What are the options for the U.S. in 2003-present?
Also see "When might US Troops come home?" FAQ and
US-Politics 2005 FAQ

The U.S. could speed up the training of Iraqis, try to bring in the UN or other foreign troops or peacekeepers, withdraw troops, or push for elections in 2004. President Bush is urging Americans to "stay the course" to make us safer and make Iraq more secure. One detailed writing is suggested by the Friends Council on National Legislation (FCNL), called "Finding a Way Out of the Quagmire." 

In a trip to Iraq over Thanksgiving 2003, Senator Hillary Clinton again urges asking the UN for more support toward Iraqi self-governing.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A24865-2003Dec1?language=printer

After the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 14, 2003 polls showed Americans expected a continued struggle.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A540-2003Dec15.html

In a retrospective of where we stand on Iraq, the first Washington Post editorial of the year, was "A New Year in Iraq."  It details numerous option for the U.S. and opens, "The people of Iraq enter the new year better off than they were 12 months ago.  The horrific regime of Saddam Hussein is gone, the systematic oppression over; free speech and political activity are everywhere and material conditions are improving...Some of these gains, however, are terrible fragile...The plans for security appear similarly problematic."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52729-2004Jan3.html

At his April 2004 news conference, President Bush spoke of staying the course and not cutting and running.  One response came from Anthony Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies):  We may not be able to "stay the course."

British journalist John Pilger, focusing on civilians casualties of April, suggests that we "Get Out Now."
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0416-10.htm

See more at "US Troops Home?"

The September 26 edition of  the New York Times Magazine was the first mainstream press to raise the question, "What if American just pulled out"  Neither Kerry nor Bush suggested we would start pulling out any troops until at least spring 2005.  The number one fear against quick withdrawal tends to be either civil war or a state which sponsors terrorism, perhaps similar to the pre-9/11 Taliban led Afghanistan.

After the U.S. election of 2004, the New York Times' first editorial was "The Impossible Job."  Not at the time knowing who had won the elections, the paper wrote, "For all their disagreements about the war, both George Bush and John Kerry assured the public that Iraq can be stabilized and moved toward a semblance of democratic government, and that American troops will stay until that happens.  The job will be tougher, bloodier and more expense than either candidate has been willing to admit...And neither man has come close to preparing American for the possibility that the next president may have to admit that fixing the mess in Iraq has became not merely a question of what Americans can accomplish, but al losing game in in which the US is doing its global interest more harm than good." 

A second Times editorial "Still Worlds Apart on Iraq" (11/26/04), worries that the mideast conference on Iraq had little practical affect.  Their advice for the U.S. administration "to begin changing this bleak picture" is to "work much harder at international bridge building...Simply soliciting support for current American policies will not be enough. Washington must also be willing to consider changing some of those policies as part of a renewed process of international consultation.  That might lead to more productive international conferences in the future."

Nicholas Kristof, a consistent critic of going to war, felt in late November that U.S.. troops should love leave.  His "Saving the Iraqi Children" (11/27/04) is consistent with his views of Sudan and Rwanda, a concern for civilians.  He feels that an Iraqi without U.S. troops could become another Somalia and hundreds of thousands of children would die.  Those calling for withdrawal "may end up being right," but "some well-meaning American liberals are seeking a troop withdrawal that would make matters even worse."  While our invasion "was mistaken...it would be inhumane to abandon them now."

Michael Kinsley's "It Hurts, but Don't Stop" goes further than Kristof in urging withdrawal.  In his November 21 Post op-ed, he asks, "Has there even before been a war that so many people disapprove of but so few wanted to stop?  Have the reasons for starting a war ever been so thoroughly discredited without turning into reasons for ending it?"  If 47% of Americans are against the they they aren't doing much about it and "aren't' very clear about what they would like to see happen.  Meanwhile, American soldiers die by the hundred and Iraqis--military and civilian--by the thousands in a cause these people (and I'm one of them) believe to be a horrible mistake...Bush had a good point when he wondered how, as commander in chief, Kerry could ask American soldier to die for the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Of course, that problem does not vindicate Bush's belief that Iraq II is the right war in the right, etc...Anyone who opposes the war but isn't ready to demand peace needs to answer the question 'Why on Earth not?'"  Kristof might ask, "what peace to you have in mind?"

Kinsley continues, we are too focused on "credibility" as in Vietnam "A superpower that announces a goal and gives up without achieving it will not be super for long,  In the end, Nixon and Kissenger added fiver year to the length of the Vietnam war, and we lost it anyway.  Did that add to our superpower credibility?  Well, maybe.  He concludes, "An American general in Vietnam famously said,  'We had to destroy the village to save it.'  This has become the definitive expression of the macabre futility of war.  Last week we destroyed an entire city [Fallujah] to save it (progress!) but our capacity to find that sort of thing ironic seems to have become shriveled and harmless.":  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64027-2004Nov19?language=printer

"The Cost of Staying the Course", a Post op-ed, looks at numbers of dead and wounded in Vietnam and World War II.  Brain Gifford reminds us that in World War II there were only 1.7 wounded for every death, and 2.6 wounded for every dead in Vietnam.  The Iraq War is 7.6 wounded.  'This means that if our wounded today had the same chances of survival as their fathers did in Vietnam, we would probably now have more than 3,500 deaths..."  He concludes that "taking false comfort" in the lower deaths in Iraq "trivializes those sacrifices.  We owe them and our nation a realistic discussion about the potential benefits for staying the course in Iraq vs. the probably costs.  If history is nay guide, those costs will be heavy."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A18882-2004Nov28?language=printer

Kenneth Pollack, author of Threatening Storm,  military expert, CIA analyst, and supporter of the war in 2002, wrote a thoughtful op-ed piece in the July 1, 2005 New York Times.  Pollack outlines the "five ways to win back Iraq."  Iraq is neither another Afghanistan, as the President claims, nor another Vietnam.  It is more important than Vietnam.  However, we are handling the war in the same poor way we fought in Vietnam.

"We lost in Vietnam for a complicated set of reasons.  But the most important was that we refused to use an effective counterinsurgency strategy" such as helping the local economy.  Iraq may have a better chance because of the leadership of al-Jaafari and the lack of broad support among insurgents nor the firepower of the Vietcong or North Vietnamese.  Pollack's five lessons, then, are: 
1.  "Think safety first" by protecting local Iraqis from street crime.  Worry less about hot spots as they may never be quelled;
2.  We need more troops, and more troops patrolling the streets to gain support.  Jobs, water, electricity, gasoline are critical.  
3.  Be patient as the Iraqi units learn to fights.  Lt. Gen. David Petraeus took over in 2004 and predicted 3-5 years before Iraqis could take over.
4.  Deal with the theft of oil revenue by focusing less on Baghdad.  Reconstruction must grow from the bottom up.
5.  Buy off the Sunni sheiks, as has happened throughout history of the region.  

Pollack concludes his piece, "The course we have adopted in Iraq so far is not working particularly well and it could fail altogether.  To date most of the changes offered by both sides of the political aisle amount too little more than tinkering with the current strategy.  But if we're going to succeed in stabilizing Iraq and defeating its insurgency, we hare going to have to make a radical shift to a traditional counterinsurgency strategy, even though it could be politically very painful  No matter what one thinks of the invasion, it is clearly in our best interest, to say nothing of the Arab world's' that we succeed in Iraq.  To do so, we will have to apply some lessons we learned from bitter history."

On the last day of November, 2005, President Bush gave a major speech on Iraq.  He based his remarks on a new "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq", a lengthy document.

Pollack's March/April 2006 contribution to The Atlantic was "The Right Way." 

Anthony Cordesman, author of numerous books on the military, responded (Times op-ed, 5/9/06) that "Three Iraqis would be one big problem."  These proposed "ethno-religious entities...are wrong:  fracturing the county would not serve either Iraqi or US interests, and would make life for the average Iraqis even worse."  Cordesman worries, as I did originally of Biden's argument,  of further relocations (see Violence 2006 FAQ) and the 40% urban population living in multiethnic cities like Baghdad and Mosul.  There will be fights over oil and Sunni insurgents will gain power but be out of the oil loop, leading to Sunni neighbors like Egypt and Saudi Arabia supporting them.

Also see "US Politics '06"

The "three Iraqs" was clarified by Biden who emphasized that he want the country to remain whole. However, in mid-September the main Sunni block in Parliament boycotted to protest a Shiite-Kurd plan "to carve Iraq into a federation of three autonomous states," reported the Post. The new Iraqi Constitution allows such autonomous regions, but Sunnis were promised that the document would be amended. The "carve it up" option, as labeled by Tom Hayden, is proposed in a new book by Peter Galbraith, who has experience with successful partition of the Balkans in the '90s. Galbraith is an official consultant to the Kurds, who most desire such a course of action. Hayden is reminded of Northern Ireland when the occupiers claimed they couldn't leave because the "natives will kill eachother." How does one deal, for example, with one million Sunnis living in the Shiite dominated city of Basra? "Partition is not the solution", opines Washington Post commentary just 10 days before the November US elections. The writer is Executive Director The Iraq Foundation.

Hawks William Kristol and Rich Lowry contributed "Rienforce Baghdad" to the Post in September 12, 2006. "We are at crucial moment in Iraq. Supporters of the war, like us" want to secure Baghdad. The US had recently added troops to Baghdad, but Pentagon reports of lessened violence omitted some types of violence. Kristol realizes that sending more troops would temporarily make the Iraqis feel more dependent. But violence radicalizes Shiite militias like Sadr's. "The Iraqis aren't yet up to it....Americans troops are more trusted and more welcome than Iraqis," even to Sunnis and moderate Shiites. Kristol and his co-writer are editors of The Weekly Standard and The National Review.

If the primary goal of US troops, according to some Generals, is to train Iraqis to take over security, and since Iraqi forces are poorly trained or not loyal to the national military, could the US be setting up the Iraqis as the one's to blame for the "loss of Iraq." Could it be argued that "the Iraqis just didn't want it enough"?

"One Iraq or three?" titles the lead Tribune editorial of October 8. The complex debate is about oil, religion, sect, ethnicity, power, national identity, and politics. According to the Constitution, any split "would be delayed until at least 2008...It's impossible to tell how all this will play out." The Chicago paper warns that a Shiite bloc "is likely to become a satellite of Iran, the big winner in any split. If the goal is to tamp down the violence, a fractured Iraq isn't likely to be suddenly peaceful."

"All our options are bad," writes Nicholas Kristof in October 2006, stating the obvious. He worries that a timetable might encourage insurgents to hang on. "Or maybe Iraq will fall apart no matter what we do." But our presence, including "suspicions that we plan to stay forever--is doing more harm than good." A State Department poll concluded that nearly 3/4 of Baghdad residents said "they would feel safer if US forces left Iraq." Kristof concludes, "So it's time to face the grim reality and announce that all our troops will leave Iraq by October 2007." For much more on Kristof and other columnists, see "Op-Ed" FAQ.

Those who fear partition worry about other minorities in the Middle East, such as the Druze and Christians of Lebanon, and, of course, the Kurds of Turkey, Syria, and Iran. A Jordanian political analyst warned, "If this starts in Iraq, it will end up God knows where."

In late October, diplomat Richard Holbrooke wrote a commentary in letter form to the President. After Bush told us "stay the course" was not longer pertinent, the diplomat suggested "Three Choices, Mr. President."

Anthony Cordesman, military expert, looks at a possible breakup and concludes, "It's very difficult simply to say federalism is bad. Some kind of separation may be necessary. Not every form of federation means breaking up Iraq." Tony Snow, White House spokesman worries about re-creating the Balkans because partition can be "a recipe for a tinderbox."

In late November, during their summit in Jordan, both Maliki and Bush spoke against the partition of Iraq.

Partition came up again in the summer of 2007, with Presidential candidate Joe Biden being its most forceful advocate. Columnist Charles Krauthammer detailed the partition options in his Sept. 7 Post commentary.

Biden gained a Republican supporter of partition in Sen. Brownback of Kansas. "Federalism not Partition" argued Biden and Gelb in their Oct. 3 commentary in the Post. They remind readers that their 2006 proposal now has support of 75 Senators in a quiet October vote. Their goal is to "promote a political settlement based on decentralized power-sharing. It was a life raft for an Iraq policy that is adrift."

The Iraq Study Group was due to report in November or December of 2006 with their recommendations for the way forward. As co-chair James Baker said of talking with Syria and Iran, "It's not appeasement to talk to your enemies." Baker will likely not recommend a rapid withdrawal or a partitioning of the country, saying, "There's no way to draw lines." The Times reports that the group is "unlikely to issue suggestions that the president has not tacitly approved in advance." Cheney has met with the group. The Iraqi Study Group was created "with the reluctant blessing of the White House." The Pentagon was floating three options in November 2006, "Go big, go long and go home."

The option to increase US troops, proposed by the President in January 2007, is discussed in "When US Troops Come Home?" FAQ
and also at "US Politics Since Nov. '06" FAQ.

In somewhat of a surprise to me, the Senate in late September 2007, passed a non binding resolution endorsing the partition of Iraq. The vote was condemned by six Iraqi political parties as well as the US embassy. Those who feel the partition of Bosnia was successful, argue a similar strategy for Iraq. Kurdish and Shiite parties were more supportive of the plan.

The partition/autonomy seemed to be endorsed soon after by the son of the powerful Shiite cleric, Hakim. He is the heir-apparent to his father, suffering from cancer.

In .late 2007 and early 2008, partition was rarely in the news. One exception was a Post op-ed (1/18/08) from Iraq's own national security adviser, Mr. al-Rubaie. He acknowledges that Iraq's government is "at a stalemate...The shape of a reconstructed, federal Iraq could vary" but he suggests give units: Kurdistan, western (Mosul) , Kufa, Basra, and Baghdad.

US advisers to train Iraqis is the main suggestion from an Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, in his Times op-ed of early April, 2008. "The key to success...rests largely with a small group" of US advisers who "live and fight along side foreign forces." He draws from experience in Vietnam and El Salvador. The advisers in Vietnam only started getting their support in 1969, which was too late to make a difference. We will "let down" Iraqis "if we don't send more and larger teams to embed with locals...The American people must be patient." Nagl concludes that we must help our friends defend themselves.

In 2009 under the new Obama presidency, would troops be coming home? See "Troops Home" FAQ for many more details.