Return to PS FAQs

Where are the WMD?  Does it matter that WMD have not been found?  What did the Presidential commission reveal?  

Also see Wilson/CIA Leak for 2005-06 Updates , "Congress and WMD" and WMD FAQ section for detailed pre-war analysis
and see Wikipedia:  Iraq/WMD 

Claimed Rumsfeld ten days into the war, "We know where they [WMD] are.  They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad, and east, west, south, and north somewhat." Skeptics say WMD stands for "Weapons of Mass Deception" or "What Me, Deceive?"

Back in May 2004 deputy Sec. of  Defense Wolfowitz suggested that WMD was just an accuse.  He told Vanity Fair magazine that "for bureaucratic reasons" we settled on one issue, WMD, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on."
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-05-30-wolfowitz-iraq_x.htm

In other WMD news, after the war began, Tony Blair still expected to find "weapons programs" (my emphasis)  though BBC reported in mid-July  that top administrators in the UK have given up their WMD search.  Blair's July 17 speech to Congress was well received. See full text of Blair's speech.

On WMD evidence, Blair suggested, "If we are wrong, we will have destroyed a [regime] that, at its least, is responsible for inhuman carnage and suffering.  That is something I am confident history will forgive. But if our critics are wrong, if we are right, as I believe with every fiber of instinct and conviction I have that we are, and we do not act, then we will have hesitated in the face of this menace when we should have given leadership.  That is something history will not forgive."  

The president was more confident: "We won't be proven wrong" (Tribune, 7/18/03). A Senior Defense official had said in March, "We have to find and show the world Saddam's weapons."  In mid-January 2004 Blair publicly doubted whether WMD will be found.  This was prior to Kay's disclosure.  

In August Blair was testifying before a government inquiry, and 70% of British determined that he had mishandled and/or manipulated the weapons evidence. Blair's closest adviser, Alastair Campbell, resigned in late August.  He was charged with re-writing the "sexed up" dossier from September of 2002. The resignation was announced the day after Blair's testimony The Tribune labeled Campbell as "the second most powerful politician in Britain" (8/30/03). In September two-thirds of the UK wanted Defense Minister Hoon to resign. (NPR, 9/8). 

The UK investigation, which begun hearings on August 11,  includes the early September allegation of Brian Jones, a retired senior official with the defense intelligence analysis staff.  The "deploy within 45 minutes" claim bothered him because it came second hand from only one source.

In Blair's surprise visit to southern Iraq in early January, 2004, he labeled Iraq as the "test case...whose regime had a proven record of the use of weapons of mass destruction, not just their development" and he tortured his own people.  "If we had backed away from that, we would never have been able to confront this threat in other countries where it exists" (NYTimes, 1/5/04). 

In late-January the Hutton report concluded that the BBC was at fault and that Blair had not been guilty of "sexing" up the certain dossier.  Yet, Blair followed Bush a few days later in announcing an investigation of pre-war intelligence and WMD.

Bush defended his intelligence (and see second article on defense) and Rumsfeld and Rice argued on the Sunday talk shows (July 13) that the line in the speech was "technically true" "accurate", "may yet prove to be true" and "factually correct."  Then, the administration claimed that the charges are politically motivated. Tenet's main contact point in the White House is Rice, and Tenet had scratched the uranium claim from Bush's October 7 speech in Cincinnati, and the CIA asked Britain to drop its claim in the fall of 2002, but Rice claimed that she was "unaware" of the intelligence but also that there was new evidence since October. The Rumsfeld "bombshell" was acknowledging in June that no new evidence on WMD was used since '98 in the determination to go to war. Powell left the claim out of his speech just a week after the State of the Union though in July 2003 he labeled the affair an "overreaction."  The President "wasn't in any way trying to mislead" (Boston Globe, Derrick Jackson, 7/23). 

Cheney, whose August 2002 speech stressed Hussein's nuclear capabilities, has made little public comment; neither has Powell. Cheney launched a "counter attack" in late July, saying no war would have been "irresponsible." 

In May of 2003 President Bush declared on Polish TV, "We have found the Weapons of Mass Destruction."  He was referring to alleged mobile biological weapons lab.  Whether these trailers really housed WMD was very controversial at the time, and most experts agreed right away that the President was mistaken.  We have official confirmation in April of 2006 that the Pentagon concluded two days before the President's comments that in fact the trailers were not used for WMD but for making helium.

Partly as a result of Bush's comments, in June 2003, Americans continued to be badly misinformed about WMD. "They aren't paying attention" and are easily misinformed by visuals of trailers or barrels.  For example, in June, 1/4 believed that Hussein had used WMD during the war and 1/3 believed that the U.S. had found WMD.  By mid-July, Post/ABC polls were showing that "fifty percent said Bush intentionally exaggerated evidence to suggest Iraq had [WMD]."  PEW polls back in January 2003 concluded that only 29% thought war was wise without proof of WMD.

In June and July the administration more frequently made to distinction between finding WMD and finding WMD programs. President Bush said in mid-July, "I am absolutely convinced with time we'll find out they did have a weapons program",  using the past tense to describe the program (Chicago Tribune, 6/10/03)

One argument that WMD will be found is this question: "Why would Hussein have allowed horrible sanctions to continue all these years if he didn't still have WMD?" Former inspector David Kay is among those leading to search into the summer.

It turns out that CIA assessments and tone changed from Clinton to Bush without any new evidence, according to the Tribune's, "Critics note shift in report about Iraq' nuclear plans."  

This story of evidence and credibility seemed to leave the headlines (at least of the Chicago Tribune) after about two weeks and be relegated to the op-ed pages  Even the New York Times dropped the issue from its op-ed pages in late July for at least 3 days in a row. Other stories in late July taking top billing included the 9/11 report, the Abbas visit, the two son's death, and Kobe.

In late July 2003 President Bush spoke to reporters with Kofi Annan and surprisingly claimed, "We gave him [Hussein] a chance to allow the inspectors in, and he wouldn't let them in.  And...after a reasonable request, we decided to remove him from power." 

The powerful and detailed August investigative report on misleading WMDs in the Washington Post was co-authored by Walter Pincus.  It details "a pattern in which President Bush, VP Cheney, and their subordinates--in public and behind the scenes--made allegation depicting Iraq's nuclear weapons program as more active, more certain, and more imminent in its threat than the data they had would support." http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0810-01.htm

In September, Rumsfeld was not eager to discuss the WMD issue but criticized Bush's critics as unwittingly helping the enemy.

One September scenario of the missing WMD is that Hussein's weapons may have been a bluff.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A25416-2003Sep30?language=printer

In late October no signs of a nuclear program had been found.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17707-2003Oct25?language=printer

David Kay, former inspector under UN and in charge of post-war WMD investigation, appointed by the Bush administration, was expected to issue a report by late-September.  Would he emphasize WMD or WMD programs?  Would he find a "smoking gun"?  In advance of the report, officials said no WMD were found despite over four months with hundreds of workers and interviews with numerous Iraqi scientists. They also emphasized that the report was "preliminary".

Kay's October report admitted finding no WMD but emphasized that Hussein could not be trusted, was still a threat, and had the "intent" to resume production after the inspectors left.  Hans Blix conclusion that there were likely no WMD at the time of invasion was joined by former chief inspector Rolf Ekeus who felt that "Saddam Hussein did not produce anything since 1991" but destroyed stockpiles after the Persian Gulf War (Wash Post, 3/25/03, "Iraqi weapons report won't be conclusive").

In late December, former Bush Sr. cabinet member Brent Scowcroft led a panel to investigate the uranium claim.  His group concluded that there was no basis for the uranium claim, but also that the fabrication was not intentional. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A25935-2003Dec23?language=printer

In December we learned that Kay would probably quit after his six month stint, even as some of workers and translators were being moved from WMD to security operations.  "The surprise in his first report was not the revelation that no actual WMD had been found," wrote the NYTimes editorial of December 26.  "That was obvious from daily news reports.  Rather it was the team's judgment that Iraq did not even have active program to make chemical or nuclear weapons and had been pursing missiles that could threaten only nearby counties, not the U.S."  The editorial expressed hope that the Bush administration will "take the opportunity presented by Mr. Kay's possible departure to enlist the help of UN inspectors, who have long experience in Iraq."  

On January 22, 2004, we learned that Kay would probably be replaced by Charles Duelfer.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A37126-2004Jan21?language=printer

In a series of interviews over the weekend of January 24-25, after he quit as chief U.S. weapons inspector, Kay said that he felt Iraq did not have any WMD when the war began. "We were almost all wrong", he argued, referring to the intelligence agency. Bush and Cheney continued to state that the weapons would yet be found, and urging patience.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56311-2004Jan28.html

Among other press reaction to Kay's conclusions was the generally pro-Iraq War Washington Post in, "Mr. Kay's Truth Telling."  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A58491-2004Jan28?language=printer

Back in the news in August of 2004, Kay again faulted prewar intelligence, as Richard Clarke had done.  "The dog that did not bark in the case of Iraq's WMD weapons program, quite frankly, in my view, is the National Security Council."  He felt that a new director of intelligence would not improve the situation until the "systemic failure of the CIA" are dealt with.  Kay asked why Powell had to personally vet data before his UN speech, when Powell was "ultimately left to hand in the wind for date that was misleading and, in some cases, absolutely false and known by parts of the intelligence community to be false?  Where was the NSC then?" (NYTimes, 8/19/04). 

In his State of the Union speech of January, the President had only referred to "Weapons of Mass Destruction related program activities" on which Kay had reported. Cheney's interview is on NPR, where one will also find Kenneth Pollack's take on the war in 2004 in a series of interviews.  The LA Times looks at a number of "Cheney Distortions" on evidence 
http://www.npr.org/display_pages/features/feature_1610113.html
http://www.npr.org/features/feature.php?wfId=1601685
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines04/0123-02.htm

Did Hussein have any WMD?  Captured in November, top assistant Tariq Aziz looked at Hussein's motives and felt that the leader wanted doubts about his arsenal to linger so he wouldn't lose face with Arabs and so he could deter an American invasion.  Hussein thought he could hunker down and gain a French or Russian brokered cease-fire.  He may have even been bluffing his own generals about the presence of WMD, according to the Post  report and Aziz. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A55022-2003Nov2?language=printer

The first 11 days of 2004 brought numerous accusations against the administration's truthfulness on WMD.  The Washington Post used an 11-page analysis to conclude that "Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A60340-2004Jan6?language=printer

A few days later Powell finally admitted that there was no proof was Iraq-al-Qaida links.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/Default.aspx?id=3909150&p1=0

During the same week of January 2004 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released its 111 page study of the pre-war intelligence. The study details the lack of strong evidence the administration had on WMD and on Iraq-al Qaeda connections. The Carnegie page includes the full report, a two page summary, and press reaction the report. 

Also see Carnegie's helpful "Summary Tables" comparing pre-2002 assessments with the October 2002 NIE, UN finding, administration statements, and newer evidence.  The helpful chart separates chemical, biological, and nuclear. 

On CBS's 60 Minutes, Former Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, added to the accusations.  He provided documents which showed that for the administration, the war was indeed inevitable.  Bush's cabinet had discussed and planned details of the war and post-war in the opening days of the Bush presidency, well before 9/11. It wasn't a matter of if, but how, alleged O'Neill.

O'Neill had served in the Nixon and Ford administrations and was close to Dick Cheney. O'Neill was asked to resign in December 2002. The new book, The Price of Loyalty, is being promoted is by Pulitzer Prize winner Ron Suskind of The Wall Street Journal.  One of the secret memos is entitled, "Plan for Post-Saddam Iraq." (Chicago Tribune, 1/11/04). 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/09/60minutes/printable592330.shtml

Other plans involved peacekeeping forces, war crimes tribunals and Iraqi oil fields. The tone of the January 2001 meetings was "all about finding a way to do it" with no question as to why pre-emption was the right policy. He labels the second NSC meeting as Iraq as the primary topic. At these meetings O'Neill describes how Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld talked "in general terms about post-Saddam Iraq, dealing with the Kurds in the north, the oil fields, the reconstruction of the country's economy and the "freeing of the Iraqi people.'" (NYTimes, 1/13/04). Added O'Neill, "But I've been around a hell of long time, and I know the difference between evidence and assertions and illusion or allusions and conclusions that one could draw from a set of assumptions...I never saw anything in the intelligence that I would characterize as real evidence [of WMD]" (NYTimes, 1/12/04). 

The initial White House spokesman response to O'Neill's charges was not to deny the charges but to say :"The administration simply is not in the business of doing book reviews" but described the book and interviews as "an attempt to justify the former secretary's own opinions instead of the results this administration has achieved on behalf of the American people." One White House officials laughed off the charges: "It's laughable to suggest that the administration was planning an invasion of Iraq that shortly after coming to office." 

The next day, while in Mexico, the President declared that O'Neill served his country well but that he, Bush, was ready to move on.  Then he added, "The stated policy of my administration toward Saddam Hussein was very clear...Like the previous administration, we were for regime change."  Bush was referring to the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1988 passed by Congress and signed by Clinton, making it U.S. policy "to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein..." Also see "Was the War Inevitable" FAQ section.

The press had a field day with the O'Neill charges in January, 2004. 

Democrats feasted on the January 2004 O'Neill story.  For example, said candidate Howard Dean, "I've always said the president had failed to make the case to go to war with Iraq....Now, after the fact, we are learning new information about the true circumstances of the Bush administration's push for war...The country deserves to know--and the president needs to answer--why the American people were presented with misleading or manufactured intelligence as to why going to war with Iraq was necessary."  
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/10/oneill.bush/index.html

Added John Kerry, "These are very serious charges.  It would mean [Bush administration officials] were dead-set on going to war alone since almost the day they took office and deliberately lied to the American people, Congress and the world...It would mean that for purely ideological reasons they planned on putting American troops in a shooting gallery, occupying an Arab county almost alone.  the White House needs to answer these charges trustfully because they threaten to shatter [its] already damaged credibly as never before."

After O'Neill, the Carnegie Report, and a week after Kay's testimony, in which he called for an independent commission, the President finally decided to name of panel on Iraq intelligence failures.  The panel would consist of 9 members and finish their study well after the November elections.  He described the panel as "independent" and "bipartisan...I want to know all the facts."  

Who would serve?  Would the President appoint them all?  The author of this web site  predicted on Feb. 2 that those who might serve on the panel could be James Woolsey, former head of CIA, David Kay, Brent Scowcroft, Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, or Henry Kissenger. By Feb. 3, Woolsey and Scowcroft had been mentioned, as well as former Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey (D). 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5543-2004Feb2.html

Press reaction to the commission was supportive but some had reservations.  One thoughtful commentary came on Feb. 3 from Richard Cohen of the Washington Post. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A7219-2004Feb2?language=printer

George Tenet, head of the CIA, gave a major speech at Georgetown in early February 2004, defending the CIA, admitting that some of the intelligence was wrong.  The Chicago Tribune emphasized his point the next morning that the CIA never said the threat from Iraq was imminent.  Despite repeated claims from the President to the contrary, several in the administration did say before and after the war that the threat was imminent. http://www.hillnews.com/marshall/110503.aspx

The day after CIA's Tenet gave a major speech at Georgetown on pre-war intelligence, the President announced his commission, co-headed by a Democrat and a conservative judge. The commission was to finish their work well after the November 2004 elections, in March 2005.  The group was not going to look into how the administration used the intelligence but just the intelligence itself. Meanwhile, Senate committees expanded their mandate to examine how the intelligence might have been misused. For more on Senate, see "Congress reaction to WMD" FAQ. Also see "Should/Will Tenet and Rumsfeld Resign?"

Did the U.S. provide the UN inspectors with all the information they had on likely weapons?  The CIA admitted in February that that had withheld some information.  Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) was especially upset by this WMD development.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A60818-2004Feb21?language=printer

A few days later, The President defended the war on Sunday morning, February 8 on Meet The Press with Tim Russert.  Some feel he defended U.S. policy well, calling the war just and describing Hussein as "a madman".  Others felt his answers were vague or changed the subject.

As John Kerry seemed to be cementing the Democratic nomination with victories in Virginia and Tennessee on February 10, his criticism of the President and pre-war intelligence escalated.  The press was also more critical, as evidenced by "Selling The War Without Lying", in which San Francisco Chronicle's Harley Sorensen suggests that "the fear campaign...turned out to be just a marketing technique, a device used to sell as war that might not otherwise be tolerated by the American public."  Sorensen then quotes from what could have been Bush's "truthful" rationale for war, in a less convincing argument. 
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0216-05.htm

In March 2004 reports surfaced that pre-war reports contrary to the administration's assumptions were ignored. Wrote New York Times Douglas Jehl (3/6/04, "US, Certain That Iraq Had Illicit Arms, Reportedly Ignored Contrary Reports"), "In the two years before the war...American intelligence agencies reviewed but ultimately dismissed reports from Iraqi scientist, defectors, and other informants who said [Iraq] did not posses illicit weapons..."  Jehl's follow-up of March 11 opened, "The Pentagon is paying $340,000 a month" to Chalabi's INC for "intelligence collection".  The article continues, "Internal government reviews have found that much of the information generated by the program before the American invasion...was useless, misleading or even fabricated.  Under the unusual arrangement, the CIA is required to get permission from informants, from the INC." The CIA had severed ties to the INC back in 1995, in part, writes Jehl, "because of doubts about the quality of information is was providing." ("Pentagon Pays Iraq Group, Supplier of Incorrect Spy Data", NYTimes, 3/11/04). 

Only in early April did Colin Powell admit that some of the pre-war intelligence he gave at his February pre-war UN speech was indeed probably not true.  Powell spoke of the "multiple sources" he thought were behind the certainty he had given to the mobile biological weapons labs.  He had labeled these labs as "the most dramatic evidence" during the February speech.  He suggested that the commission, whose report is due in March 2005, look into the intelligence.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A46440-2004Apr2?language=printer

Powell continued to push the CIA, according to the Times, "why he was apparently misinformed about" WMD which Powell told the UN about in February 2003.  The arsenal was "a key rationale" for the war.  In mid-June Powell express particular concern about the biological claims the CIA assured him were legitimate. The Secretary of State had called these labs "some of the most solid" evidence, but he has stepped back from these claims.  In May he declared, according to the Times, "the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and in some cases, deliberately misleading.  And for that, I am disappointed and I regret it."  Pervious to the charges made by Powell in 2003, the DIA knew one of the sources was a fabricator.  The charge was still on the CIA web site. Of course, when INC's Chalabi provides some of the sources, bias is to be expected.  Chalabi sought an invasion of Iraq and probably wished to be its new President. Chalabi's group was paid millions by the CIA over the past few years.  The payments were to stop in June, 2004. 

In mid-March, 2004 Chief UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix released his new book, Disarming Iraq.  While acknowledging that Saddam was "evil" he was upset that UN inspectors were not given more time, because war could have been averted. Early on in the inspections process, he too was convinced that Iraq probably did still have WMD.

On March 16 Blix was interviewed on NPR. On March 18 Blix spoke in Chicago before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek reviewed Blix's book in the New York Times of April 11. He highlighted Blix's January 2003 reported to the UN that Iraq had not recognized the importance of disarmament.  "But is a fashion that is almost reminiscent of World War I, the Pentagon's military timetables drove American diplomacy,.  The weather had become more important than international legitimacy.  Zakaria concludes the review, "American is paying the price in credibility for its mishandling of Iraq.  But the real price is being paid by the Iraqi people, whose occupation has been far more lonely and troubled than it needed to be."

In April an Israeli intelligence report added to the controversy, concluding that on pre-war intelligence they had been "floundering in the dark."

In May we learned that a roadside artillery shell which was exploded contained sarin. It was an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Was it part of a huge leftover stockpile of the Saddam regime?  Was it imported from another country?  Initial reports from experts is that the insurgents would not have known the device contained sarin.  Two Americans were injured; no one was killed. Iraq admitted having sarin up until 1990. Rumsfeld was not yet declaring this a victory:  "We have to be careful." Kimmitt called the IED "virtually ineffective as a chemical weapon." About 10 days later the Pentagon announced that it was indeed Sarin, but from the pre-Persian Gulf War era.

On June 2, 2004 CIA Chief Tenet resigned.  The President praised him; Tenet stated that his resignation was for personal reasons. For more on Tenet, see P.S. FAQ, "Will Tenet and Rumsfeld Resign?"

News from July included the mid-July Senate Committee report vindicating Kay's "We got it all wrong" on WMD report to Congress. 

The Washington Post joined the New York Times and The New Republic is analyzing and criticizing their own WMD reporting in the pre-war period.  The Post's 6 page story, "An Inside Story", appeared on August 12.  

In October 2004 the WMD surfaced again when the new chief U.S. weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, told us of his progress.  Repeating what inspector David Kay had reported in January, Duelfer, appointed by the President, has found no evidence of pre-war WMD in his nearly 1000 page report.  Saddam also had no definitive plans to make them and no programs to build them.  Duelfer reported to the Congress that the U.S. was "almost all wrong" on WMD.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9790-2004Oct5?language=printer
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12115-2004Oct6?language=printer

The Tribune front page story of October 7 was entitled, "Report on Iraq arms undercuts president:  No evidence of WMD, terror link."  The paper also added that Saddam "sought to retain the capacity to quickly reconstitute those program once UN scrutiny of his regime diminished."  However, there was no plan to diminish the scrutiny by ending sanctions or by pulling out the weapons inspectors in the spring of 2002. 

NPR's commentator Daniel Schoor put it this way:  "There were no stockpiles of weapons, just stockpiles of dreams."

On January 13, we learned that the WMD search at been permanently discontinued in December.  The administration does not expect to find any WMD in Iraq.  One wonders why they searched for so long?  Perhaps the skeptic does not wonder why they didn't stop searching in September or October, before the Presidential elections.

Dan Rather criticized his own CBS network.  In early October spoke on a network anchor panel, aired on NPR.  He needed "more courage" as a journalist, before the war.  "We didn't ask the tough questions", the veteran anchor added.

In late October we learned that 380 tons of explosive material was missing from Iraq.  It had not been sufficiently guarded by American forced after the UN inspectors were forced to leave.  The issue quickly became a political issue for Senator Kerry.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A60413-2004Oct25?language=printer

A few days later 4000 anti-aircraft missiles were announced to be missing.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A31050-2004Nov6?language=printer

In the fall of 2004, millions of Americans still believe that Hussein had WMD and even that the U.S. found them. 

"US ends search in Iraq for WMD" was the Chicago Tribune story of January 13, 2005.  White House spokesman McClellan said the president had no regrets about invading Iraq.  "Based on what we know today, the president would have taken the same action because this is about protecting the American people."  McClellan did not emphasis the hope of democracy among Iraqis.  

The New York Times had more to say.  In their lead editorial that day sarcastically titled "Bulletin:  No WMD Found", the paper writes that this search may have been "one of the greatest nonevents of the early 21st century...For more on press reaction, see Congress and Press react on WMD.

In March 2005 results were that 56% of Americans believed that Iraq had WMD before the start of the war.  This was higher than a few months earlier, when the end of the WMD search was announced. What accounts for this amazing statistic?

The Presidential Commission came out with its report at the end of March.  Reluctantly appointed by President Bush, the 9 member panel conducted hundreds of interviews and operated in secret and was led by Judge Laurence H. Silberman and former senator Chuck Robb and had access to the most secret of documents. 

One suggestion was that dissent on intelligence is critically important. A New York Times front-page story calls it "A searing critique of how the CIA and other agencies never properly assessed Saddam Hussein' political maneuverings or the possibility that he no longer had weapon stockpiles."  

The report singles out Tenet, DIA, and NSA.  The unclassified version is 400 pages, and the classified version is 600.  Why did Saddam want the world to think that he probably did still have WMD?  Some of his commanders say they were fooled and the leader for at least somewhat divorced from reality.   He might have wanted to make Israel and Iran concerned and prevent another coup.

The Times reminds us that the National Intelligence Estimate, hurriedly completed in the fall of 2002, was forced to be declassified  It included strong allegations of aluminum tubes and mobile biological weapons labs.  "The report particularly ridicules the conclusion that Mr. Hussein's fleet of 'unmanned aerial vehicles' which had very limited flying ranged, posed a major threat...To this day, Mr. Cheney has never backed away from his claim, repeated last year, that the 'mobile laborites' were probably part of a secret biological weapons program.  US allegations of nuclear program or weapons in Iran and Sought Korea, whether true or not,  will hold less credibility now.  For much more on pre-war intelligence and administration claims, see pre-war FAQ Home.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11145-2005Mar29?language=printer

On the day of its release, March 31, Silberman and Robb were interviewed on the PBS Newshour, terming it a "harsh report".  The leaders concluded that the intelligence community was "dead wrong" on Iraq WMD, which was not new news to those Americans who have followed the story over the past two years. Silberman and Robb felt that intelligence was working off "assumptions not evidence....They didn't report that they really did not know."  The commission leaders felt the assumptions about Iraq continuing to make WMD after 1990 were "not illogical" but "no one asked" if the material might have been destroyed.  Intelligence also used single sources for some key information which proved to be "worthless and misleading."  

How much of this did we know before the war?  There was such "groupthink" that nearly everyone assumed that Saddam still had WMD.  But could or should we have know the truth before the war?  Some experts, outside of the intelligence community,  had strong doubts. See pre-war FAQs, especially on WMD/Inspectors and on pre-war Nuclear Weapons. 

President Bush "welcomed" the commission report, highlighting some of the positive aspects.  He wanted to focus on the 74 recommendations.

Were members of the intelligence community pressured by the administration?  The leaders, responding to a Newshour question, replied that they "hadn't heard" of any such pressure.  When asked why caveats  were not included in some intelligence, the commission leaders replied, "We ducked."

A Post article the next day spoke of missed opportunities in the intelligence community, in "Doubts on Weapons Were Dismissed."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17211-2005Mar31?language=printer

Also see  Op-ed reaction to the commission.

The next day's Times news story labeled it a "scathing report"  and "scorching assessment" which the commission concluded would have "harm done to American credibility because of the Iraq failure would take 'years to undo.'"  The paper's reporter and author on Iraq, Todd Purdum wrote, "Yet in its own way, the...commission...left little doubt that president Bush and his top aides had gotten what they wanted, not what they needed, when they were told that Saddam Hussein had a threatening arsenal of illicit weapons."  

He quoted the commission, "It is hard to deny the conclusion that intelligence analysts worked in an environment that did not encourage skepticism about the conventional wisdom."  Purdum wrote of the biggest unresolved question:  "Who was accountable ,and will they ever be help to account for letting what amounted to mere assumption 'harden into presumptions....'  A full accounting awaits the work of historians...Some who foresaw potential disaster were punished or pushed aside, while the president and vice president were given new terms."  

Purdum's book on pre-war through fall of 2003, is entitled, A Time of Our Choosing.

The commission report on WMD did not get as much media attention as it might have because it was released on the day of Terri Shaivo's death and on the following day the TVs were not analyzing the WMD story but focused on the pending death of the Pope. 

Who is curveball?  This relatively new information from the commission tells of German intelligence using a single source who claimed Iraq had mobile biological labs.  This was a central argument in Powell's pre-war UN speech. He called them "eyewitness accounts" but they were not. It turns out that there were strong doubts about Curveball before the war; some labeled him a "fabricator." He was the chief source on biological weapons. After the war, it was determined that he was lying

Tenet denied being warned about the doubts about this source but the commission determined that the CIA director was sufficiently warned.  Was Tenet simply trying to please his boss?  In their article, "Doubts on Source for Key Piece of Data Were Suppressed", the Times summarized the report's conclusions that "several senior CIA officials waged a quiet campaign at the highest levels...to stop the US from continuing to rely upon Curveball's claims."  The concerned went to Tenet and his deputy, McLaughlin but "were never passed on to Powell.  The story "shows how a frightening claim embraced by the White House rested 'almost exclusively' on a single, shaky pillar of evidence.  It also reveals how a 'culture of enforced consensus' inside the CIA acted to suppress and resist any doubts raised.  Analysts who voiced concern about Curveball were 'forced to leave' the unit."  McLaughlin and Tenet said they did not recall receiving any warnings, even thought the commission said that Tenet called the division chief at home on the night before Powell's speech.  "The division chief told the commission that he seized on the phone call to tell Mr. Tenet that the Curveball intelligence reporting 'has problems.'" 

The LA Times completed a thorough investigative piece on "Curveball" and how the US fell under his "spell."  The report of mid-November is 15 pages. Germany had warned the US about Curveball before the war.  This was the first time German officials had spoken publicly. He was considered a poor source and usually received information second hand. A front-page Tribune article (11/20) opened "The German intelligence official responsible for one of the most important informants..say the Bush administration and the CIA exaggerated his claims in the run-up to the Iraq war."  Five German officials told the press that Curveball never saw anyone produce germ weapons.  Rather, his information was "often vague, mostly secondhand, and impossible to confirm."  He had emotional and mental problems.  "The White House. ignored evidence that UN weapons inspects disproved virtually all of Curveball's accounts before the war."  The German supervisor was "shocked and aghast" when he heard Powell misstate Curveball's information.  

The British had also warned the US before the war.  In 2001, they warned that satellite images take four years earlier, conflicted with Curveball's description of a germ factory.  "The photos showed a wall around most of the main warehouse, blocking trucks from getting in or out.  Hans Blix concluded that there was "no evidence "of mobile biological production facilities two weeks before the US attacked. 

What was Curveball's motive?  The CIA admits now that he fused fact, research off the Internet and what former co-workers call "water cooler gossip" into a "nightmarish fantasy" to get a Germany visa. The Baghdad-born chemical engineer flew to Munich in 1999 and applied for political asylum.  Curveball was identified on 60 Minutes in November 2007. His biological lab stories were fabricated. An Iraqi defector named Rafid Ahmed Alwan is believed to be living in Germany, probably under an assumed name.

"Artificial Intelligence" is the book review of the November released new book, "Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused the War." The review in the Times, by Newsweek's Middle East editor, opens, "In the last months before the American invasion of Iraq, as we now know all to well, the administration of President George W. Bush showed a fine disregard for truth or consequences." The central question of the book is, "How was it, precisely, that the administration convinced itself and the American public that there was proof Saddam Hussein had WMD?" In Cheney's case it was a story "of willful blindness masquerading as secret intelligence." Sec. Colin Powell, in his now infamous speech before the UN in the weeks before the war, claimed that this defector 'actually was present during the biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998." Better than defector would have been "fabricator" with "marvelous chutzpah." As we had previously learned, the Germans had warned the US about using Curveball as a source, but the CIA "bought into" his claims "site unseen." We should have known better when the UN inspector couldn't find anything, even at the sites which Powell suggested. The review concludes, "In a real sense--and this is worth remembering as we listen to the drumbeat for military attacks against Iran today--doubts did not matter. The invasion of Iraq had been decided in 2002 and was going to happen in 2003 not matter what information came to the administration."

During the next week, George Will wrote about Curveball in his Post column. He examines WMD, intelligence, and the looming conflict with Iran.

The Curveball research was done by Bob Drogin on the LA Times. His book is Curveball: Spies, Lies and the Con Man Who Caused a War. Interviewed on Amy Goodman's Democracy Now, Drogin details the WMD non-story in his 10 minute interview of late January. How did a cab driver cause a war? He was trying to get a visa to Germany and gave the administration what they wanted to hear, so the CIA "conned itself." Cheney's role was not so large, in this case. "The sytem was utterly corrupt," added Drogin. He hesitates to say that the President lied, but evidence was pushed when it should not have been.

See also "Was the War Inevitable?" for related stories.

News of the fall of 2005 included the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mohammed El-Baradei and the IAEA team.  Before the war, they had told the world that Saddam did not have nuclear weapons. 

For other fall 2005 news, go to "US Politics" where President Bush and others in the administration bring up the pre-war WMD issue. 

Douglas Feith, who was undersecretary of defense in the lead up to war, is being investigated by the pentagon 's inspector general.  He admitted in July 2005 that the administration erred by building its public case mainly on WMD.  In an AP interview the former Rumsfeld assistant said though war was a correct decision, "I don't think that simply saying he's a tyrant and we have a chance to replace a tyrant would have motivated the war."  Feith was accused of manipulating intelligence by Sen. Levin and others.  Charles Duelfer, the AP reminds us, concluded after the war began, that there was no evidence Saddam produced any WMD after 1991.

We learned in mid-November that Feith links to Chalabi will be among those issues investigated.  Feith set up an independent group, the Office of Special Plans,  before the war, to re-examine intelligence which the CIA and others had not deemed condemning of Iraq.  Also see "Was the War Inevitable" for 2007 updates on Feith.

An NPR analysis of the pre-war intelligence aired on the day before Thanksgiving. 

Cheney continued to be discussed in November, in a piece by Robert Scheer.  "Cheney's Trouble with Truth" included reference to Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) who before the war was the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee.  He feels the declassified NIE "represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed WMD, avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the classified version." 

Does torture bring good WMD intelligence?  Just the opposite, it appears.  A man ironically named Libi (not Scooter Libby) was tortured by Egyptians and admitted that Iraq gave chemical weapons instruction and poison gases to Al Qaeda.  Libi's testimony was used by Powell and others before the war.  Before the war the DIA warned that his testimony was suspect. Libi recanted in January 2004 and is nowhere to be found, perhaps in a secret prison. See more at "Torture" FAQ.

Concerning "Libby's Lies", we learned in mid-December that Wilson's trip to Niger was not even necessary, because the US had already been told by French investigators that the uranium link was bogus.  Alain Chouet of the French spy service investigated at the request of the CIA.  The team told the US a year before the President's State of the Union speech on the topic. The Frenchman had sent a team of 5-6 to Niger, a former French colony with strong economic ties to the mother country. His cautions grew more emphatic over time.  Some in the CIA agreed with the French conclusions. These exchanges had not been previously disclosed. As Chouet recalled in a Tribune article, "We told the American, 'Bull...It doesn't' make any sense."  He added that Rocco Martino, an Italian intelligence source had tried to sell the forged documents to the French. The French were strongly against the war in 2002 and 2003. 

Polls of December 2005 asked Americans if Bush was telling the truth about WMD.  
Telling the entire truth -- 23%
Hiding something  -- 45%
Mostly lying -- 25%
Overall, 52% felt the Bush administration "intentionally misled" the public.

He added in his prime-time speech following the December 15 Iraqi elections, "We did not find those weapons.  It is true that Saddam Hussein had a history of pursuing and using WMD.  It is thru that he systematically concealed those programs, and blocked the work of UN weapons inspectors.  It is true that many nations belied that Saddam had WMD.  But much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong.  And as your president, I am responsible for the decision to go into Iraq.  Yet it was right to remove Saddam Hussein from power.  He was given an ultimatum--and he made his choice for war."

At his following press conference, the President was asked if faulty WMD intelligence hurts the US claims on Iran's nuclear ambitions.  "People will say...well, if the intelligence failed in Iraq, therefore now can we trust the intelligence in Iran?  It's not question that the credulity of intelligence is necessary for good diplomacy." 

During the summer of 2006 polls showed that the percent of Americans who thought Saddam had WMD before the war had actually increased. Now about 50% of Americans believe this falsehood, up from under 40%.

Who supplied WMD to Iraq in the '80s and '90s?  This is explored in pre-war FAQs. Many western and US companies were involved. News of December 2005 was of the first trial of a supplier  in a Dutch court.  The supplying of chemical made to weapons and used against Kurds was sentenced to 15 years in prison.  The Dutch businessman was complicit in war crimes, because he knew that the materials could be used to make lethal poison gas.  Halabja was part of a Saddam campaign that killed 5000 people. 

In June 2007, it was reported that, amazingly, the UN is still spending millions of dollars searching for Saddam's WMD.

WMD's were very infrequently in the news in 2007, compared to 2002 and 2003. However an Iraqi chemical weapon was actually found at the UN. The phosgene nerve gas had been stored at the inspection agency office. Phosgene was one of the chemicals used in World War I and by Saddam against the Kurds.