nation.  Some of the steps included education government, commerce and exercise of personal freedom.  

Washington Post analysis included the editorial "Mr. Bush's Challenge" and a Robin Wright/Mike Allen piece on unanswered questions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A53312-2004May24?language=printer

The New York Times editorial criticized the President's May 2004 speech and offered a few suggestions.  The President spoke "after nearly 14 months of policy failures, one of them acknowledged by the president, which have left Iraq increasingly violent and drained Washington's credibility with the Iraqi people and the international community...His 'five steps' toward Iraqi independence were merely a recitation of the tasks ahead."  Anticipated weekly speeches from the President leading up to June 30, the Times suggests ways to "achieve a clean break that is so essential."  A "good start" would be to convene a summit meeting "to create a multinational group to oversee the transition."  The paper concludes its May 25 lead editorial, "The president still has five speeches left to deliver before June 30. We hope he will use them to come up with a more specific plan, to stop listing the things we already knew needed to be done and explain to us how he intends to do them.  An acknowledgment of past mistakes would be nice."

Reaction to the President's speech also included Sen. Joseph Biden, who called it "a rationale but no strategy." 

In late May, 2004 word started to leak out as to who the four major leaders would be. The Prime Minister was rumored to be a nuclear scientist imprisoned for years at Abu Ghraib for refusing to continue his nuclear work under Saddam. A few days later he expressed a lack of interest perhaps because the Bush administration was not aware that he had been chosen. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64453-2004May28?language=printer

As the story of the appointments played out, it became clear that there were tense behind the scenes discussions and pressures.  Bush and Bremer were sometimes at odds with Brahimi.  Brahimi called Bremer "the dictator of Iraq." Brahimi was sometimes at odds with the IGC.  Any new appointee would not want to be seen as a puppet as the U.S. The New York Times reported On June 2  that "it has become clear that...Brahimi played a secondary role in setting up the new government."  The IGC and U.S. were the primary players.

On May 28, 2004 the new Interim Prime Minister became Ayad Allawi, a Shiite with support and funding from the CIA.  Brahimi's appointment of him was approved by the U.S. appointed Iraqi Governing Council. Alawi, a member of the IGC,  spent most of the last 30 years in exile after breaking with Saddam and his Baath party. With the next round of elections scheduled for no later than January 2005, Alawi could conceivably be in office just 8 months. For more on Alawi, see pre-war FAQ,. "If Not Hussein"  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A62691-2004May28?language=printer

Newly appointed Alawi said, "Like any country, we don't want to continue to be under occupation.  But at the same time, we need the support of the multinational forces to defeat the enemies of Iraq."  These new leaders spoke of the top priority of improving security but also wanted to focus on jobs and sewage. Insurgents directly threatened to kill Alawi.

There was similar delay, controversy, and compromise over the position of President. Adnan Pachachi declined the offer, as he was favored more by the U.S. than by the IGC.  Pachachi was the Iraqi Foreign Minister way back in 1968.  For more on Pachachi, see "If Not Hussein" pre-war FAQ. On June 1 Sheik Ghazi Yawar was named the Interim President of Iraq. The President (at right) is more of a figurehead while the Prime Minister will hold more power.

Shiek Yawar was born in Mosul in 1958, the year the monarchy fell in a coup of cycles of violence and instability.  He moved to Saudi Arabia before returning to become part of the U.S. appointed Iraqi Governing Council. Yawar vows to seek full sovereignty for Iraq. 

A look at Alawi, Yawar and other new leaders is in the Washington Post. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/iraq_govt_members.html

In addition to the four main leaders, two Shiite, one Sunni, and one Kurd (as predicted) there will be 33 ministers.  The ministers include an Assyrian and Turkmen.  In fact, the Iraqi Governing Council officially abolished itself on June 1, 2004. 

President Bush was pleased with the new government, saying "A free Iraq in the heart of the Middle East is going to be a gamechanger."  He called the new leaders a major step toward stability and democracy, but he expected continued violence. 

Reaction from The Chicago Tribune (6/2/04) was cautiously optimistic.  The lead editorial pointed out that the "hand-wringing" and "second guessing" of Iraq's political future "proved to be wasted energy....Forming a balanced interim government is an impressive and encouraging sign that Iraq is posed to begin tending its own affairs again.  Now the U.S. must let it do so, even if it means Iraq's policy clash with U.S. interests.  No, make that especially if those policies clash."  The piece concludes, "Iraq is a free country, soon to be governed by its own people.  Despite the continued violence, that's reason for optimism."  

The New York Times of the same day was predictably less optimistic than the Tribune.  Focusing on the selection process, the editorial expressed that "the ability of the [IGC] to essentially seize control of the selections left Mr. Brahimi looking ineffective.  That does not bode will for the UN's ability to help in the next phase, the organization of the elections.  The American proconsul...Bremer...gave the impression of a man reluctant to part with nay of the power he has wielded for most of the past. year."  This piece concludes, "The end of the Governing Council conclude a chapter of unpopular, ineffectual governance that failed to stem a growing insurgency and did little to lay the groundwork for a workable democracy.  Although the new govern body looks uncomfortably like the old one with anew name and a few added powers, it must be helped to do better."

University of Chicago Professor Roger B. Myerson linked Democracy to prison horrors.  "After all our promises to being democracy to Iraq, our refusal to allow any free democracy during our occupation period may be as obscenely un-American as the Abu Ghraib horrors."

Also see CNN's "The New Iraq" and see many other suggested links

The planned timetable from June 30, 2004  to 2006 looks like this:
--July 2005:  A National Council of 100 members to be selected in a conference of at least 1000 Iraqis. The Council can veto orders or decrees from the Prime Minister with a 2/3 vote.
--January 2005:  Elections for a national assembly to draw up a new constitution
--January 2006:  Direct national elections 

The conference of 1000 was delayed once, and pushed back to August.  Safety seemed to be the primary concern. As it turns out, U.S. appointed interim leaders took over sovereignty a few days before the June 30 date.  Pundits and citizens disagree to what extent Iraq is "free" and "sovereign."  

Under the tightest of security, the conference did indeed begin in mid-August with the goal of establishing the framework for a National Assembly.  Ongoing violence in Najaf made the conference controversial. The Chicago Tribune editorial emphasized that "this was the first national gathering in Iraq's history at which all were free to speak their minds...So while world attention focused on Najaf--armed conflict is more captivating than nascent democracy--the conference...may say more about the future of Iraq." (8/17/04, "Free to speak their minds"). This new 100 seat assembly will act as a parliament, overseeing the Allawi government until January 2005 elections. 19 spots were reserved for members of the former Governing Council set up during the U.S. occupation. 

This Interim National Council met for the first time in early September, hoping it would be a first step toward democracy.

After the turnover, one question being asked is, "What is success?" Does success mean keeping all U.S. troops in Iraq until they have formed a true Democracy?   Does it mean withdrawing troops as the country becomes more stable?  How does the U.S. assure all the terrorists/insurgents are out of Iraq?  

To help answer this question, The National Intelligence Council completed their latest National Intelligence Estimate in July.  Ordered by outgoing CIA chief Tenet, and approved by the current chief, the existence of the NIE was not made public until September 16.  Their best guess "shows pessimism on Iraq's future", described by the top New York Times headline that morning. It was the first NIE report on Iraq since the infamous report of October 2002, just before Congress voted for war.  The Times reports that the estimate "stands in contrast to recent statements by Bush administration officials" and these conclusions were reached in July before the recent "worsening of the security situation in Iraq."  Though the Presidential spokesman was upset with the continued negative view some people have, administrative critic Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) responded:  "The president has frequently described Iraq as, quote, 'the central front of the war on terror.'  Well by that definition success in Iraq is a key standard by which to measure the war on terror.  And by that measure, I think the war on terror in trouble."

In August 2004 Allawi began threatened to institute martial law, he brought back the death penalty, and he closed the popular Arab TV station, Al Jazeera.  Iraqi officials claimed that the TV coverage overemphasized the nearly daily kidnappings and could be encouraging more kidnappings. 

September violence led to greater hints that the January 2005 elections would either be limited or delayed.  Unless a huge military offensive somehow takes control of Fallujah, Ramadi, and other towns, there will be no security in these areas. 

Interim Prime Minister Allawi visited the U.S. in late September, meeting with President Bush and speaking to Congress.  He vowed that January elections would not be delayed

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45694-2004Sep23.html
The rosy outlook of Bush and Allawi contrasted with the bleak portrait by Kerry and others. Allawi told Congress,, "[Iraq is ] emerging finally from dark ages of violence, aggression, corruption, and greed." (NYTimes front page, 9/24/04).   Rumsfeld suggested for the first time that since "nothing is perfect in life" elections would take place even if up to 25% of the country was not included.  

The link between the insurgency and the election plans became more clear in the fall of 2004.  These elections will choose a 275-member national assembly.  Then, the assembly will, according to the Washington Post, "select a new government to replace the current, appointed leadership and oversee the writing of a new constitution.  Final elections are planned for the end of 2005.

With elections scheduled for no later than the end of January of 2005, throughout September and early October, it was clear that many towns and cities in the Sunni region would not be safe enough to take part in elections.  Then, the U.S. administration announced  on October 11 that there would be a delay in efforts to initiate offensives against insurgent-controlled areas.

With just two weeks to go before the U.S. election, word came that the UN had only 35 officials in Iraq, due to deteriorating security.  The UN originally estimated it would need at least 270 UN advisers to oversee credible elections.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43378-2004Oct18?language=printer

After U.S. elections, limits on Assembly candidates begun to surface  The requirements to run are more strict than in the U.S. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A29081-2004Nov5?language=printer

Prime Minister Allawi's relatives were kidnapped and threatened with decapitation.  The group demanded a November end to the U.S. Fallujah offensive and demanded a return of Iraqi prisoners.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38793-2004Nov10.html

Sunday January 30 was the date set for elections.  Allawi in late November considered talking to opponents to avoid a possible Sunni boycott.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2096-2004Nov21.html

Also in late November the Iraqi foreign minister announced a meeting with insurgents in Jordan to convince them to take part of forthcoming elections.  The meeting was requested by some at the international conference in Egypt. Another potential positive note was the capture in Mosul of Zarqawi assistant Abu Said.

However, just after Thanksgiving, 17 political parties asked to have the elections postponed six months.  Allawi's party was one of the groups.  

Specifically, those calling for a delay were Pachachi's (at left) Movement of Independent Iraqi Democrats, Allawi's Iraqi National Accord, the Sunni-led Iraqi Islamic Party, and the two Kurdish parties, Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Pachachi again called for a delay in mid-January, feeling that the vote will not be legitimate.

Kurds and Sunnis tend to favor a delay, whereas Americans and Shiites, including Ayatollah Sistani, favor no delay. An exception to this is a Shiite leader who wants to be sure that elections are seen as legitimate.  "We are insistent that the right conditions should be created, especially in Sunni areas, because an election without their full participation is not in the interest of the Iraqi people," said Hussein al-Shahristrani.  In mid-December Kurds seemed more likely than Sunnis no participate. 

Calls for delay continued into the new year.  In early January 2005, the Iraqi defense minister wanted voting to be postponed to ensure greater Sunni participation. Hazem Shaalan is concerned, as are some American officials, that if the Sunnis are blocked from voting or boycott the election, the outcome "will not be consider legitimate" (NYTimes, 1/4/05). 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A14424-2004Nov26?language=printer

Allawi criticized those violent Iraqis as trying to start a Civil War.

For Post-Election updates, see"Post-Jan. 30 Politics" FAQ and "Iraqi Politics '06" FAQ

"Don't Postpone Elections", urged the Washington Post on the last day of November. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A20903-2004Nov29?language=printer

President Bush publicly joined the chorus a few days later saying, in no uncertain terms, that there would be no delay in the elections.  Nor was the President keen on the suggestion that the voting be spread over a 2-3 week period. Iraqi officials tended to echo the president's wishes. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27885-2004Dec2?language=printer

In a rare Presidential news conference (12/20) the President focused on the hope for important elections in less than six weeks. "...People that endured decades of oppression are also preparing to choose their own leaders.  Next month Iraqis will go tot the polls and express their will in free elections.

"Preparations are under way for an energetic campaign, and the participation is wide and varied.  More than 80 parties and coalitions have been formed, and more than 7000 candidates have registered for he elections."  In response to a question about Americans lack of confidence in developments in Iraq, the President replied, "The ultimate success in Iraq is for the Iraqis to secure their country....And the strategy is to train Iraqis  so they can fight off the thugs and the killers and the terrorists who want to destroy the progress of a free society."  He added that the opposition are the "enemies of freedom."  

Mid-December violence increased as elections neared.  By the deadline for registration, there were 7700 candidates for the 14 million eligible voters at 9000 polling stations.  New rules guaranteed that 1/4 of those elected to the Assembly (now more often called "Parliament" in the press) would be women.  The plan is also that the 120,000 Iraqi security forces will be in the forefront with American forces "over the horizon" but out of sight.

A new ideas was unofficially floated on Christmas day that would allow Sunnis a certain representation even if turnout was low in Sunni areas.  The next day being a Sunday, the topic came up on the morning TV news shows.  Some Democrat Senators publicly favored the idea.  Just two days later the largest Sunni party announced a boycott of the elections. The party, headed by Mohsen Abdul Hameed (Hamid), is the Iraqi Islamic Party.  It was at first unclear whether they sought a boycott or a six month delay. Interesting election analysis from the Washington Post (12/28/04).  A lopsided election without Sunnis may further alienate Sunnis were the armed insurgency is growing.  

Powell encouraged "all Sunnis and all Sunni leaders to join in this effort, to say no to terrorism, no to murder and yes to democracy."  Voters have not been able to register in some Sunni areas, especially Fallujah and Ramadi.  Responded one academic and Sunni activist, "If there will be an election Jan. 30, it will not be a celebration day as everybody wanted.  It will be a doomsday in Iraq."  Leaflets circulated with the headline "Ultimatum Warning Threat" and vowing that Jihadist battalions will kill election organizers, blow up poling stations, and "liquidate within 48 hours" anyone who votes..

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28323-2004Dec27?language=printer

That day an alleged bin Laden tape urged all Iraqis to boycott the elections. The tape declared, "In the balance of Islam, this constitution is infidel and therefore everyone who participates in this election will be consider infidels."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28323-2004Dec27?language=printer
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A29992-2004Dec27?language=printer

For the first time since 9/11, President Bush responded in details to a bin Laden statement.  "His vision of the world is where people don't participate in democracy...where there is no freedom of expression, freedom of religion and/or freedom of conscience.  And that vision stands in stark contrast to the vision of, by far, the vast majority of Iraqis...So the stakes are clear in this upcoming election...It's the difference between the ability for individuals to express themselves and the willingness of an individual to try and impose his dark vision on the world, on the people of Iraq and elsewhere.  And it's very important that these elections proceed."

What would lead to a good turnout?  What would be considered a good turnout?  Even if voting is safe, thousands have likely already decided that it is not safe to stand in line to vote.  Would 50% be a good turnout?  What is only 25% of Sunnis vote?  How will Sunnis react to their future lack of representation?

If Shiites, with about 60% of the population, gain a majority in the Assembly, could they lean toward Iran and consider establishing an Islamic state?  In mid-January, Allawi admitted what other Iraqis and Americans had been saying for weeks, that four provinces were not ready for elections.  Unfortunately, these provinces included about half of the total population of Iraq.

We also learned that the elections will have a unique international flavor.  Chicago will be one for five cities in the U.S. where Iraqi nationals can vote.  The other cities are LA, Detroit, Nashville, and Washington.  Those illegible will include nationalized US citizens and the US-born children or Iraqi citizens.  Estimates are that this would include nearly 250,000 U.S. residents.  Some Iraqis are complaining that they do not live near one of these five US cities. Yet, as registration opened, the front page New York Times story reported that some drove hundreds of miles. For example, NPR reported of a family driving 12 hours to register.  Another family flew from Seattle to LA to register and then flew back a week later to vote.  

The US will be one of at least 11 countries were expatiates will vote. Around the world, about 1/4 of Iraqis abroad registered to vote, as it turned out.  In a strange twist on "international flavor"  allegations were put forth in mid-January that one million Iranians had crossed the border illegally to vote in the elections. Actual voters outside Iraq were led by Iran with over 50,000 voters, followed by Sweden, Britain Germany and the U.S., all over 20,000.  Those others over 10,000 voters included Jordan, Netherlands, Syria, Denmark, UAE, Australia, and Canada.

As the insurgent violence seems to have an effect on the elections, see "Why are Americans and Iraqis being killed?" FAQ.

For Post-Election updates, see"Post-Jan. 30 Politics" FAQ and "Iraqi Politics '06" FAQ

Who are the leading candidates?  In addition to Allawi, other top contenders would be interim vice President Ibrahim al-Jaafari(at left) and Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.  His party, the largest in Iraq,  was founded in Iran, where he spent nearly 25 years in exile.  The party has the blessing of Iraq's most powerful and respected Shiite, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The United Iraqi Alliance is the umbrella group which support Hakim. This group was the pre-election likely winner.

Hakim's headquarters was attacked on December 27, though he was unharmed.  A car bomber set off a huge explosion, killing 9 and wounding 67.  In the weeks before the scheduled election, Hakim enjoyed Iraqis, especially Sunnis, to take part. "We have rejected the idea of a sectarian regime, and we believe that Iraq is for all Iraqis. 

The Chicago Tribune reported that the leading candidates for Prime Minister were Allawi, al-Hakim, Abdel Abdul Mahdi (SCIRI,  finance minister) and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, leader of Dawa and current Vice President.  All four of these men are Shiite. 

Leading candidates for President were deemed to be Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar, interim President, Pachachi, and two Kurdish leaders, Talabani, and Barzani. For details on many of these men, see the pre-war FAQ, "If Not Hussein."

Though no longer a favorite of the Pentagon, Ahmad Chalabi continued to be active in late 2004.  In the Wall Street Journal his op-ed piece was "The Future Iraq Deserves" (12/12/04).  He wrote, "doubt and distrust set in when liberation became occupation. The momentum of political freedom cannot be reversed."  A permanent constitution "is the pillar to uphold democracy." Reports one week before the election was that Chalabi was to be arrested for defaming the defense minister for allegedly shifting $500 million in funds.

An end of year Tribune op-ed came from an Iraqi who snuck out the country in 1983.  "An immigrants' walk to freedom" (12/29/04) emphasizes this Assyrian Christians hopes of the elections which he hopes will be "an important way station on Iraq's journey from being a land ruled by gangsters to being a democracy respected by its own people and the world.  We see terrorist viciously trying to disrupt the process, murdering both Iraqis and American soldiers.  Beheadings, bombings and assassinations, will continue, but millions of Iraqis are willing to risk death in order to cast a ballot."  He also points out polls which show that nearly 2/3 have consistently expected life to improve.

On the last day of 2004 Al Jazeera reported, according to the AP/Tribune that 700 election workers in Mosul had resigned. They also confirmed the withdrawal of the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni coalition. 10 days later the entire 13-member election board of Anbar province resigned, in another significant blow to the coming elections.  The province includes Fallujah and Ramadi.  The head of the commission explained that it was "impossible to hold elections" and that attacks have already prevented voter registration.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A60832-2005Jan9?language=printer

Threats continued right up until election day.  Zarqawi called for the death of Shiites and the death of anyone who dares to vote. Specifically, leafletters tossed out this message:  "This is a final warning to all of those who plan to participate...We vow to wash the streets of Baghdad with voters' blood."  Others warned voters to stay 500 yards from all polling station.  "To those of you who think you can vote and then run away, we will shadow you and catch you, and we will cut off your heads and the heads of your children."

In the week before the election, a poll showed that 80% of Iraqis were planning to vote.  This was surely be seen as a good sign. There were about 14 million eligible voters

What might post-election Iraq look like?  Bush Sr. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft helped begin this debate three week before the Jan. 30 elections.  He suggested that the UN take over most security from the US and predicted "an incipient civil war."  President Jimmy Carter's NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski echoed these concerns:  "I do not think we can stay in Iraq in the fashion we're in now.  If it cannot be changed drastically, it should be terminated.  The most optimistic outcome, he predicted is a Shiite-dominated theocracy, "not what we would normally call a democracy."  The view of an entire panel of experts is summarized.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A54680-2005Jan6?language=printer

For Post-Election updates, see"Post-Jan. 30 Politics" NEW FAQ) 

Experts on the Newshour felt the elections were "a proving ground for two versions of Islam," one which believed in democracy and one supported by al Qaeda.

In President Bush's second inaugural speech, he did not mention Iraq by name but spoke of his overriding goal of spreading freedom and liberty throughout the world.  His speech included, "The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world...the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."

One reaction to the President's speech came from the Chicago Tribune editorial.  One of their favorite quotes was, "'American will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling.  Our goals instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.'" 

Another reaction, from the VP of the Council on Foreign Relations, James Lindsay (served on Clinton's NSA), highlights that the language was needed to explain the Iraq War.  "Much of what the president said...is what he's been saying...since about the time that it turned out that there were not WMD found ...What's different about the inaugural address is that visibility of the moment, not the content of what the president said."

Illinois Senator Dick Durbin (D) wondered "what kind of elections they will be if candidates names can't be published, if polling places can't be designated and when few Sunni Muslims are able to participate."

Two Republican Senators (Alexander and Hagel) felt that the administration needed to "present a clear plan for achieving its goals...making a withdrawal possible" (NYTimes).

The lead New York Times editorial, on the eve of the elections stressed on the importance of focusing "on the hope that a reasonably successful election can be a large first step toward a self-governing and stable Iraq that can survive without huge numbers of American troops."

On the eve of the potentially historic elections, insurgents vowed death to anyone who voted and President Bush urged that elections "will change the world."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A44099-2005Jan28?language=printer

At his press conference a few days before the election, the President cited as "discouraging" the news of the deadliest day for American (37 dead).  Wanting to focus on "long term objectives" he emphasized "spreading freedom."  The elections were called "the first step in a long process...Terrorists have declared war on Democracy", he added, referring to Zarqawi's recent statements.  Freedom scares the terrorists and Zarqawi hates democracy.  He urged Iraqis to vote to "defy the terrorists"  and to be "brave...Freedom brings peace....Our noble goal is to free people in the name of peace."  The President also added, "Our children and grandchildren will benefit from a free Iraq."  He spoke of our mission being to defend Iraqi from terrorism and asked, "Do we have the will to stand with Iraqis?"  

An interesting postscript on this period involving Bremer was the subject of an August 2007 Times op-ed by Roger Cohen. Using Powell and former ambassador Khalilzad as sources he tells of a critical decision of May 6, 2003. That's the day that Khalilzad expected Bush to announce his return to Iraq, writes Cohen, "to convene a grand assembly--something like an Afghanistan loya jirga--that would fast-forward a provisional Iraqi government." Instead came the surprise appointment of Bremer to head the CPA. Recalls Khalilzad, "We were just playing with a few final words. Then the game plan suddenly changed: we would run the country ourselves..Powell and Condi were incredulous. Powell called me and asked: 'What happened?' And I said, 'You're Secretary of State and you're asking me what happened!'" Powell recalled that there was "no discussion, no debate, things changed. I was stunned." Bremer had come to Bush to "put it plainly...You can't have tow presidential envoys running around Iraq." Bremer still believes this decision was correct. But Powell feels that it was a mistake "not to move more rapidly to putting an Iraqi face on it." Careful reading of this site will recall that Shiites had wanted elections sooner, but Bremer and the CPA held out.

Another postscript to the first year of the war came from Washington Post columnist and author Rajiv Chandrasekeran, who wrote Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone. The New York Times deemed it one of the best 10 books of 2006. The author was interview on WBEZ's Worldview on December 10. Chandrasekeran discusses the first year of the war, when buggling mistakes were made. Topics include reconstruction, looting, Saddam's palace, universities, taxes, administration loyalists, health care, capitalsim, and more. Also see "Who Lost Iraq?" FAQ.

For Post-Election updates, see"Post-Jan. 30 Politics" FAQ and "Iraqi Politics '06" FAQ