Should We Go (Have Gone) to War?:
Columnists Wavering on War
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1. What were the views of Thomas Friedman (New York Times)?
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At least four columnists in the Washington Post or New York Times had the wherewithal to admit they were not sure about going to war or not. Thomas Friedman, writing on every Thursday and Sunday in The New York Times, and focusing on foreign policy, seemed to support a war in the fall of 2002 for the democratization of the country and region, not because Hussein was a threat. |
For example, in his September 18 "Iraq Upside Down", Friedman wrote, "Don't believe the polls that a majority of Americans favor a military strike against Iraq. It's just not true...What is true is that most Americans are perplexed...'How come all of a sudden we have to launch a war against Saddam?'...Saddam has always been homicidal not suicidal...He loves life more than he hates us."
Yet, Friedman worries about nation building in "You Gotta Have Friends" (9/29/02). In "Thinking About Iraq I" (1/22/03) he suggests that regime change is critical and feels liberals underestimate this cause and effect of change in the Middle East. "What liberals fail to recognize is that regime change in Iraq is not some distraction from the war on Al Qaeda. This is a bogus argument. And simply because oil is at stake in Iraq doesn't make it illegitimate either...Although President Bush argues that the war in Iraq "is about disarmament--and that is legitimate--disarmament is not the most important prize here. Regime change is the prize." Friedman concludes. "...Liberating the captive people of the Mideast is a virtue in itself and because in today's globalized world, if you don't visit a bad neighborhood, it will visit you."
Then, in "Thinking About Iraq II" four days later (1/26/03), he considers post-war Iraq. "If and when we take the lid off Iraq, we will find an envelop inside. It will tell us what we have won and it will say one of two things...Congratulations! You've just won Arab Germany [with talent, natural resources, etc.]...or...You've just won the Arab Yugoslavia [divisions, hostilities, etc.] ...The conservatives and neocons, who have been pounding the table for war, should be alot more humble about this question, because they don't know either. Does that mean we should rule out war? No. But it does mean that we must do it right," which involves years of nation building. A progressive Iraq "is the only morally and strategically justifiable reason to support this war." He concludes that despite his reservation and "my gut telling me" to wait, "if war turns out to be the only option, then war it will have to be--because I believe that our kids will have a better chance of growing up in a safer world."
Later, in "Will The Neighbors Approve" (2/6/03) he speaks of "the incredibly narrow base of support that exists in America today for this audacious project...It is long-term, difficult, risky, costly, audacious project...It is one that will require a real nation-building commitment, and a real effort to stabilize the region by simultaneously promoting a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Is the Bush team up for all that? Is the nation up for all that? I'm not sure." See Friedman's columns archived. and see "Oil" FAQ section for more Friedman reaction.
Friedman's Feb. 12 contribution frets over occupation, allies, and timing. "It is worth doing only if we do it right...The allies also have a willful blind spot. There is no way their preferred outcome, a peaceful solution, can come about unless Saddam is faced with a credible, unified threat of force...The Bush talk that we can fight this war with just a 'coalition of the willing'--meaning Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia--is dangerous nonsense." Finally, on the timing of starting in March before the summer head, "The timing cannot be determined by the whether or the need to use troops just because they are there. You cannot launch a war this important now simply because it's going to be hot later. I would gladly trade a four-week delay today for four years of allied support after a war. I would much prefer a hot, legitimate, UN-approved war with the world on our side to a cols, less legitimate war that leaves us owning Iraq by ourselves."
Next came Friedman's "Tell the Truth" (2/19)
which reinforced that he wants to confront Hussein but do it right, "with
allies and staying power, and the Bush team has bungled that. The Bush
folks are big on attitude and weak on strategy and terrible at
diplomacy...[They] think diplomacy is a phone call." Europe is still
upset that Bush "trashed" the Kyoto Treaty. Friedman urges the administration
to "tell people the truth. Saddam does not threaten us today. He can
be deterred. Taking him out is a war of choice--but it's a legitimate
choice" for four reasons:
1. he is undermining the UN;
2. if left alone he will seek weapons to threaten his neighbors;
3. the people of Iraq deserve to be liberated;
4. a progressive state in Iraq could reform more of the Arab/Muslim world
because "angry young people who are attracted to radical Islam" are
the real WMD.
| Speaking of fear and terrorism in "My Survival Kit" (2/23) Friedman asked if there will be more attacks. "There will be. The question is whether we can survive them and still maintain an open society. What good is it to have Osama trapped in a basement somewhere if, just by simpering a few threats to Al Jazeeera TV, he can trap us in self-sealed rooms -with duck tape]?" |
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Again critical of the French in "The Gridlock Gang" (2/26), Freidman wrote, "The truth is, France is not interested in promoting egalite, fraternite, and liberte in the Mideast. It is primarily interested today in managing American power." Quoting from Mideast analyst Stephen Cohen, he adds, Arabs "'don't want to get rid of Saddam at the cost of being controlled by Americans'...When it comes to building democracy in Iraq, the European are uninterested, the Americans are hypocritical, and the Arabs are ambivalent." The democratization project to revolutionize Mideast political thinking would be the ultimate goal for Friedman. "If done right, the Mideast will never be the same. If done wrong, the world will never be the same."
Less than three weeks before the war began, Friedman wrote of the "presidential gamble" in "The Long Bomb." Examining lessons of history, he argued, "What you are about to see is the greatest shake of the dice any president has voluntarily engaged in since Harry Truman dropped the bomb on Japan. Vietnam was a huge risk, but it evolved, incrementally. And threatening a nuclear war with the Soviets over the Cuban missile crisis was a huge shake of the dice by [Kennedy] but it was a gamble that was imposed on him, not one he initiated. A U.S. invasion to disarm Iraq, oust Saddam Hussein and rebuild a decent Iraqi state would be the mother of all presidential gambles...Mr. Bush is betting his whole presidency on this war of choice."
Expressing his ambivalence directly, Friedman continued, "My dilemma is that while I believe in such a bold project, I fear that Mr. Bush has bailed to create a context for his boldness to succeed...I mean that if taking out Saddam and rebuilding Iraq had been my goal from the minute I took office (as it was for the Bush team), I would not have angered all of Europe by trashing the Kyoto global warming treaty without offering an alternative. I would not have alienated the entire Russian national security elite by telling the Russians that we were ripping up the ABM treaty and that they would just have to get used to it."
In the coming week Friedman continued to complain about eh lack of a threat from Hussein and the need for allies in rebuilding. "Fire, Ready, Aim"( 3/9) included: "Saddam Hussein has neither the intention nor the capability to threaten America, and is easily deterrable if he did. This war is not a war of necessity that was Afghanistan. Iraq is a war of choice...We need the word's permission--because of what it would take to rebuild Iraq...If we're alone, it will turn into a U.S. occupation and make us the target of everyone's frustration. And alone, Americans will not have the patience, manpower, and energy for nation-building which is not a sprint but a marathon." Still seeming to support a war overall, he added, "regime change in Iraq is the right choice...but for now, this choice may be just too hard to sell."
One week before the war, Thomas Friedman's column "Grapes of Wrath" included a discussion of allies and security. The "war of choice" is against a nation which "poses no direct threat to us today." Recalling an earlier column, he labeled Iraq "The Arab Yugoslavia." The president should be more concerned with energy independent, Arab-Israeli peace, environment, and the budget. He concludes, "If whatever is left of that post 9/11 solidarity is exploded in a divisive, unilateral war in Iraq, we will not only be sacrificing good feelings, but also the key to managing this complex, dangerous world" (3/12).
On the eve of war, Friedman was already focusing on postwar issues. His "Repairing the World" (3/16) contrasted Blair and bush, wishing that Blair would take over "leadership on the whole Iraq crisis." He wonders if the Bush team can "do it right." If so, democracy could come to the Middle East, if not, Bush may focus too much on the war on terrorism. Friedman concludes, "Once we set this Iraq crisis behind us, we need to get back to exporting our hopes, not just our fears."
"D-Day" was Friedman's March 19 column, just hours before the war started. He examined the "model" a new Iraqi government could be for the Middle East but is critical of Bush's diplomacy. "Though the Bush team came to office with this Iraqi project in mind, it has pursued a narrow, ideological and bullying foreign policy that has alienated so many people that by the time it wanted to rustle up a posse for an Iraq war, too many nations were suspicious of its motives."
2. Why was Richard Cohen wavering on war (Washington Post)?
| The transition of the views of the Post's Richard Cohen is interesting to study. Before Bush's UN speech, he was concerned with "the willingness of Washington to exaggerate the threat" ("War Without Evidence", 9/10/02), like Vietnam. "But what is the evidence that Iraq is preparing to launch an attack on the U.S.? There is none." |
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Nine days later in "Cooling as the Clock Ticks", Cohen cited a Gallup Poll which showed that "Many Americans have not yet caught on...53%...believe Saddam Hussein 'was personally involved in the [9/11] attacks'...The more time between windup and delivery, the more questions get raised. Since last September 11, a cause for war has become a cause to wonder" (9/18/02).
In mid-October ("Ready for War"), Cohen speaks of nukes and al Qaeda and openly explain his change of heart: "In the immediate aftermath of [9/11] , I felt, why wait? since then, I have questioned and probed, wondered, and worried, but my bottom line has not changed...war may be the only course."
Yet, even in late October's "Good Reasons Aren't Enough For bush", Cohen skepticism of the administration's evidence was palpable: "Both the president and his aides have exaggerated the Iraqi threat, creating links and evidence where they do not exist. Even before this war starts, its first victim has been truth". In Bush's claim that Hussein "in my judgment would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army", Cohen replies, "maybe in his judgment--but no really anyone else's . the "six months away from nukes" is not backed up by intelligence. "What's disturbing about the exaggerations is that they fertilize the growing paranoia of that must now [late October] be called the antiwar movement. Not since the Vietnam era have we seen the vilification of a president as a scoundrel and a liar--not to mention fool." Cohen concludes, "If American are going to die in Iraq, then the reasons for war cannot be embellished" (10/24/02).
In response to Cheney and Rice's concern that a WMD might someday reach the U.S. Cohen replies, "What's the proof 1.) that Saddam has such a weapon, 2.) that he has a means for delivering it, and 3.) that suicide of this sort is his intention." Cohen concludes, "But by its warnings without evidence, by its penchant for unilateralism and by its initial disregard for Congress, the Bush administration is sowing seeds of doubt. The palpable urge of this administration to go to war is, at this moment, just downright inexplicable. It either is failing to make its case, or, worse, has no case to make. I'm ready for war--but just tell me again why". In late January's "Bush, the Bad Guy", Cohen criticized Europe for their excessive anti-Americanism (1/28).
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However, Cohen did eventually become more ready for war by February. For example, in "Winning Hand for Powell" (2/6), Cohen writes, "Iraq not only hasn't accounted for its [WMD] but without a doubt still retains them. Only a fool or possibly a Frenchman could conclude otherwise...Here was a reasonable man making a reasonable case." Cohen concludes that doing nothing is "a dire consequence." |
Cohen's' first March contribution looked again at the pros and cons for going to war. "Now we are on the verge of war with Iraq. Bush has given his reason--some of them good, some of them not so good. In general, I have been supportive, but I am left with the uneasy feeling that something is being left unsaid. Sometimes I have to wonder what sort of bee this president has in his bonnet. Let me be precise. One of the reasons for getting rid of Hussein was supposedly his dogged desire for Iraq to become a nuclear power...But UN inspectors have come up with no evidence that Iraq is producing nuclear weapons...If, in the end, it turns out that Hussein is the threat Bush says he is, then war is the right choice."
Responding to the Pope and Jimmy Carter's March calls against an unjust war, and sounding Friedmanesque at times, Cohen's bottom line is that he wants Hussein out of power. ("When Peace Is Not Better Than War", 3/11). He realizes that American troops have brought back the inspectors. He grants that in this run-up to war the Bush administration has "slipped, stumbled, and fallen on its face. It has advanced untenable, unproven arguments. It has oscillated from disarmament to regime change to bringing demo cay to the Arab world. It has linked Hussein with al Qaeda when no such link has been established. It has warned of an imminent Iraqi nuclear program, when, it seems, that's not the case. And it has managed, in a tour de force of inept diplomacy, to alienate much of the world, including some of our traditional allies."
Cohen's eve of war contribution to the Post, "We Still Need Allies", (3/18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42837-2003Mar17?language=printer), urged the French to "butt out...because Hussein kills Iraqis everyday...he threatens us all." Cohen still worries that Bush is overconfident, especially "inelegant" diplomatically. He is concerned that Bush better be right. "I have always thought this war was worth fighting, and at the same time I have always feared tis consequences. If things go badly for a while, the U.S. will need France--if not as an ally, then at least as a silent partner." If Cheney is "simply mouthing off" on the nuclear threat, "Bush must someday be held to account."
Through July 2003, Cohen continued to write often about Iraq (See "P.S." FAQ section).
3. How did David Ignatius feel about the coming war? (Washington Post)?
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David Ignatius of the Post wrote more often about Iraq as we came into 2003. |
He concludes "The Read on Wolfowitz" (1/16/03) with an admission that "the hardest nut for me to crack--the risk that a war fought to preempt [WMD] could trigger the use of those very weapons. The CIA director, George Tenet, has warned of this danger. President Bush and his advisers shouldn't feel [bad] if they want to think this conundrum through very carefully before taking final action."
Ignatius' "Salesmanship in a Skeptical World" (1/28) suggests that giving the inspectors another month "is harmless" for three reasons: it give Hussein "more rope with which to hang himself. And it would allow the Bush Administration more time to sell its Iraq policy to a skeptical world. Even at home, the administration has not yet made a persuasive case for war."
Two weeks later Ignatius starts to commit to war: "My own gut tells me that this is a war worth fighting." (1/31/03).
Drawing historical parallels in the weeks before war, is "Get Ready for the American Ninjas" (2/25). He is still confident that "the Iraq war is just and defensible...but the administration efforts to rally support for war have been demonstrably inept, and Rumsfeld has been a principal culprit...Rumsfled increasingly reminds me of a previous secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara...Because they were so confident in their grand designs, neither man really understood the need to build broad public support for war."
International support or isolation? Which path will the president proceed down. "Perils of Isolation" (2/28) examines three diplomatic test of early March that would answer this question. Ignatius explains the Palestinian-Israeli road map, obtaining a second resolution, and bring Russia on board.
"Perhaps this is a war like Vietnam," wrote Ignatius in his March 14 "In the Gulf, Quiet Anticipation." The war would be fought with "a fuzzy mix of Wilsonian idealism and realpolitic--to prove that America is tough enough to fight a bigger, more important one elsewhere. In the case of Vietnam, America wanted to show that we would stand up to the Soviet Union in Europe. In the case of Iraq, President Bush many want to show that America is tough and powerful enough to vanquish any who dare to topple our skyscrapers."
Ignatius's eve of war piece "A New Iraq, A New Arab World" opens with the author pondering, "What is the justification for American's war against Iraq?"...I still have trouble with President Bush's rationale about preventing the use of WMD" but "I cannot escape the impressions I formed of Hussein in 1980" of torture and intimation. "I know American holped create Saddam Hussein' that's part of why I think we have a moral obligation now to help the Iraq's oust him."
Two days later, writing from Kuwait City, Ignatius quotes a warning from a Kuwait editor in chief. "From the day the war starts, the Americans will look lie heroes. But from the day Saddam is toppled, you are no more the liberators" but an occupying army. Ignatius worries about the economics of reconstructions and the the postwar planning "has no soul--no sense of the Arab need for dignity and self-determination" ("Rebuilding A Nation's Dignity", 3/20, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A57331-2003Mar19?language=printer ).
4. Why was E.J. Dionne wavering? (Washington Post)?
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E.J. Dionne, Jr. of The Post also received the self-proscribed label of "waverer" in "Listen To the Doubters". |
After the State of the Union speech Dionne thinks "Bush still has a problem that goes beyond style." We don't know if this war is primarily about WMD, regime change, or bringing democracy to Iraq and "reviving the politics of the Middle East...The best case for this war may be the humanitarian case...The administration is willing to grasp whatever evidence it can get it hands on the justify a course that seems to have been set long ago." particularly the al Qaeda link. "Bringing al Qaeda back into the picture whenever the polls show sagging public support does nothing to build trust." Dionne labels himself a "doubter" mostly because of concerns about "winning the peace...Like many Americans, I do not feel fully comfortable in either of the big camps lined up against each other over this war. what are the "long term costs" of the war, he wondered.
Dionne's "Wrong Way to Do the Right Thing" (3/11) echoed some of the same ambivalent views as Friedman and Cohen and examined the inevitability of war from early on. In September 2002 Dionne had seen the administration policy as "Rumsfeld's policy in a Powell package" but hoped he was wrong. "But events of the past few weeks [UN, weapons inspectors] suggest that Bush knew all along he was going Cheney and Rumsfeld's way. He intended to make war on Saddam Hussein under almost all circumstances. Short of Hussein's removal or abdication...Bush's problem is that when he sought UN support last fall, he was looking for a marriage of convenience, not a commitment. The administration never expected inspections to work--and many in its ranks clearly hoped they wouldn't....In political terms, Bush's approach was brilliant. By going to the UN in September, Bush disarmed many Democrats who would not vote against the president at a moment when he was seeking UN support. The president won himself a virtual blank check from Congress to proceed as he wished."
Dionne wishes not to just blame France but the American "grand theory" which sees" unfettered American power as capable of remaking the world. That's certainly bold. It's also dangerous." Dionne concludes, "The paradox is that creating the more democratic world we week requires more than power. It demands alliances, institutions, and trust. Doing the right thing the wrong way for the wrong reasons could squander all three."
In August of 2003 Dionne looked back at Cheney's
accusations and Wolfowitz' misestimates.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A29303-2003Aug21?language=printer
Before the war, recalls Dionne, Cheney was asked by Tim Russert on Meet
The Press , "If your analysis is not correct and we're not treated as
liberator but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in
Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly,
bloody, battle with significant American casualties." The Vice President
replied that he felt it wouldn't turn out that way because, according to
Dionne, his sources (mostly those outside Iraq) "said what the administration
wanted to hear."
5. What were the views of David Broder? (Washington Post)?
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The Post's veteran columnist David Broder, who usually focuses on domestic issues, joined the "waverers" a week before the war in "Bush's Minimalist Mantra." |
Broder was concerned with Bush's most recent press conference. "Whatever he was asked, Bush reiterated the almost formulaic set of propositions that leave him convinced, as he put it, that if Saddam Hussein 'should be disarmed, and he's not going to disarm, there's only one way to disarm him' war...What the news conference revealed was his extraordinary capacity to reject any efforts to put this matter in any broader context--his ability to simplify what otherwise would be a wrenching decision...[his] rhetoric... sounds scripted."
Broder's eve of war contribution,
"Step by Step to War" focuses on the inevitability of the
war. "When historians have access to the memoirs and diaries of the
Bush administration's insiders, it's likely they will find that President Bush
set his sighs on removing Saddam Hussein from power soon after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks --if not before." Broder continues, Looking back at the
policy of preemption, "the major landmarks of the past year appears to have
been carefully designed to leave no alterative but war with Iraq--or an unlikely
capitulation and abdication by Hussein...It quickly became clear that Iraq had
been chosen as the test case of the new doctrine" of preemption.
Developments in the fall were "handled with considerable political skill
and produced the desired results. The inspectors arrived, the buildup of
military forces in the Persian Gulf began. But what was not anticipated
was the scale of the opposition to preemptive war in counties that had appeared
to agree with the principles Bush had enunciated." So, with fewer
allies that the U.S. had hoped for, there is an increase in "the risks and uncertainties
of what promised in any case to be al long, difficult and dangerous reconstruction
process in postwar Iraq."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42836-2003Mar17?language=printer